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A Comparative Thematic Analysis of Newspaper Articles in France after the Bataclan and in the United States of America after Pulse

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A Comparative Thematic Analysis of Newspaper Articles in France after the Bataclan and in the United
States of America after Pulse

by

Simon Rousset

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, especially my parents, Nathalie and Dominique, and my sister, Mathilde. Your encouragement, support, and unconditional love have always been my source of inspiration and guiding force throughout this entire process. I also dedicate this dissertation to my nephew Marius, born when I was reaching a turning point in the dissertation.

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ABSTRACT

This project interrogates unequal power relations that underlie newspaper representation of terrorism and reinforced Orientalism discourse following the 13 November 2015 mass murders in Saint-Denis and Paris, France, and following the 12 June 2016 mass shooting in Orlando, Florida, United States of America (U.S.A.). It was not surprising to bear witness to the ways national media took hold of these major socio-political events. These events, and the stories that have been published about them, are interpreted through the prism of terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism, in the sense that the media tend to transcribe the shock of the attacks as a sounding board that freezes in time not only collective emotions, but also moral concerns based on a certain perception of those responsible for these acts.

Using comparative thematic analysis, the events and their representation in the national press as terrorism are critically engaged in this dissertation. Rooted in critical cultural studies, political theory, and international and intercultural communication, this project analyzes articles in French published by two national newspapers the week following the attacks in Saint-Denis and Paris, France, from 13 to 20 November 2015, by *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* and articles published the week following the attacks in Orlando, Florida, so from 12 to 19 June 2016, by *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. These days were selected because they offer an understanding of representational strategies used by newspapers to instantiate these events.

This project ultimately contributes to the study of how media frame terrorism following these terrorist events, what meanings are assigned to identity, and the place of people who are

traditionally marginalized within contemporary articulation of terrorism. I contend that news reinforced Orientalism in a construction of "folk devils" that often turns out to be disproportionate in the face of the global threat. France and the U.S.A. are then constantly presented in a Western continuum that finds the West threatened by a common enemy. This dissertation seeks to understand who benefits from the acts of terrorism and how examining media reports through the lens of moral panic provides auto-generative mechanisms and platforms for additional media and political attention and subsequent terrorist acts. These findings encourage scholars to consider the multiplicity of ways that Orientalism is reified despite strong calls to unity.

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

On the night of Friday, 13 November 2015, bombs started exploding in a suburban city north of Paris, France, by a stadium where an international soccer game between France and Germany took place. The suicidal bombings that started in Saint-Denis, France, triggered a series of other attacks from another group of perpetrators who struck in multiple places in downtown Paris as mass shootings started being reported by people at coffee shops, bars, and restaurants. This series of attacks ended at the Bataclan concert hall where people attending a concert were being held hostage by a third group of attackers, many of whom were killed on site. That night, 139 people died, including the perpetrators, and hundreds of other people were injured.

A few months later, on the night between Saturday, 11 June 2016, and Sunday, 12 June 2016, gunshots were fired inside the Pulse nightclub not long before closing time at one of the most inclusive gay nightclubs in Orlando, Florida, a traditionally conservative state and region in the U.S.A. Patrons and employees who, for the most part, identified with the Queer Latin experience of people living in the community surrounding Pulse, were trapped inside the club for hours, held hostage at gunpoint by a single perpetrator, Omar Mateen, who identified himself in a call to 9-1-1 operators shortly after the beginning of the attack. Some hostages were shot and injured. People died from the bullets of both Mateen and the police. Survivors of the attack, bystanders, and hostages fled outside onto the streets to search for help as soon as alerts of the

attack were posted on the social media profile of the nightclub. In less than four hours before Mateen was cornered and killed by officers that night, 49 people were killed and 58 wounded.

In these two events, the signification of a strong nation was presented at prey with terrorism. In the minutes that followed the first of many 13 November 2015 attacks, "#prayforParis" became one of the (if not the number one) trending hashtag on Instagram (Laurent, 2015). A "Safety Check" option was even made available for users of Facebook, a featured deployed for the first time in the case of human-caused disaster (Schafer et al., 2019). The multiple levels of images, information, organization, and compassion shared on social media, made available to online users as either one of the attacks were still unfolding, indicated a lot about the power of social media to represent such acts. It was not surprising to observe, at the time, the inflammatory social media accounts intertwine or contradict the live coverage of both events. One of the precursors in bringing violence inside households since the first and early 1990s Gulf War, namely the infamous multinational broadcast news agency based in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A., the 24/7 Cable News Network (CNN), rapidly instantiated each one of the events.¹ Its not-so-for-profit counterpart owned entirely by the nation-state of France, France24, also instantiated both of the acts with a privileged attention to archiving news produced about the 13 November 2015 attacks. The mediatization of coordinated or isolated acts of mass murders has traditionally relied on the inescapable journalistic logic of answering the "who, what, where, when, how, why" questions by amplifying stories told in response by first responders, survivors, witnesses, and other possible targets. Media representation has traditionally placed readers in such an immersive experience, according to Garcin-Marrou and Hare (2019), that the readers

¹For an updated version of the immersive account published live as media coverage of the 13 November 2015 attacks on CNN, see Almasy et al. (2015). For the same live coverage about the 12 June 2016 attacks, see Fantz et al. (2016).

might find themselves almost automatically immersed in, "*une position spectatorielle paradoxale, le plongeant dans le chaos post-tuerie mais l'en extirpant également par la distance (imposée aussi par les forces de sécurité)*" (p. 161), a passage that reads in English as such, "a paradoxical spectatorial position, plunging it [the reader] into post-killing chaos but also extirpating it [the reader] by distance (also imposed by security forces)" (p. 161). This dissertation is therefore attentive to the immersive experience that invites the reader to assume this paradoxical spectatorial position, especially since presidents and other public officials have increasingly occupied centerstage of media representation following these acts (Guigo, 2019).

In response to the 13 November 2015 attacks, then-president of the French Republic François Hollande gave a public address deploring the "horror" and urging people to consider that "*[f]ace à la terreur, la France doit être forte, elle doit être grande et les autorités de l'Etat fermes, nous le serons*" (Cornevin et al., 2015). This passage literally translates as, "In the face of terror, France must remain strong, and the state authorities remain firm, we will be." Once again having to face the threat posed by terrorism a few months after Charlie Hebdo, the executive branch of the government is presented again in a demonstration of strength, in the sense that the dominant responses to the acts in the public sphere and the instantiation of the January 2015 attacks as terrorism in the media, reverberated a demonstration of state monopoly on violence (Weber, 1963/1919).

In the wake of the 12 June 2016 attacks, then-president of the U.S.A. Barack H. Obama deplored "an act of terror and an act of hate" before inviting people to come "united [...] to defend our people (Obama, as cited in "Read President," 2016). Obama further declared that the attack at Pulse is "an attack on all of us and on the fundamental values of equality and dignity that define us as a country [...] the values that make us Americans" ("Read President," 2016).

With Obama nearing the end of his presidential term, the Presidential candidates at the time used the attacks in their campaign strategy. For example, Donald J. Trump reacted to the attacks by demanding that Obama name the source of the attacks as “radical Islam” before suggesting a travel ban on Muslims. Hillary Clinton’s comments on the attacks supported Obama’s stance, calling for national unity. Newspaper reports of the Pulse attacks mention the “horror” that adds up to a series of other violent attacks imprinted in the nation’s recent past (Shear, 2016). The “horror” of the Pulse shooting saturated media with media pundits, politicians, and others who coined the attack as one of the deadliest since 11 September 2001 (called 9/11 thereon) a tragic comparison that was later overshadowed by the shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 2017. Comparisons to 9/11 and more recent events, like the 2 December 2015 attacks in San Bernardino, California, were used to frame the Pulse shooting and revived debates about gun control, immigration, and violence.

At the time of the attacks, a co-investigator and I were already investigating the dominant discourse unfolding in the responses to the 7 January 2015 attacks of Charlie Hebdo headquarters and the 9 January 2015 hostage situation at a Kosher supermarket that took place in France. We were specifically interested in interpreting the post-Charlie events as terrorism by deconstructing the dominant responses to the acts through the lens of social drama sequences (Rousset & Maret, 2016). This lens interrogates the socio-cultural repercussions of events that breached societal expectations about violence. We had concluded by interrogating the paradoxes of recourse to secularism in the wake of the January 2015 events and the stigmatization of Muslims in France, and arguably in the U.S.A., that underlined the injunction to *be* Charlie. *"La responsabilité collective de la non-intégration d'individus (les terroristes) dans la communauté nationale revient paradoxalement à un groupe plus restreint stigmatisé et réifié (la communauté*

musulmane)," Rousset and Maret (2016) explained about the paradox of secularism in France post-Charlie. A passage that translates best in English as followed, "the collective responsibility for the non-integration of individuals (terrorists) into the national community paradoxically falls on a smaller stigmatized and reified group (the Muslim community). "*Les dominés*," they continued, "*étant dans ce cas bien spécifique les responsables sous-entendus d'un acte qu'ils n'ont pas commis*" (Rousset & Maret, 2016, p. 247), or "The dominated being, in this very specific case, those responsible for an act that they did not commit."

Secularism, as a taken-for-granted term often used to denote the separation of church and state, refers to the political discourse that has shifted drastically in the turn of the twenty-first century as,

a discourse about the articulation of the sovereign identity of Western European nation-states" with at its heart an articulation of "racialized gender [...] a problem of difference that is not external to the national body, but whose conceptualization nonetheless affects the way all outsiders are perceived, how their handling of differences of sex and sexuality establish their place on the evolutionary scale of civilization. (Scott, 2018, p. 24)

In the address to the nation broadcasted moments after the attacks, however, Hollande appealed to principles of *laïcité* – French articulation of secularism – implicitly. The president announced the decision by the political body to reactivate the state of emergency, which stands for the state of exception that grants greater administrative power to people who have the authority to restrain liberties by imposing the closure of certain places and prohibiting demonstrations among other security measures. Some news reports even mentioned that the French colonial past and its contemporary deployment of secular values in reaction to the January 2015 attacks constituted a fertile ground for the "djihadistes" behind the 13 November

2015 attacks. Perpetrators who “*jouent, avec un plaisir pervers, sur les fractures sociales et identitaires francaises,*” a passage which translates as: “plays, with a perverse pleasure, on the French social and identity fractures” (Barthe & Guibert, 2015). The numerous comparisons made to the Charlie Hebdo events saturated newspaper reports that described the “scenario” that once again plunged the nation into a state of horror.

Following Hall’s (1992) claim that “media play a part in the formation, in the constitution, of the things that they reflect,” or “the discourses of representation” (p. 14), this project interrogates the discursive practices of representation unfolding in these two specific attacks. Each of these events was perceived and coined by politicians and represented in the media at the time as a series of “unprecedented” events in the history of France (Nossiter & Goldstone, 2015) and the “worst mass shooting” in the history of the U.S.A. (Stack, 2016). These events were selected for analysis for the apparent similarity in the insistence by news editors to coin these attacks as such, that is, “unprecedented,” which would suggest a common injunction to *exceptionality* for nation-states that operate under different conditions.

This project contends that such a dominant way of interpreting terrorist events is not new, especially since 9/11, and even more so since the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France. Yet, the dominant interpretation of the Bataclan and Pulse massacres and the unfolding media spectacle about terrorism underlie deeper cultural issues that permeates the everyday “*quotidien*” of people in France and in the U.S.A. today.² This project attends to the discourse of representation introduced in Hall’s methodological approach by analyzing national newspaper articles with the highest national readership at home, with a high visibility online, with easily accessibility even if

² According to the *Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales*, a comprehensive French dictionary, *quotidien* refers both to what takes place on a daily basis and to the news press published every day in France about current events.

one were to buy a newspaper in Relay© street kiosks – that is, those newsstands one might encounter after going through the security control processes found in many airports in France and probably in the U.S.A. as well (Balbastre & Kergoat, 2011). This global outreach, even for national newspapers, offers a unique vantage point for a critical intervention from scholarships found in communication, culture, and identity.

This intervention connects media reports, cultural understandings of events, and identity. For many people, identity is the fluid discursive formation of the Self, an “emotionally charged” understanding of the self always in relation to other people; an embodiment of multiple selves who always understand the self/selves within the cultural fabric of societies. That is to say, identity is a communicative process. It is common to assume that people constantly attempt to make sense of a shared lived reality. The goal of this project is to understand how communication – as the “symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed” (Carey, 1989, p. 8; see also Fassett & Warren, 2015) – intervenes in the understanding of power that shapes the cultural terrain following the Bataclan and Orlando attacks.

In understanding power dynamics and how communication constitutes identities in cultural mediated realities, the main topic is terrorism. By analyzing articles published the week following the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, by *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* and articles published the week following the attacks in Orlando on 12 June 2016 by *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, this project interrogates (inter)national press coverage of terrorism in the so-called West. Said (2004) urged consideration of Orientalism – commonly understood in the field of cultural studies as the set of discursive practices that have traditionally pitted East and West and that have posited people from the East as Oriental Others (Barker, 2012) – as an

appropriate lens because it “is very much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of contemporary history,” “when the mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust and resurgent self-pride and arrogance [...] are very large-scale enterprises” (Said, 2004, p. 870). This project turns to Orientalism as a framework to understand the underlying issues of identity, representation, and violence by analyzing how national newspaper articles reveal the underlying discourses and politics of two events that happened in two different nation-states.

The events selected for this study are chosen among other events that appeared to have breached the boundaries of Western societal values and morals, like the Charlie Hebdo attacks (January 2015), the failed attacks on the Thalys train in between Paris and Brussels (August 2015), the attacks at a regional administrative center in San Bernardino, California (December 2015), the truck rampage on the *promenade des anglais* in Nice, France (July 2016), the shooting at a concert in Las Vegas, Nevada (October 2017), to recall a few tragic events that marked the latest part of histories of France and the U.S.A. This study deconstructs terrorism in the news by tracing the role of media in making Muslims to be the culprit, always and already operating outside and in opposition to Western universalist ideals of freedom, and thus a marker of difference for the enactment of secular assimilationist policies (Jansen, 2013) that have been the center of debates in the public spheres of France and the U.S.A. since before 9/11.

The critical approach to Orientalism offered by Said becomes the theoretical lens to understand these trends, and to de-center the Western-centric assumptions that underlie contemporary terrorism discourse about identity and communication. Considered to be a leading postcolonial theory for the ways Said challenged traditional canons of Western scholarship, media, and literature that have constructed the image of Arabs and Muslims in dehumanizing ways, Orientalism is used in this dissertation to deconstruct terrorism. Situating news press

articulation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks within contemporary discursive practices of Orientalism, this study examines how newspapers perpetuated the mythological and essentialist distinctions between people from superior, progressive, liberal, and enlightened Western societies pitted against the inferior, backwards, barbaric, and uneducated non-Western societies. The main concerns that motivated this dissertation were how the identity of the perpetrators of both the 13 November 2015 and the 12 June 2016 attacks was represented in dominant responses by politicians and media pundits as “radical Islamic” terrorists, or *islamistes* in French news, because of revendications or demands made by and for the Islamic State during or after the attacks. The focus on the identity of the perpetrators as being from “over there”, coupled with the use of the language of the war on terror that depicted Muslims as culprits, that associated Islam with terrorism, and conflated counterterrorism policies with immigration, underlined how Orientalism could be reified dogmatically, “that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared [...] or to be controlled” (Said, 1978, p. 301).

This dissertation stems out of concerns for the ways in which laws, policies, and regulations have constructed people who identify as Muslim, or who are identified as such, as the target of racializing practices. Specifically, what drives this study are concerns about the surveillance practices and policies that have targeted Muslims in France under the state of emergency since the Bataclan, and the anti-Muslim political agenda pushed by Trump with the call for a travel ban – a call that was later turned into an executive order upheld by the Supreme Court (2017, February 7) – in the U.S.A. By deconstructing news representation of terrorism through the lens of Orientalism, this project seeks to better understand the transnational continuities and discontinuities of colonial legacies that continue to shape communication about religion, national identity, race, and sexuality in contemporary France and in the U.S.A. Drawing

from Orientalism to deconstruct newspaper representation of terrorism in France and the U.S.A. also allows this project to respond to the call by scholars in cultural studies and communication to deconstruct Orientalizing discourses that articulate Muslim and Arab as one and the same, because “in today’s post 9/11 context, the War on Terror racializes Muslims as brown threats” (Yousuf & Calafell, 2018, p. 314).

Summary and Statement of Sensitizing Questions

To summarize this dissertation, the goals are threefold. First, this project seeks to understand the significance of acts that challenged the authority of a nation-state in the use of legitimate violence. Second, this project interrogates newspaper representation of terrorism following these acts that breached societal expectations about the use of political violence. Third, this project challenges the reinforcement of Orientalism by studying what terrorism means and how cultural identities are constituted communicatively in two specific national contexts. More specifically attentive to this latter and more specific purpose, the dissertation project deconstructs Orientalism by comparing themes in media reports that underlie unequal power relations within the contemporary cultural politics of contested and misrepresented Eastern-Western identities and the set of antagonistic relationships that are instantiated in the backdrop of terrorist episodes and their aftermath. As Orientalism is constructed discursively and materially in mediated contexts, one part of the second goal (mentioned above) is to determine how codes and languages made salient in the analysis of national newspaper strike this deeper logic related to Orientalism.

In light of these three goals, this project contributes theoretically and practically to the role of media in constructions of cultural identities of nation states informed by Orientalism. Specifically, this project pays attention to questions related to issues about identity made salient

in the analysis of news discourse. It is possible to witness how media narratives about the perpetrators are constructed in ways that revive a certain hostility towards people responsible for the acts as folk devils, defined as the scapegoats (Cohen, 2002), which then are also embedded in the amalgam between immigration and terrorism. These narratives allow scholars and practitioners to better understand how France and the U.S.A. are always and already presented in a Western-centric continuum that presents itself as threatened by a common enemy. We also address the war-like security discourse that saturated the news as an element that contributed to increasing concerns about the terrorist threat and expectations in terms of public policy. We make visible the paradox with which the press and political authorities are confronted. This paradox lies between unity and distinctions, consensus and dissensus, belonging and exclusion. In other words, the paradox operates between the consensus on “the need to come together” and the explicit and symbolic relegation of people who are Muslims (or identified as such) and/or people who identify with a “fluid” sexual identity (in the case of the shooting in Pulse) and who are already often marginalized (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2019; Puar, 2017; Welch, 2004). This rhetoric appears throughout the documents analyzed even though the sense of belonging (especially towards the "nation") is also promulgated as a bulwark against "radicalization" and possible actions.

To develop this contribution, this project attends to the following questions as entrée points into the media texts about terrorism. These questions are sensitizing frames: (1) How do national newspapers in the U.S.A. deploy the notion of terrorism the week following the 12 June 2016 attacks at Pulse nightclub in Orlando? and (2) How do national newspapers in France deploy the notion of terrorism the week following the 13 November 2015 attacks at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris? Examining the answers to these questions then enables study of the main

research question (RQ): In what ways do national newspapers in France and the U.S.A. reinforce Orientalism? This research question both extends the theoretical underpinnings of Orientalism as a framework to understand the historic specificity of terrorism in the media today and serves to highlight the assumptions about terrorist acts as working in isolation from or parallel to the doing of nation-states.

In addition to addressing issues related to terrorism in the media, this examination of newspaper articles contributes to the field of critical cultural studies in communication in several ways by deconstructing newspaper codes and conventions used to construct terrorism, and by offering a comparative analysis of national newspaper articles respectively published in France about the Bataclan attacks and in the U.S.A. about the Pulse attacks.

Overview of Chapters

The dissertation opens with a review of the literature on terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism in the media (Chapter Two). This section offers the theoretical background of this project anchored in critical cultural studies, political theory, and international and intercultural communication scholarships. The interdisciplinarity of this project is inspired by anglophone and francophone studies that challenge dominant understandings of identity, communication, and culture. I continue with the methodological foundation for a comparative thematic analysis of newspaper articles (Chapter Three).

The first analytical chapter (Chapter Four) investigates the representation of the attacks that ended at the Bataclan. I begin with an analysis of narratives published by the newspapers about the perpetrators of the attacks. These narratives work to fuel a sentiment of hostility against people who identify as Muslims or who are identified as such. I continue by analyzing

how the description of the events and the dominant responses by politicians, media pundits, and other moral entrepreneurs like police officers and investigators published in French newspapers, vehicle justifications for the prolongation of a state of emergency. I contend that the war-like discourse post-Bataclan is a central theme of newspaper representation. A set of accounts that speak to a growing fear in France and the necessity to face the threat posed by terrorism. I conclude by analyzing the ways in which news media make of the desire by some to stigmatize Muslims in France as undeniable in the face of terror.

In the second analytical chapter (Chapter Five) I analyze the articles published by the two national newspapers about terrorism in the U.S.A. post-Pulse. I begin with an analysis of the description of the attacks that marked an incomprehension. I pay specific attention to the ways newspapers make sense of the dominant responses to the Pulse attack by politicians a central theme. A way for readers to feel concerned, worried, and seized with a need to make dominant responses by people like then-presidential candidate Trump a plausible reality at all times for everyone. I continue by examining the amplification by media of what comes across as a rush on the part of the police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and politicians, to rationalize the motives of the perpetrator.

The third analytical chapter (Chapter Six) draws out differences and similarities between newspaper accounts of the events in France and in the U.S.A. I begin with an observation of similarities between the national press in France and the U.S.A., which relay dominant discourse marked by incomprehension and difficulties in defining a problem which is nevertheless condemned. It appears that hostile discursive tendencies reinforce the climate of fear. One of the main differences, between the dominant discourses in response to the Bataclan attacks and those in response to the Pulse attack, is the volatile effect of panic. Indeed, post-Bataclan rhetoric seem

to be anchored in the long term and the media convey justifications for the enactment and prolongation of the state of emergency. In the U.S.A., the effects of panic wear off much faster over time. This temporal difference is observed by the attempted and unsuccessful passage of a law to prevent the purchase of firearms from people appearing on “watch lists” (Corso, 2017). I conclude by interrogating the media appeal to people who identify or are identified as Muslims to testify on the presidential candidacy, for example. From a critical point of view of Orientalism, this way of narrating the lived experience of Muslims in the U.S.A. supports the dualistic hypothesis characteristic of Orientalist discourses according to which there is a "good" and a “bad” Muslim (Maira, 2009; Mamdani, 2002).

In the concluding chapter (Chapter Seven), I discuss the findings before offering insights into the implications of this research project. I conclude with a reflexive understanding of limitations and a discussion hopefully useful for future projects.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The influences of Hall and Said on this research project are significant for the understanding of research about language and communication in newspaper representation of terrorism. The transformative calls from the Birmingham tradition in cultural studies (Hall et al., 1980) invite an interrogation of the articulations of oppressive policing practices in nation-states by studying newspaper articles. In a sense, this dissertation project aims to contribute to the more contemporary call for the study of newspaper representation of terrorism through the lens of moral panic sequences conceptualized under the aegis of Hall. This allows me to address events that constituted a breach in contemporary society and to investigate the role of newspapers in the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse post-Bataclan and post-Pulse.

In this section of my project, I begin by exploring the history of terrorism research and the tensions in the definitions of the phenomenon before looking at how terrorism research focuses on terrorism in the media as a moment of moral panic, or the role played by media in the construction of an image of “folk devils” disproportionate to the global threat (Cohen, 2002). As mentioned earlier in the cases of the Bataclan and Pulse, the perpetrators were identified as Muslims far removed from the norms and values of societies in France and the U.S.A. It is important to consider such stunning events because, taken as a whole, these events underlie the way “folk devils” have cultivated panic (Walsh, 2017). After this conceptual discussion, I focus on terrorism in the media and the underlying issues of violence related to representation and

identity. If this dissertation focuses on the role of media in perpetuating the panic for the week that followed the Bataclan and Pulse shooting, it contends that the dominant discourses and moral panic dynamics can be traced back to historical processes that have been a trademark of the societies being studied here.

At the time of the 2016 attacks in Orlando, Trump was a candidate to become the next president of the U.S.A. This is what he said after the incident:

The bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America in the first place, was because we allowed his family to come here [...]. We have a dysfunctional immigration system, which does not permit us to know who we let into our country, and it does not permit us to protect our citizens properly.

(Donald J. Trump address on the Pulse attacks, in Beckwith, 2016)

Trump's response to the Pulse attack is making reference to the shooter's nationality as Afghan and shows how such political discourse functions to marginalize Brown bodies. The argument states that the reason why Mateen perpetrated the attacks in Orlando is because his parents immigrated to the U.S.A. Mateen's father, who had fled Afghanistan after the invasion of the Soviet Union and who moved to the U.S.A. in the early 1980s, became the focus of attention after the shooting for posting social media commentaries about current political issues in Afghanistan (Torbaty & Landay, 2016). In addition, Trump's call dismisses the fact that the perpetrator identifies as a person from the U.S.A., by using "us/we" as different from him/they (his parents). Not only does Trump's speech perpetuate the dichotomous "us" vs. "them" peculiar to orientalist discursive practices – that I later describe - it also supports Silva's (2016) claim that contemporary issues underlying the topic of terrorism in the media further alienates Brown bodies in "the language of security and securitization," that "becomes the basic

terminology of rights and citizenships” (p. 5). I argue that terrorism in the media contributes to the production of a culture of anxiety that subjectifies Black and Brown bodies, particularly individuals who might self-identify as queers of color, following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks.

Terrorism Discourse in France and the U.S.A.

To understand terrorism in the media, this project begins by addressing the numerous contradictions found in the definitions being given of the term “terrorism” in French and English. I begin with the authoritative sources for everyday usages of the term terrorism before paying attention to how scholars defined the term. The Oxford English Dictionary lists French as the etymon to define terrorism in English. OED first defines the term by tracing its roots back from the use of terror during the Revolution and the symbol of political violence. A contradiction emerged when examining other definitions. Specifically, a contradiction lies in the second understanding of terrorism that OED defines as: The unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims; (originally) such practices used by a government or ruling group (frequently through paramilitary or informal armed groups) to maintain its control over a population; (now usually) such practices used by a clandestine or expatriate organization as a means of furthering its aims.

This contradiction is particularly evident when one stops to question whether there exists an official or authorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. It is not surprising to find a similar ambiguity in the French definitions found on the *Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales* (CNRTL). However, a difference in defining terrorism can be found when terrorism and terror are used as an analogy in literature and the arts (e.g., “intellectual terrorism”). Intellectual terrorism stands for the set of practices aimed to intimidate

or limit the distribution of ideas perceived as embarrassing ("Terrorisme," 2021). However, the definition itself is not the issue per se. It simply highlights a contemporary paradox in society. The point is to interrogate--in conducting a comparison of two thematic analyses of national responses to two historically, specific, and *exceptional* events--where the responsibility associated with terrorism is attributed. The issues in defining the term terrorism become, as Dubuisson (2017) demonstrates, how nation-states apply different legal variations to the term. The notion of terrorism becomes symbolic when nation-states like France or the U.S.A.:

souhaitent l'exclure de manière radicale pour des modes d'actions qu'ils estiment légitimes par principe, qu'il s'agisse de l'usage de leurs forces armées pour les Etats les plus puissants, ou de l'exercice du droit des peuples à l'autodétermination, pour les Etats issus de la décolonisation. (Dubuisson, 2017, p. 31)

The English translation of this passage is as follows,

wish to exclude it in a radical way for modes of action that they consider legitimate in principle, whether through the use of their armed forces for the most powerful states, or the exercise of people's right for self-determination, for the States that emerged from decolonization.

The attempts at defining terrorism by nation-states communicatively shape the practices of institutions like the police, the military, and the law and mobilize people with such power. Yet those people and the institutions they represent operate outside of the legal field of terrorism. This would mean that by disseminating a definition of terrorism in the legal apparatus, nation-states disengage with any forms of responsibility. A critical cultural studies approach becomes critical to investigate the publicized privatization of nation-states that emerge from a comprehensive contextualization of the events. It would illuminate the oppressive conditions of

institutional practices that sediment practices of racism about which Hall (Jhally, 2006b) talks. The author, Dubuisson (2017), specifies that in France, following the attacks at Charlie Hebdo and the Kosher supermarket hostage situation, penal law prevailed, and the legal treatment of terrorism relied, at the time of the 13 November 2015 in France, on “*règles relatives à la garde à vue, à la détention provisoire, à la surveillance, à l’interception de communications, à la prescription*” (pp. 36-37), or “rules relating to police custody, pre-trial detention, surveillance, interception of communications, prescription.”

In other words, the acts of 13 November 2015 have a deeper repercussion on people in France who are already the targets of a society that preys on terrorism. A nation-state that grants people in the judicial branches the authority is tempted to use the flexibility of counter terrorism to converge interests in the definition of the threat posed by terrorism. This is important to consider because, following these acts of extreme violence, we understand why newspaper representation focused heavily on the state of emergency, the declarations of war, and other escalations of violence. The quote by Dubuisson reminds us of the differential treatments made in the context of terrorism. A reminder of the reality of people who identify with Islam and who live under the policing practices of social institutions of police, education, media in France,

that disproportionately target and incarcerate young Muslim men; Muslim children attended crowded, underfunded public schools; Muslim families are disproportionately represented in public housing projects; and Muslims are themselves the targets of Islamophobic intolerance, as is clear in the growing instances of physical assault, verbal abuse, job discrimination, and legal sanction. (Fernando, 2014, p. 240)

Although terrorism resists a singular definition (Mooney & Young, 2005), researchers agree on certain characteristics of the term. According to Anderson and Sloan (2009), terrorism

consists of using violence, with the intention of creating fear, to reach a broader audience. In that sense, technological advances in communications leads to new forms of terrorism-- “nonterritorial terrorism” (p. v)—thus making terrorism an even more pervasive phenomenon that blurs the lines between types of terrorist actors (state, revolutionary, entrepreneurial), their goals, and their modus operandi. By modus operandi, scholars who study terrorism refer to the instantiation of a moment as a crisis by the ensemble of discursive practices that shape labor relations following attacks marked as terrorism. These discursive practices would include, for example, the deployment of a militaristic articulation of the state of emergency that was at the center of media representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks. For another example of discursive practices, one could consider the increasing deployment of public and private security forces in already highly securitized places across an already highly weaponized U.S.A. Folks might remember the outrage expressed by politicians in France³ after the mimicry made about the 13 November 2015 attacks by Trump, close to three years after the events. Folks might also remember that some of the families of the patrons who died at Pulse and other survivors of the 12 June 2016 attacks sued the security officer on duty that night, for failing to provide security.

³ The outrage was not only about the actual act of mimicry, or imitation of a "terrorist" shooting down one person after the other. The outrage was spurred by what Trump Donald J. Trump, then-president of the U.S.A., stated after this mimic in the 4 May 2018 speech delivered in front of an audience gathered for a National Rifle Association convention. In front of people who Trump claimed "stand strong for those sacred rights given to us by God, including the right to self-defense" the president then claimed that "if one employee or just one patron had a gun. Or, if just one person in this room had been there with a gun aimed at the opposite direction, the terrorist would have fled, would have been shot, and it would have been a whole different story. I mean, right?" before the crowd clapped in ovation (see McIntee, 2018; Rushworth, 2018). s

The Media in Terrorism: Fabricating the Panic

This definitional perspective highlights the symbolic and political violence that informs this project rooted in communication and cultural studies research. This project shares a communication scholarship perspective that often considers how media frame certain events (Cannizzaro & Gholami, 2018; Chauhani & Foster, 2014), especially in the wake of terrorist events (Altheide, 2002; Decker & Rainey 1982; Dunn et al., 2005; Hogan, 2006; Iqbal, 2017; Kabir & Bourk 2012; Lewis, 2005; Mahoni, 2010; Morin, 2016). To situate this project in the scholarship that focuses on terrorism in the media, this project pays attention to the ways in which scholars like Artrip and Debrix (2018) talk about “effects of terroristic imagery” as a condition “to overstimulate the global media system to the point of what we call its saturation, exhaustion, and reversal” (p. 75). By mobilizing scholarship in communication and cultural studies, this project interrogates media in terrorism to understand the articulation of oppressive surveillance practices that followed the Bataclan and Pulse attacks.

This project draws from the concept of moral panic as it is approached by Hall et al. (1978) in their book *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*. Their conceptualization of a moral panic is important to understand the role of media in times of crisis. To specify, Hall et al. (1978) relied on the concept coined by Cohen (2002) in *Folk Devils and Moral Panic* known as *moral panic*, a moment in which,

[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the

condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.

Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal or social policy or even in the way society conceives itself. (Cohen, 2002, p. 1)

To paraphrase this passage, moral panic refers to the dominant perception of concerns following a specific event through representation of a threat to the normative foundations of society. Media, to refer back to Cohen cited above, play a role in the definition of a threat by presenting people who are defined as such in “stylized and stereotypical fashion.” A threat posed by “folk devils” who are perceived in society as real, symbolic danger, by moral entrepreneurs and that is amplified by media (Pece, 2018). For Hall et al., media played a crucial role in the legitimation of decisions by the ruling elite class in Britain to assert authority and sovereign power over the “monopoly of legitimate violence” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 225). Drawing from the interdisciplinary scholarships of *Policing* to study terrorism in the media means to position the legal, social, and cultural responses to the Bataclan and Pulse attacks as terrorist events that “come to serve as the articulator of the crisis, as its ideological conductor” (Hall et al., 1978, p. viii). By analyzing national newspaper articles as a site of analysis, this project argues that the official reactions to the terrorist events following the Bataclan attacks in France and the Pulse attacks in the U.S.A. speak to a moment of crisis.

In this study, the sequential model of moral panic (Goode & Ben Yehuda, 2009, pp. 48-49; see also Hall et al., 1978; Walsh, 2017) is mobilized to understand the role of media

representation of terrorism in amplifying the panic following the 2015 and 2016 attacks.⁴ The moral panic model determines five major temporal trends. These trends are: a concern for the behavior of a group and its consequences on society; an increase in hostility towards the affected group, the focus of concern; the presence of a substantial or generalized consensus on the reality of the threat caused by the identified group; the assumption that a larger number of the identified population is capable of these acts, and the immeasurability of public concern about the threat; and the volatile nature of moral panic which translates into the institutionalization of societal concerns, normalizing the punitive nature of panic that targets transgressors (Goode & Ben Yehuda, 2009, pp. 37-43).

It is possible to observe how strong emotional reactions from presidents, ministers, and other stakeholders evoking Charlie, coupled with the social media resonance of popular trends like #Pray for Paris in the wake of the attacks, invoked the enactment of laws and reforms on national identity, security, and surveillance that highlighted the construction of a deeper societal problem signifying a moral panic. After the shock of the events, the national press also conveyed a strong hostility towards the “scapegoats.” France is then constantly presented within a Western continuum that finds itself threatened by a common enemy. As such, the purpose is to show how questions about identity feed the moral panic.

⁴ According to Hall et al. (1978), the moral panic process implies “at least five essential conditions: a state of anticipatory mobilization and preparedness in the control apparatuses; a sensitizing of official circles and of the public through the mass media; a perceived danger to social stability- such as when the crime rate is read as indexing a general break-down in social authority and control ; the identification of a vulnerable ‘target’ group’ (e.g., black youth) involved in dramatic incidents (‘muggings’) which trigger public alarm; the setting in motion of the mechanisms by which conspiratorial demons and criminal folk-devils are projected on to the public stage” (p. 305).

The Reinforcement of Orientalism Discourse in Newspaper Representation

As mentioned previously, Orientalism is used as a theoretical framework to deconstruct media representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks. In this section of the dissertation, I show how Orientalism is defined and explained by leading scholars in the fields of postcolonial theory, cultural studies, and communication before drawing out the facets through which the corpus is analyzed.

It is with the publication of *Orientalism* by Said (1978) that the theory has known a long career in the academic realm, even though Said was not the person who coined the term.⁵ He demonstrated, from a humanist standpoint (Radakrishnan, 2007), how canonical Western texts constructed limiting and negatively stereotypical representations of the East, now commonly mistaken as the Middle East, in literature, academic scholarship, and the press. Drawing from his positionality as an Arab Palestinian American literary critic and leading political theorist, Said analyzed and challenged how texts produced by scholars in the field of philology like de Sacy or Renan, were perceived as objective, but were shaped by and conversely worked in tandem with imperialist domination. For Said, “[O]rientalism [...] has less to do with the Orient than it does with “our” world” (emphasis in original, Said, 1978, p. 12). To paraphrase Said, Orientalism is the diffusion of Otherness and the set of related discourse that diffuses in the cultural imaginary. This orientalist discourse is a mechanism that relies on,

⁵ The tenets of Orientalism were ethically attributed by Said to Anouar Abdel-Malek (1963), writer, journalist, doctor in philosophy, sociologist, from Egypt who occupied a seat as a leader in charge of research hosted by the CNRS, the French National Center for Scientific Research, for some time. This study recognizes the significance of this visionary scholar who, already in 1963, deconstructed the "two faces of neo-Orientalism" that manifested in "the rebirth of the nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America" post-WWII (p. 112). Neo-Orientalism refers to this historical escalation into nationalist movements and the myths of socialist states erupting post-WWII era, leading to the confrontation of what Abdel-Malek conceptualized as "Two Europes" that "are rethinking this complex: the Europe (and European America) of the colonial powers; the Europe of the socialist states and movements, soon joined by the revolutions on the three forgotten continents" (p. 112).

a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic [...] texts [...] an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction but also of a whole series of “interests” which [...] it not only creates but also maintains; it is [...] a certain will or intention to understand [...] to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different [...] world. (Said, 1978, p. 12)

By studying the production of academic and non-academic texts from Western countries such as France, Britain, and the U.S.A., Said argued that Orientalism subjugated and objectified people from studied areas through narratives that emerged from the logic of imperialism. He argued that these texts (e.g., reports from military officers and ethnographers on the ground, artists and novelists) created (and arguably, continue to create) systematic representations of people in the East as different from people in the West, as Others. Essentializing the lived experiences of people in and of the regions from now contemporarily known Western sub-Saharan to Western China and Japan, these representations were characterized by language used to mark difference (Barker, 2012).

To study these discourses and representations, this dissertation project investigates newspapers as the “aesthetic texts” that continue to draw a “geographical distinction” between the West and the East by elaborating on the “series of interests” underlying terrorism discourse that centers people in position of power, such as presidents, security experts, and other media pundits, following the Bataclan and the Pulse attacks. To interrogate issues of power as they emerge in discursive formations, this project relies on an understanding of the different layers of power that fuel Orientalism,

a discourse that is [...] produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or

imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do to understand as “we” do). (Said, 1978, p. 12)

The goal for this project is to understand how these different layers of power materialize in the wake of terrorism by analyzing articles published in national newspaper.

A type of power that, in the case of the phenomenon of terrorism studied here, has tended to solidify a convergence of interests that resonates more with the notion of “necropower” introduced by Mbembe (2003, 2019), that accounts for “contemporary forms of the subjugation of life to the power of death” and

for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximally destroying persons and creating *death-worlds*, that is new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer upon them the status of the *living dead*. (Mbembe, 2019, p. 92)

This research thus situates necropower as a contemporary understanding of discursive regime of power, political and moral underlying the discourse of Orientalism. Necropower should come across newspaper representation of terrorism in the response made to acts in which people use the body to blur the line between freedom and suicide, and to challenge the state and state sovereignty over technological warfare. I am not comparing France and the U.S.A. to the apartheid-like conditions of Palestine that led Mbembe to deconstruct necropower. However, I bring necropower to offer a context of contemporary formations of terror that reinforced Orientalism since Said challenged its dogmas.

At the time of the Bataclan and Pulse events, I was already building interests in conducting research that addressed three problematics of political concerns: about acts of violence, about limiting images and representation in media, and primarily about the perpetuation of racism through the reinforcement of Orientalism.

The first problematic revolved around the desire to better understand what leads people to use their own bodies to commit horrific acts of violence in the name of religion, the state, or simply the self. I am also equally nauseated by the responses that come from leaders of nation-states to resort to a similar type of violence, only difference is that state use of violence is made legal. The concern is therefore about the a priori conditions that have made of the acts of violence studied here, a possibility for its use and its justification. In that sense, I am interested in studying even further (after the dissertation) the phenomenon of violence which is, in my opinion, a global concern.

The second problematic that boosted my research interests was about the role of newspaper in particular, and media in general, in offering very little understanding of specific articulations of violence. That is mostly due to my standpoint as a participant observer invested in keeping track of contemporary identity politics in France and the U.S.A. It is also due to my background growing up in a household in which news was always put on trial. Jumping forward to the era in which the Pulse and Bataclan attacks took place, I was beginning to learn from Black feminist epistemologies, about the dehumanizing language used in media and the controlling images in the post-race era, meaning after the abolition of slavery in 1865 in the U.S.A. and in 1848 in France.⁶

⁶ Note that the most recent utterance of post-race could be attributed to Christiane Taubira who was instrumental in passing a law that recognized human trafficking and slavery as a crime against humanity (see *Tendant a la reconnaissance de la traite et de l'esclavage en tant que crime contre l'humanité*, 87 Sénat § 2001–434. (2001). <http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas00-087.html>).

Which leads me to the third problematic that animates my research agenda, the concern about the perpetuation of racism through Orientalism. One could only imagine how easily the dehumanization of people in Egypt took place and how the depiction of people who had to face the imperialistic violence of Napoleon and its troops, saturated journals and press of the late 1790s (e.g., *Courrier de l'Égypte*).⁷ Related to the third and final problematic is how the first two weave together as elements that reinforce Orientalism and perpetuate racism. In this final challenge, the question is about the role of newspapers in the representation of specific acts of violence and the state response to these events. My contribution is to question what Said contended in the late 1980s but within different schemes of violence:

“The border wars” that are an expression of essentializations - Africanizing the African, Orientalizing the Oriental, Westernizing the Western, Americanizing the American, for an indefinite time and with no alternative (since African, Oriental, Western essences can only remain essences) – a pattern that has been held over from the era of classic imperialism and its systems. (Said, p. 312)

The goal here is to draw from previous research that has shown how certain acts, when marked as terrorism in media, escalate the fear of the “barbaric” Islamic otherized Other. The central problem of Orientalism is, as pointed out by Said with regard to literature from Orientalists -- deemed experts on questions about the Orient -- with textual attitudes that normalize “expression of essentializations” and, concomitantly, amplify the justification made by experts for the legitimate use of sovereign rights over life and death, border and citizenships.

⁷ See: *Courrier de l'Égypte*. (1798). https://data.bnf.fr/fr/32750347/courrier_de_l_egypte/

In *Orientalism*, Said distinguished between manifest and latent Orientalism. This distinction was marked over time, by the transition from an abstract and unconscious process that otherized the Orient through the production of an imaginary about people from the Orient as exotic, promiscuous, backwards. This was what Said coined as latent Orientalism, which shifted in the late nineteenth century at a time when novelists, artists, philologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and political theories (tied to Colonialism) disseminated these unconscious ideals into public life and materialized this othering process. This is what Said called manifest Orientalism, the process that brought stereotypical and dehumanizing assumptions about the Orient into public life for people in the West to consume through images and writings. Such a distinction is important for this study because, according to Said, the notion of objectivity that was at the center of knowledge produced under latent Orientalism remained almost untouched in its more manifest forms. For example, the manifestation of latent Orientalism doesn't stop at newspapers, 24/7 broadcast news, radio shows, and other means in the mass production of news today. One could be subjected to manifestation of Orientalism in the diffusion of advertisements for chemically induced products with the sole purpose of whitening skin, in the distribution of scripts and mise en scene in contemporary western cinema and television series narratives with villains (Jhally, 2006b; Shaheen, 2003; Smith et al., 1998), and most importantly for Said, I think, in the decision-making processes of nation-states that hold sovereign powers over life and death, border and identity. In this regard, Orientalism discourse cannot be separated from the “biological determinism and moral political admonishment” that have racialized and alienated “Orientals” and “all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized” (Said, pp. 206-207). I highlight how mass media in general and the national newspapers under analysis often perceive themselves and are often perceived as objective agents reporting facts.

The challenge is to deconstruct how latent Orientalism continues to be a constant, that is, continues to be manifest in contemporary news discourse about terrorism.

To do so, this study follows the methodological devices offered by Said in the study of Orientalism. The goal is to examine contrasted discursive practices that pit the West against the East and the dehumanizing ways these adversarial relationships are made apparent. As a residue of this othering, “the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture as Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” (pp. 3-5). It is based on these assumptions that Said offered the methodological devices to understand Orientalism within specific contemporary histories. That is, this project intends to distinguish between various forms of knowledge and the politics of knowledge production in/about the study of terrorism, to draw from sound methodological devices to challenge the authority of dominant subjectification of the Other found in the analysis of national newspapers, and to investigate the personal dimension and examine the current processes of identification that are permeating the everyday lived experiences of people in France and in the U.S.A.

Criticisms of Said on Orientalism

Overt or contemporary manifestations of latent Orientalism are not, in a sense, new. Other theorists, poets, revolutionaries, and decolonial scholars, have sought to challenge the conditions imposed by colonialism. As a case in point, Césaire (1955) who wrote in the seminal work, *Discours sur le Colonialisme*, about the realities of the colonized by posing the equation: “*colonisation=chosification*” – or, in English, colonization=thingification – as a metaphor to

speak about “*sociétés vidées d’elles-memes, des cultures piétinées, de terres confisquées, de religions assassinées, de magnificiences artistiques anéanties, d’extraordinaire possibilités supprimées*” (p. 23). This passage best translates as follows: “societies emptied of themselves, cultures trampled, lands confiscated, religions assassinated, artistic magnificence destroyed, extraordinary possibilities suppressed.” This passage is also best understood as an entry point to frame the criticisms to Said's critique of Orientalism.

There are different facets of the theory on Orientalism discourse coined by Said that have been questioned, challenged, and expanded since its inception as a leading approach to understand the reality of the colonized conditioned by the dehumanizing, and at times exoticizing, perception of the colonizer. These productive critiques often revolved around the question of agency of the so-called Oriental subjects and around the role of the construction of gender in the discursive frames that buttress Orientalism discourse. I now address some of these critiques and explain how they pertain to this project.

Feminist scholars have expanded on Said’s critique of Orientalism, especially as it relates to the representation of Arabs and Muslim women in literature, the arts, and academic texts (Lowe, 1992). Yeğenoğlu (1998) aligned with Said’s critique of an Orientalism that serves to mark and vilify Arabs and Muslims as barbaric while upholding Western superiority. In *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a feminist reading of Orientalism*, Yeğenoğlu deconstructs the ways in which Western femininity upheld Orientalism. Yeğenoğlu examined how, through their status as white women, artists were able to portray lives of Arab and Muslim women, a feature originally forbidden to White men. In a sense, Yeğenoğlu argued that through the lens of Western (read as White) femininity, representation of Arab and Muslim women shifted Orientalist representations through the process of unveiling. Using the harem trope, white women seeking

acknowledgments in the artistic realm, broadened the imaginary of people in the West about the East (Dubrofsky, 2006).

By participating in the portrayal of the harem, for instance, Western femininity responded to the demand of a dominant White male gaze to unveil the elite Muslim women. Lewis (1996) pays attention to the ways in which women authors and artists who struggled to carve a space for women's representation in the West, did so by upholding Orientalism. In *Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity, and Representation*, Lewis (1996) analyzed the works of artists like Henriette Browne and George Eliot to deconstruct the colonial gaze, arguably the lens portrayed in Browne's and Eliot's artwork. For Lewis (1996) orientalist discourse stands for the way power is diffused, "as an ordering of knowledge [that] produces positionalities (enunciative modalities) into which individuals are interpellated and from which they may speak or act (as policemen, lawyers, mothers) but which are never the truth of themselves" (pp. 18-19). From my perspective, this definition reinforces the idea that invites a Western audience to imagine the need for people from the so-called Orient to be "civilized" or become more like the West. It also offers a more complex understanding about communication and identity underlying Orientalism.

Orientalism in Context: Contemporary Manifestations

The theoretical framework of Orientalism has been deployed and operationalized by scholars of postcolonial theory (Malreddy, 2015), especially those interested in expanding this groundbreaking theory on issues related to citizenship (Isin, 2015; Maira, 2009) and globalization (Turner, 1994). The critical lens provided by Said in *Orientalism* – which he further expanded in *Culture and Imperialism* – became a meaningful perspective to deconstruct how media today participate in the perpetuation of Orientalizing discourse (Said, 1992).

According to Said, Orientalism was more than just discourse that organized knowledge as objective and rational epistemologies that ordered academic thoughts. Orientalist texts constructed an imaginary Other in need of civilization for and by people in the West who consumed these truths. The essentializing aspects and effects of these texts served as a fertile ground for political decisions of empires and nation-states in the West to colonize the so-called Orient. Through the lens of Orientalism, the West is always perceived as civilized and progressive while the East is always already perceived as barbaric and backward. Contemporary terrorism discourse, as Said explains at length in his book *Culture and Imperialism*, maintains this imaginary hierarchy. The following passage illustrates the concerns raised by Said at the end of *Culture and Imperialism* about the challenges faced by conscious intellectuals who seek to challenge dominant discourses that continuously reinforce Orientalism, that,

The fear and terror induced by the overscale images of “terrorism” and “fundamentalism” – call them the figures of an international or transnational imaginary made up of foreign devils – hastens the individual’s subordination to the dominant norms of the moment. This is as true in the new post-colonial societies as it is in the West generally and the United States particularly. Thus to oppose the abnormality and extremism embedded in terrorism and fundamentalism [...] is also to uphold the moderation, rationality, executive centrality of a vaguely designated “Western” (or otherwise local and patriotically assumed) ethos. The irony is that far from endowing the Western ethos with confidence and securing the “normality” commonly associated with privilege and rectitude, this dynamic imbues “us” with a righteous anger and defensiveness in which “others” are finally seen as enemies, bent on destroying our civilization and way of life. (Said, 1978, p. 310)

The significance of this passage by Said for this dissertation is twofold. First, Said highlighted the role played by media in constructing the figure of terrorism through representational modes and strategies that fuel the imaginary of people in Western nations with the image of “made up” folk devils. Second, it speaks also to the paradoxes of Western rationality that seek to find any justification available to resort to political violence in the defense of ideals that appear to be irreconcilable with the reality imposed by this normative and essentialist myth of a clash of civilization. This passage also shows the irony of the dominant discourse that tends to appeal to audiences in the wake of events marked as terrorism. This irony, to paraphrase Said, lies in the fact that responses to such violent events result, at least for nations in the West, in the reinforcement of legitimate violence (e.g., bombings in Raqqa by the French military forces, or the state of emergency in France that featured military occupation of public spaces). Scholars often questioned the meaning of these responses and wonder what it would mean for presidents and first responders to listening to – even for a minute – demands made by the perpetrators during or in the revendications made public after the Bataclan attacks and Pulse shooting. The demands made by the perpetrators during the attacks, often read in news from stories of people who survived the attacks, were to withdraw troops from nations like Afghanistan and/or to stop bombing Syria.

Orientalism discourse was observed by Said in the texts written by military officers during colonial occupations. These texts were embedded in the composition of story lines, published in and/or broadcasted by popular, traditional, and mass media. The way Said conceptualized Orientalism in the form of a trilogy – *Covering Islam*, *Question of Palestine*, and *Orientalism* – allowed for interpretations of character developments, plots, and the cultural significance of narratives written by novelists, politicians, and media pundits, as meaningful

ways to understand how Western control of resources, national imaginary, and class consciousness created the conditions for the contemporary issues related to racialized identity at the intersection of religion, nationality, and sexuality. Orientalism functions like a web in the racializing matrix. Orientalism, from a Black Feminist and Postcolonial theoretical standpoint, normalized oppressive and dehumanizing language that have perpetuated essentialist discourse asserting Western modes of dominance. Orientalism is what Andrea Smith (2016) coined as a pillar of White Supremacy in heteropatriarchal societies like France and the U.S.A. (see also Fleming, 2017).

As a pillar of White Supremacist Heteropatriarchy, Orientalism discourse was reinforced in newspaper representation of terrorism following events marked as terrorism by an intensification of the media consumer experiences with mediatized “textual attitudes” like the one about terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks. It is fair to assume with Said that terrorism as text in newspapers, purported “to contain knowledge about something actual” (Said, 1978, p. 94). “Such texts,” Said continues, can “create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe” (p. 94). Texts that, in the context of newspaper representation of terrorism post-Bataclan, convey how “a human being confronts something [...] threatening and previously distant” (p. 93) and the ones that convey appearances of successes that can only inherently intensify the threat posed by terrorism, and that terrorism post-Bataclan is “what in essence we know or can only know about it” (p. 94). Using Said’s methodological devices in my parallel analysis of French and English articles published by influential national newspapers respectively in France and in the U.S.A, it is possible to observe how national newspapers exerted a lot of energy to draw out the figure of terrorism.

Orientalism also acts as a theoretical foundation for understanding terrorism as a phenomenon with historic specificity. The assumption here is that the articles analyzed for this project serve as a platform to understand how Orientalist discursive formations materialize in societies today. In this part of the project, I combine Orientalism with the work of theorists who address issues of representation and identity in terrorism today, like Silva (2016), who talks about a sudden shift in the cultural process of "identification" (p. 51),⁸ or Alsultany (2012) who writes about the "simplified complex representations" and more specifically the "simplified complex explanations" encountered in traditional news outlets (p. 128) that shape our realities today.⁹

In other words, this project looks at the aesthetics of newspapers and seeks to challenge conventions and codes to construct objectivity in news media. This approach questions how broad concepts of culture and freedom are deployed in news and how they are deeply anchored in newspaper representation of terrorism. The central problematic of this research is guided by the following research question: how or in what ways did newspaper representation of terrorism after the 13 November 2015 and the 12 June 2016 "terrorist" events, reinforce Orientalism? This question is broken down into two distinct point of comparisons essential for the understanding of

⁸ For Silva (2016), "the level of individual agency that one assumes in identity has been reinscribed with additional powers when it becomes identification. With the latter comes the ability to identify self and other as insider and outsider, essentially creating regimes of identification: discourses that create categories of identities that converge under the rubric of security and terror" (p. 51). Vital for this project is how Silva informs our understanding of consensus-building - implied in these processes of identification - and moral panic. "Identification strategies," Silva continues, "form a system of consensus surrounding identity that naturalizes the system of racialized hierarchies that we come to accept as 'normal.' Thus, the identification produces the categorical criteria of popular tropes of identity." Equally important is then to draw from Silva and interrogate newspaper representation of terrorism that may have fallen under the trap of naturalizing hierarchies of race and may have participated in the production of tropes of identity that have always and already existed.

⁹ For Alsultany (2012), the portrayals of the perpetrators of acts marked as terrorism "and the media's implication that we should abstain from a sympathetic response" have consequences. "First, 'going Muslim' is not an adequate explanation for the actions of these men. Political violence at its core is not about symbolical castration, or sexism, or heterosexual failure, but rather about complex political and historical problems. Second, affect is configured to support empire. A lack of sympathy for 'supposed' terrorists like these goes hand in hand with the delegitimization of any discussion of how U.S. foreign policies contribute to contemporary political problems" (p. 128).

contemporary textual attitudes reinforcing Orientalism. The problematic questions one side of the Atlantic and the representation of terrorism on national news in France after the 13 November 2015 attacks, and the other side of the Atlantic and the question about the representation of terrorism on national news in the U.S.A. after the 12 June 2016 mass shooting.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Orientalism stands for the sets of discourse that have produced epistemological and ontological assumptions about what it means to be from the Orient from the perspective of people in positions of authority in the so-called West. As AlSultany (2012) argued, the use of the term terrorism by media following 9/11 was a subtle way to conflate all events perpetrated by Muslims and Arabs as terrorism and conversely, “masks terrorism perpetrated by people who are not Arab or Muslim” (p. 101). For example, media representation of the acts committed by far or alt-right organizations who use violence do not necessarily refer to the perpetrators as terrorists (DeFoster, 2017). Conditioned by 9/11, “media accounts”, AlSultany argued, have traditionally focused on “what drove these men to violence, and yet they ultimately offer reductive explanations” (p. 128). The ways that media representations of acts marked as terror tend to “decontextualize and dehistoricize terrorism while offering a root cause that signals complexity” (p. 128), is important for the broader purpose of the dissertation. This project seeks to deconstruct the ways newspaper reify Orientalism by looking at how news reporters and editors covered terrorism in ways that simplified complex notions of identity in the coverage of the Bataclan and Pulse. Thus, I seek to shed lights on the dynamic processes of decontextualization and identity formation underlying terrorism discourse in France and in the U.S.A.

To study the representation of terrorism in media and to understand how Orientalism may be reified in news, requires establishing conceptual frameworks that can be identified in

discourse. As explained earlier in this dissertation, moral panic is useful to understand the ideological displacement that unfolded following the attacks at the Bataclan and Pulse. Moral panic is defined as the process through which a group of people are essentialized and categorized as a threat after a breach in societal expectations about political violence (see Chapter Two). People turned into folk devils, or in this case, Muslims who are from the U.S.A. and France or Western Europe but who don't comply to the secularist values of the nation— through the definition of a problem. What fuels the moral panic is the discrepancy between threat and reactions, or as Hall et al. (1978) state “between what is perceived and what that is a perception of” (p. 29). When Hall et al. (1978) studied the mugging panic in Britain,¹⁰ they revealed how the definition and representation of specific types of crimes served as a justification for the criminalization of Black youths. Thus, it is possible to assume that there are “signifying mechanisms in the media and the sources on which they depend” and that newspaper representation of terrorism “sustain the generation of the moral panic” (p. 222). This project thus pays attention to the ways in which media representation of the events at the Bataclan and Pulse work in tandem with the dominant control culture perpetuated by the police and the law in defining and explaining the events. Hence, the necessity to situate the cultural context within which the events, and their representations in media, unfolded for a week in media.

So, when the groups of perpetrators attacked the Stade de France, restaurants, bars, and the Bataclan concert hall in Paris - people like Bilal Hadfi, Brahim Abdeslam, Chakib Akrouh, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Ismael Omar Mostefai, Samy Aminour, Foued Mohamed-Aggad, among

¹⁰ I would like to thank Steve Wilson for pointing out that there is an important parallel here, but also some differences in the use of moral panic as a framework. The term “muggers” was not used to refer to mass shooters. This dissertation draws from the conceptual framework of moral panic derived from the study about the mugging panic to interrogate the signifying mechanisms in media, “a way of signifying events which also intrinsically escalates their threat” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 223).

others – supposedly orchestrated by Daech, and when Mateen shot the workers and patrons at Pulse inspired by and with similar revendication than the 13 November 2015 attacks in France, it was not surprising to observe how media instantiated these moments through frames of crime and terror (Meyer, 2020; Truc et al., 2018). The conceptual framework of moral panic illuminates how these events breached thresholds of violence for the way they challenged the moral and legal basis of French and U.S.American societies. Moments of violence highlight “the highest of the limits of societal tolerance, since violent acts can be seen as constituting a threat to the future existence of the whole state itself (which holds the monopoly of legitimate violence)” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 225). The events themselves, and their representation in media, and the dominant responses by politicians, thus freeze violence over time. The signifying practices of media in general, and of traditional media such as newspapers in particular, used to represent terrorism linger over time and become the recurring imageries through which people make sense of and remember events.

In summary, the purpose of this project is to show how Orientalism is reified through (a) the reinforcement of civilizational discourse, (b) the us/them binary, and (c) the conflation of terrorism with Islam and radicalism. To do so requires understanding themes highlighted from data analysis and to understand how they reinforce Orientalism. In the following section, I construct a map of meaning by offering a rationale. I explain why it is important to use newspaper articles as a site of inquiry. Next, I turn to the step-by-step process of conducting a comparative thematic analysis towards the critique of Orientalism.

Newspapers as a Site of Inquiry and the Definition of Societal Problems

This project pays attention to the journalistic style and editorial choices for the publication of newspapers articles during the seven days that followed the events. I chose to study newspapers because they are an important medium that societies in the West rely on for information. There are many reasons why it is important to focus on newspaper representation to understand how Orientalism is reified following events marked as terrorism. News accounts printed by mainstream newspapers constitute a fertile ground to grow our understanding of issues related to representation following such events. Newspaper articles become a site of inquiry for research that focuses on the way dramatic events like mass shootings hold news values. Print news about specific events is more likely to bring into the “realm of meanings” what are perceived as unusual and unexpected events. Moments in time and space are referred to and by “maps of meaning” that are socially identified, classified, and contextualized, making the event intelligible in the public sphere (Hall et al., 1978, pp. 54-55).

To trace this map of meaning following the Bataclan and Pulse in newspaper means to highlight the articulations of terror, terrorist, and terrorism within the realm of meanings about which Hall et al. talk. National news, print press included, played an important role in assembling the mugging panic in Britain by “recruiting the powerful in the initial stages where topics are structured [and] by favouring certain ways of setting up topics and maintaining certain strategic areas of silence” (p. 65). It is the first methodological assumption, namely that news favor certain perspectives over others. To understand how the events at the Bataclan and Pulse were made somewhat intelligible by the ruling class, this study thus shows what was made absent and how these absences intertwined with what was most visible in national newspapers. Newspapers constitute a springboard to understand how certain truths are made universal and

other truths are omitted, erased, or even silenced. Media in general, and newspapers in particular, play a secondary role to shape society's perception of societal problems.

Numerous scholars in communication and cultural studies have already demonstrated how news outlets including newspapers participate in the definition of societal problems such as terrorism. News functions as an ideological vehicle, or as Altheide (2006) points out:

“Journalistic accounts about terrorism reflect news organizations’ reliance on official news sources to provide entertaining reports compatible with long-established symbols of fear, crime, and victimization about the threats to individuals” and Western societies like France and the U.S.A. in the war on terror (p. 417). The recurrent use of experts by news outlets invites audiences, or readers, to perceive and define a threat. The frame of the war on terror has reverberated in media since 9/11 when events marked as terrorism took place. It constitutes the fertile ground for Western nations to make sense of terror-related events. In that sense, the contemporary ways in which news travel, and the stronghold of media corporations from the U.S.A. and arguably from France, which controls the manufacture of news, is dangerously striking because, as Said already posited in *Culture and Imperialism*, “it can mobilize passions atavistically, throwing people back to an earlier imperial time when the west and its opponents championed and even embodied virtues designed not as virtues so to speak but for war” (Said, 1993, p. 37). The ways in which fear underlies terrorism in France following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo events was only confounded when the attacks that ended at the Bataclan took place a few months later. The ways media framed the events at Charlie reinforced the discursive practices that associated Muslims with terrorism, regardless of whether the individual was associated with the acts perpetrated by the brothers Kouachi.

Recent research conducted about news framing of events marked as terrorism pointed to the ways 9/11 marked a turning point in the representations of Muslims and people who identify as such. As I explained above, the global media construction of Muslims as the figure of terrorism took roots in the early 1970s. Roche (2019) showed that there are similarities in media sequences between two international news magazines *L'Express* and the *Time* and two picture magazines *Paris Match* and *Life*, in their representation of the hostage situation of Israeli professional athletes by Black September during the 1972 Olympic Games. Roche argued that it is possible to observe,

un dialogue formel entre journaux français et américains qui nous autorise à penser des stratégies éditoriales communes; une intericonicité qui fixe durablement les représentations et les imaginaires occidentaux de cet attentat redoublant en cela le récit télévisuel; l'émergence d'une image qui aujourd'hui encore symbolique de cet épisode.
(p. 117)¹¹

The English translation of this passage is as follows:

a formal dialogue between French and American newspapers which allows us to think of common editorial strategies; an intericonicity that permanently fixes the Western representations and imaginaries of this attack, thereby redoubling the televisual narrative; the emergence of an image which today still symbolizes this episode.

The intericonicity mentioned by Roche refers to the concept of intertextuality. The notion in poststructuralism that has traditionally rejected "the idea of an underlying structure which founds meaning" (Barker, p. 84). In other words, meaning "has no single originary source.

¹¹ This passage translates as followed: "a formal dialogue between French and American newspapers which allows us to think of common editorial strategies; an intericonicity which permanently fixes the Western representations and imaginaries of this attack, thereby redoubling the televisual narrative; the emergence of an image which today still symbolizes this episode"

Rather, it is the outcome of relationships between texts, that is, intertextuality" (Barker, p. 84). In this study, I compare the news frames and dominant themes in and between national news about terrorism following the Bataclan in France and in the national news about terrorism following Pulse, in the U.S.A. Since the tragic Munich episode of the early 1970s and the 9/11 attacks in the 2000s took place, representational strategies shifted drastically to reinforce the religion-terrorism nexus. As Morin (2016) reminds us, "the repetitive use of Orientalist framing" following 9/11, continued to invoke civilizational discourse (p. 989). This study draws from Morin (2016), who compared news coverage of the 2009 attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, with the news coverage of the 2013 shooting at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., to show the differential representations between the perpetrators and to reveal how news media frame an event as terrorism and another as crime. Morin illustrated how news framed the Fort Hood shooting attack as terrorism by narrativizing the life of the perpetrator and by conflating the shooting with an act of Islamic terrorism. Conversely, news framed the Navy Yard shooting as a crime which was demonstrated by the story line about the perpetrator that focused on mental illness, gun controls, and security.

Data Selection

To understand newspapers representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse, and to show how Orientalism is perpetuated in the news following these events marked as terrorism, data were collected from four different newspapers circulating in France and in the U.S.A. I selected these countries for data collection because that is where the events took place, and because these countries are located in what is known as the West.

My social location as a bicultural and bilingual researcher allowed for the study of newspaper articles in both English and in French. For each country, newspapers with one of the highest circulation rates were used to collect data. Table 1 shows the 2016 figures of circulation for each of the newspapers selected. More specifically related to the representation of terrorism following the Bataclan, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* were selected (“Les performances,” 2017). For the shooting at Pulse, articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were collected for analysis (Pew Research Center, 2019). Combining these outlets allowed a glance at dominant discourse about terrorism following these events. It also offered somewhat of a variation in political leaning from different outlets known for their editorial lines.

Table 1. Newspaper circulation figures¹²

Newspaper	Circulation size in 2015	Circulation size in 2016
<i>Le Monde</i> ¹³	267,896 ¹⁴	269,584
<i>Le Figaro</i>	300,266	305,701
<i>The New York Times</i> ¹⁵	528,000 ¹⁶	551,579
<i>The Washington Post</i>	330,000	206,824

Sources French national newspapers:

Les clés de la presse, reporting numbers published by ACPM;

Source US national newspapers:

PressGazette reporting numbers from Alliance for Audited Media and Statista¹⁷

¹² Statistics are only available through subscription; these numbers could only be obtained via secondary sources.

¹³ Numbers are based on paid diffusion in France, not including individually paid print circulation.

¹⁴ Numbers are calculated based on the 2015-2016 evolution of paid diffusion in France.

¹⁵ Numbers are published for the first three quarters of the year 2016.

¹⁶ This is the average weekday individually paid print circulation in the U.S.A. as of September 2015 (“Circulation,” 2016).

¹⁷ This is the circulation of select newspapers in the U.S.A. 2015. (2016). Statista. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272790/circulation-of-the-biggest-daily-newspapers-in-the-us/>

Timeframe for Selection of Data and Search Term

Articles published in *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* between and including 13 and 20 November 2015 and articles published in *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* between and including 12 and 19 June 2016, were collected from the LexisNexis database (now NexisUni) using the keyword “terrorism.” The time frame for data collection corresponds to the week that followed events marked as terrorism that took place in France and in the U.S.A. Data were collected from the day the events took place (the series of attacks at the Bataclan started late evening, 13 November 2015, and the Pulse shooting occurred early morning, 12 June 2016) until the week after the event, when institutional responses deployed by people in positions of power started to take effect. In France, 20 November 2015 marks the day when the state of emergency was extended. In the U.S.A., 19 June 2016 marks the day right before the Senate voted on amendments to gun control laws. Tables 2 and 3 present a breakdown of the number of articles collected for everyday of the week that followed each event.

Table 2. Number of articles published using the term terrorism by outlet in November 2015

	13 Nov.	14 Nov.	15 Nov.	16 Nov.	17 Nov.	18 Nov.	19 Nov.	20 Nov.	Total
<i>Le Monde</i>	4	5	22	0	50	34	33	28	176
<i>Le Figaro</i>	5	13	0	52	47	36	30	28	211
Total	9	18	22	52	97	70	63	56	387

Table 3. Number of articles published using the term terrorism by outlet in June 2016

	12 Jun.	13 Jun.	14 Jun.	15 Jun.	16 Jun.	17 Jun.	18 Jun.	19 Jun.	Total
<i>The Washington Post</i>	8	14	22	20	14	13	9	12	112
<i>The New York Times</i>	6	11	24	20	20	29	20	17	147
Total	14	25	46	40	34	42	29	29	259

Types of Articles

Only articles published in specific sections of each newspaper were selected for the analysis. Since this project challenges the claims made by newspapers about the objectivity of news, articles published as editorials, opinion pieces, and letters to editors were not selected. More specifically, I selected articles published in international, national, society, economy, business, sports, and other A-sections of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. Articles published in the international, médias, politique, reportage, sciences, société, télévision, and other major sections traditionally encountered when reading *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. Collecting articles published in these sections allowed to understand the stances from primary definers who are often quoted in the news. Primary definers are, according to the term used in the sequences of a moral panic and defined by Harcup (2014), "powerful and influential voices who tend to be afforded disproportionate access to the media." For instance, primary definers are the experts, official sources, politicians, etc. Additionally, only articles over 150 words were selected for analysis because, after careful examination, articles under that word count were previews of longer articles also selected for the corpus of analysis.

Final Corpus of Data

After the initial search for articles were retrieved, the corpus of data was finalized. Following the procedure mentioned above, the final sample included: 212 articles published in *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* between 13 and 20 November and 180 articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between 12 and 19 June 2016. Tables 4 and 5 present the articles selected for analysis.

Table 4. Number of articles selected for dataset by outlet in November 2015

	13 Nov.	14 Nov.	15 Nov.	16 Nov.	17 Nov.	18 Nov.	19 Nov.	20 Nov.	Total
<i>Le Monde</i>	2	3	11	0	25	12	22	11	86
<i>Le Figaro</i>	2	8	0	29	29	20	17	21	126
Total	4	11	11	29	54	32	39	32	212

Table 5. Number of articles selected for dataset by outlet in June 2016

	12 Jun.	13 Jun.	14 Jun.	15 Jun.	16 Jun.	17 Jun.	18 Jun.	19 Jun.	Total
<i>The Washington Post</i>	7	9	18	16	10	8	5	10	83
<i>The New York Times</i>	2	7	19	13	13	25	10	8	97
Total	9	16	37	29	23	33	15	18	180

The Method of Comparative Thematic Analysis

I drew from comparative thematic analysis to provide an understanding of the patterns that are recurrent in the selected data and that might indicate how taken-for-granted terrorism is in newspaper representations. Thematic analysis, or the method used to identify, analyze, describe, and report themes within data, is often overlooked as a qualitative research method (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Roulston, 2001). Yet, this method became a logical approach to reveal patterns within a large data set and to complement the broader framing analysis conducted for this study. It is a method that is iterative (Braun & Clarke, 2006), meaning that there is constant re-evaluation of themes, codes, and categories, throughout the research process made possible by the navigation between data, researcher’s notes, and theory. The process I undertook to understand the thematic structures was informed by Braun and Clarke (2006; see also Reynolds, 2016; Sommer 2019; Testerman, 2015). By definition, thematic analysis consists of analysis of texts to highlight patterns in a set of data, and to examine its saturation. According to Testerman (2015), “themes emerge from data through repetition,

saliency, and emphasis” (p. 41). For Arasaratnam (2015), “[t]hemes are identified on the basis of substantive significance in that there is consistency in the content/focus of the articles in each theme” (pp. 291-292). Based on these understandings, this study seeks to locate patterns of repetition highlighted in data. I contend that the themes emerging from the analysis of newspaper articles about terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks, can contribute to researchers’ and non-academicians’ understandings of how Orientalism is reified in the media. Each data set corresponding with one specific incident would be analyzed first and then the second incident’s data set would be analyzed for themes. Only after the themes are located for each individual data set separately would I then move onto the comparative thematic analysis.

This project relies specifically on the comparative thematic analysis method suggested by Sommier (2019) who drew out differences and similarities between articles published in newspapers in Britain, Canada, Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom published about the ban of burqinis in France. Sommier highlighted the underlying tensions in representations of the burqini ban that indicated “a complex interplay between persistence of established representations and emergence of new groupings” (p. 257). These new groupings, Sommier argues, continue to signify dominant assumptions about what it means to be French. The author deconstructed newspaper representation that, from the perspective of other Western nations, constructed the burqini as an “appropriate difference” and that posited France as deviant for its relation to religion. In other words, Sommier highlighted the ways in which news from English-speaking nations depicted the burqini ban as inescapable, a logic that puts France as an exception for the articulation of secularism, or *laïcité*, and that has always and already relegated Muslims. I draw from this comparative approach to thematic analysis by examining differences and similarities because it enables me to show the complexity of representation (see also Alsultany,

2012). The focus on similarities and differences is useful for this study to identify the construction of socio-political realities in newspapers from two different terrorist events in two different countries (Sommier, 2019, p. 253).

As a sound qualitative method, thematic analysis requires specific steps, detailed by Braun and Clarke (2006). After the collection, gathering, and selection of newspaper articles, it is important for the researcher to become familiar with the data. While the process of collecting and selecting data may imply an inductive reasoning process, it is important to note that the analysis of data was deductive. In other words, since this study follows the literature in terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism, to develop coding categories, I used an abductive (inductive-deductive) approach to identify those themes (that I then use to categorize and critique in terms of the assumptions underlying those themes, using Orientalism and moral panic as frameworks for doing so). Immersing myself with the dataset didn't mean aligning my research orientation with the ideas expressed in the news. The process of collecting, archiving, selecting, and analyzing articles in the dataset can only really provide a partial snapshot of the multiple truths that collided following these tragic events and in the saturation of media with terrorism. Data interpretation relied primarily on deductive reasoning insofar as key scholars, postcolonial thinkers, and other people tirelessly engaged in combatting the conditions of modernity, have already challenged the themes that I present in this dissertation project.

The concern of this dissertation is therefore to understand how the logic of Orientalism discourse is perpetuated in newspapers within two unique sets of data fragments. Remember, Said used his social location to compare literature and dismantle Orientalism produced in a specific (read sarcastically, imperialistic) French and British English language. The coding of data was based on how passages for this dissertation might have hailed, or called out, consumers

of U.S.A.-based English and French news in the contemporary Western reality conditioned by the phenomenon of violence in terrorism. To take an “abductive” approach to the argument posed here might dangerously veer towards the conclusion that the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse is a viable objective. That is not the point of this project. Rather, the goal is to disentangle from texts (or, news articles) that which spoke to, with, and in contradiction with theory and reality. I engage in dialogic thinking about the ways in which selected data come to strike the deeper logic of Orientalism. A dialogic thinking that takes seriously concerns raised in newspapers with the conscious distance from what is produced in the text and with skeptical assumptions about news values. This is when I redirect you to the review of literature.

This is different from Braun and Clarke who write that, codes emerge from the data themselves to form themes. Yet, in Charmaz’s (2008) grounded theory approach, a constant comparison analysis that seeks to uncover themes can use pre-existing theoretical frameworks or constructs to examine data. The advantage of such theoretical guidance is a focus on particular phenomena determined a priori, like the terrorist attacks and moral panic. The grounded theoretical approach takes form in the understanding that the interpretation of this specific data - news articles published about terrorism following these specific acts - must reconcile the explanatory objective of news with the understanding of acts of extreme violence. Indeed, grounded theory coincides with the theoretical assumptions about Orientalism, in a sense that thematic analysis rooted in grounded theory also includes elements such as (1) the attention to context; (2) the locating of actors, situations, and actions; (3) the assumption of multiple realities; and (4) the subjectivity of the researcher, noted previously” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 408). As such, this dissertation project seeks to make of this comparative thematic analysis, a form of resistance

against the simplification of difference and against dominant articulations of ideals, democracy, and the meaning of life.

Table 6. Phases of thematic analysis

Phase	Description
Familiarize oneself with the data	Reading articles and taking notes
Generate initial codes	Coding the entire data set “in a systematic fashion” and collate data relevant to each code
Searching for themes	Collate codes into potential themes, gather data relevant to potential theme
Review themes	Check if “themes work in relation to the coded extracts and the entire data set”
Define and name themes	Refine specifics of each theme with an ongoing analysis, and the overall story the analysis tells; generate clear definitions and names for each theme
Produce report/analysis	Select extract examples, analyze the extracts, relate back to research question and literature, produce the report

(table paraphrased from Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 87; see also Reynolds, 2016, p. 117).

Familiarizing myself with the data required three different readings of the data. I decided to first read the articles published the seventh day after the events, so as to get a sense of how themes could speak to and with theoretical assumptions. I started with the seventh day because I assumed that newspapers would have more detailed reports about the attacks after a week's time and would also have access to institutional reports unavailable during the first day(s) that followed the attacks. These days corresponded to the day when the vote for the prolongation of the state of emergency took place in France, 20 November 2015, and to the day prior to the Senate vote for gun control amendments, 19 June 2016, in the U.S.A. I analyzed one day's worth of data to conduct the preliminary coding. Tables 7 and 8 show the preliminary codes generated for each national newspaper corpus and the corresponding example. To clarify, I used sentences as unit of analysis. These sentences and their translation appear verbatim in the tables below. A total of 13 codes were generated in the analysis of articles published 19 June 2016 by *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. In comparison, 22 codes were generated in the analysis of the articles published 20 November 2015 by *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. The high number of codes generated corresponds to the way the researcher split the data so as to bring more nuance to the analysis (Saldaña, 2013). The difference in number of codes coincides, in my opinion, with the difference in the number of articles published and analyzed for that specific day (see Tables 4 and 5). I used these preliminary codes as precursors for the analysis of the entire data set, which were useful to generate initial codes.

Table 7. Preliminary codes used to label passages from articles published 20 November 2015 in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*

Open coding – label <i>(french/english)</i>	Example	Translation
<i>Politiques publiques autres pays</i> Public policy other nations	<i>Depuis quelques jours, la Turquie se montre particulièrement active dans sa traque anti-Daech.</i>	In recent days, Turkey has been particularly active in its anti-Daesh hunt.
<i>Autres bombes suicidaires</i> Other suicide attacks	<i>Samedi soir, un kamikaze s'est fait exploser lors d'un assaut des forces antiterroristes contre un appartement de Gaziantep, ville proche de la Syrie</i>	On Saturday evening, a suicide bomber blew himself up during an assault by counterterrorism forces on an apartment in Gaziantep, a town near Syria

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Affrontements</i> Confrontation</p>	<p><i>Le même jour, quatre personnes identifiées comme des militants de l'organisation EI ont également été tuées par l'armée turque, à l'approche d'un poste militaire frontalier avec la Syrie.</i></p>	<p>On the same day, four people identified as militants of the IS organization were also killed by the Turkish army, as it approached a military post on the border with Syria.</p>
<p><i>Expertise sécurité</i> Security expertise</p>	<p><i>Ces efforts s'accompagnent d'une prise de conscience, au sein des renseignements turcs, du risque sécuritaire posé par les combattants étrangers qui vont et viennent entre la Syrie et l'Europe via la Turquie.</i></p>	<p>These efforts are accompanied by an awareness within Turkish intelligence of the security risk posed by foreign fighters who come and go between Syria and Europe via Turkey.</p>

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Occupation militaire</i> Military occupation</p>	<p><i>Lancée par la force "Barkhane" le 26 octobre, l'opération "Vignemale" prendra fin ce dimanche. Menée simultanément au Niger et au Mali, elle se singularise à la fois par sa durée - un mois - et son volume - un millier d'hommes. La force "Barkhane," présente dans cinq pays du Sahel, cherche ainsi à juguler les flux interfrontaliers des groupes terroristes et, au Mali, à empêcher les katibas djihadistes qui avaient occupé le nord du pays pendant près d'un an d'y reprendre pied.</i></p>	<p>Launched by the "Barkhane" force on October 26, Operation "Vignemale" will end this Sunday. Carried out simultaneously in Niger and Mali, it is distinguished both by its duration - one month - and its volume - a thousand U.S.A. men. The "Barkhane" force, present in five countries of the Sahel, is thus seeking to curb the inter-border flows of terrorist groups and, in Mali, to prevent the jihadist katibas who had occupied the north of the country for nearly a year from resuming there.</p>
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Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Rationalisation Bataclan</i> Rationalization Bataclan</p>	<p><i>Élément humain : toujours ou presque il s'agit de criminels fanatisés basculant dans la rage homicide. Élément collectif : de Merah en Kouachi et en Abdeslam, on constate une prédominance de fratries dans lesquelles s'instaure ce que la psychiatrie nomme un "délire à plusieurs." Élément topographique : toujours en cause, comme lieu de naissance ou de vie, comme bases de prédations et de repli, les territoires de la "politique de la ville," trop souvent devenus des pépinières à fanatiques.</i></p>	<p>Human element: almost always, they are fanatic criminals falling into homicidal rage. Collective element: from Merah to Kouachi and Abdeslam, there is a predominance of brotherhood in which is established what psychiatry calls a "collective delirium". Topographical element: always in question, as a place of birth or life, as bases of predation and withdrawal, the territories of "city policy", too often become breeding grounds for fanatics.</p>
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Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Responsabilités institutionnelles</i></p> <p>Institutional responsibilities</p>	<p><i>Ces mois de préparatifs ; ces multiples allées et venues, de la zone grise de Molenbeek (dans ce qu'on appelait voici dix ans déjà le "Bruxellistan") à nos propres ghettos suburbains ; ces véhicules chargés d'armes et d'explosifs ; ces appartements conspiratifs ; l'agitation d'individus dix fois fichés, repérés, parfois condamnés... sans que nul ne s'en avise vraiment dans le renseignement intérieur français ?</i></p>	<p>These months of preparations; these multiple comings and goings, from the gray area of Molenbeek (in what was called “Bruxellistan” ten years ago) to our own suburban ghettos; these vehicles loaded with weapons and explosives; these conspiratorial apartments; the agitation of individuals ten times listed, identified, sometimes condemned ... without anyone really realizing it in French internal intelligence?</p>
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Table 7. (Continued)

<p>Charlie</p>	<p><i>Un exemple : les Kouachi rôdant et repérés autour de Charlie Hebdo ; les Kouachi entreprenant de se procurer des fusils d'assaut et des cagoules ; les Kouachi volant un véhicule et le chargeant de tout un mortel outillage ; ces mêmes Kouachi, dix fois fichés et signalés, cheminant, fortement armés, vers leur cible. Cela peut, doit, se détecter. La police a essayé et échoué. Mais Coulibaly, déjà connu, y compris comme artificier d'une cellule terroriste : comment a-t-il pu totalement échapper à la vigilance des services ?</i></p>	<p>An example: the Kouachi prowling and spotted around Charlie Hebdo; the Kouachi undertaking to procure assault rifles and balaclavas; the Kouachi stealing a vehicle and loading it with a whole lot of deadly tools; these same Kouachi, ten times filed and signaled, walking, heavily armed, towards their target. It can, must, be detected. The police have tried and failed. But in the case of Coulibaly, already known as a manufacturer of a terrorist cell: how could he have completely escaped the vigilance of the services?</p>
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Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Agresseurs Bataclan</i></p> <p>Bataclan attackers</p>	<p><i>On s'interroge sur les raisons qui ont, de nouveau, permis à des délinquants faisant l'objet d'une fiche S, de pouvoir préparer et conduire des opérations terroristes en pleine capitale.</i></p> <p><i>Présenté comme ayant "joué d'évidence un rôle déterminant," dans les attaques de vendredi, Abaaoud n'en est pas à son coup d'essai. Comme l'a révélé Bernard Cazeneuve, ce personnage "semble impliqué dans quatre des six attentats évités ou déjoués par les services de renseignement français depuis le printemps 2015."</i></p>	<p>One wonders about the reasons that once again allowed delinquents subject to an S file¹⁸ to be able to prepare and conduct terrorist operations in the heart of the capital.</p> <p>Presented as having "obviously played a determining role" in the attacks on Friday, for Abaaoud, this incident is not his first attempt. As revealed by Bernard Cazeneuve, this character "seems involved in four of the six attacks avoided or foiled by the French intelligence services since spring 2015".</p>
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¹⁸ S card or "Fiche S" is a card used by police, border patrols and customs, to list people who are considered a threat to the nation (Laurent, 2015)

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Guerre</i> War</p>	<p><i>Nous entrons dans une nouvelle ère, notre président l'a dit ; nous voilà en guerre. Les mots sont lourds de sens, les conséquences aussi.</i></p>	<p>We are entering a new era, our president has said; here we are at war. The words are heavy with meaning and consequences.</p>
<p><i>Xenophobie</i> Xenophobia</p>	<p><i>Ils veulent plus de répression sur le mode : s'il y a trop d'étrangers, on ne peut pas laisser passer tout le monde, on est infiltrés. Pour illustrer son propos, l'élu raconte une anecdote. Avant même les attentats, ce maire qui penche "plutôt à droite" avait voulu accueillir des réfugiés dans sa commune de 70 habitants. "On m'a répondu OK si ce sont des chrétiens, j'ai laissé tomber", soupire-t-il.</i></p>	<p>"They want more repression on the mode: if there are too many foreigners, we cannot let everyone pass, we are infiltrated". To illustrate his point, the elected representative tells an anecdote. Even before the attacks, this mayor who leans "rather on the right" had wanted to welcome refugees in his town of 70 inhabitants."I was told OK if they are Christians, [so] I gave up" he sighs.</p>

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Radicalisation</i> Radicalization</p>	<p><i>Née dans les Hauts-de-Seine et âgée de 26 ans, La jeune femme s'était rapidement radicalisée. "J'ver bientôt aller en syrie inchallah bientôt depart pour la turkie" (sic), écrivait-elle dans un message publié sur Facebook le 11 juin dernier.</i></p>	<p>Born in Hauts-de-Seine and aged 26, the young woman had quickly radicalized. "I'm soon to go to Syria, inshallah soon to leave for Turkey" (sic), she wrote in a message posted on Facebook on 11 June.</p>
<p><i>La folie</i> madness</p>	<p><i>Une fêtarde "un peu fofolle"</i></p>	<p>A "slightly crazy" party girl</p>
<p><i>Appel Musulman</i> Call from Muslims</p>	<p><i>Nous, musulmans de France, sommes des citoyens français à part entière, faisant partie intégrante de la Nation, et solidaires de l'ensemble de la communauté nationale.</i></p>	<p>We, Muslims of France, are full French citizens, forming an integral part of the Nation, and united with the whole of the national community.</p>

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Description État d'urgence</i> Details State of emergency</p>	<p><i>Les premières sont limitées au temps que durera l'état d'urgence. En l'occurrence trois mois. Elles sont plus rigoureuses que n'importe quel contrôle judiciaire classique. Ne serait-ce que parce que l'obligation de motivation reste très légère.</i></p>	<p>The former are limited to the duration of the state of emergency. In this case three months. They are more rigorous than any traditional judicial review. If only because the obligation to motivate remains very light.</p>
<p><i>Consensus état d'urgence</i> State of emergency consensus</p>	<p><i>État d'urgence : quasi-unanimité à l'Assemblée; Les députés ont voté la prolongation jusqu'en février 2016 de ce dispositif exceptionnel, pour faire face aux attentats.</i></p>	<p>State of emergency: quasi-unanimity in the Assembly; The deputies voted to extend this exceptional device until February 2016, to cope with the attacks.</p>

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Laïcité</i></p> <p>Secularism</p>	<p><i>PAS DE "MENU DE SUBSTITUTION" dans les cantines scolaires ni crèches de Noël dans les mairies : l'Association des maires de France (AMF) a défendu mercredi une application très stricte du principe de laïcité dans son guide de « bonne conduite laïque ».</i></p>	<p>NO "SUBSTITUTION MENU" in school canteens or Christmas cribs in town halls: the Association of Mayors of France (AMF) on Wednesday defended a very strict application of the principle of secularism in its guide to "good secular conduct".</p>
<p><i>Armement de la police</i></p> <p>Arming the police</p>	<p><i>HORS SERVICE et quand même en service. Depuis ce jeudi, les policiers qui le souhaitent peuvent rester armés en permanence. Telle est la décision prise par la Direction générale de la police nationale qui vient de publier une circulaire dans ce sens.</i></p>	<p>OUT OF SERVICE and still in service. Since Thursday, police officers who wish can remain armed at all times. This is the decision taken by the General Directorate of the National Police which has just published a circular to this effect.</p>

Table 7. (Continued)

<p><i>Bombardement armée</i> Army bombardment</p>	<p><i>La France a bombardé le camp d'entraînement des Français et francophone de l'Etat islamique (EI) à Rakka, en Syrie, dans la nuit du 8 octobre.</i></p>	<p>France bombed the French and francophone Islamic State (IS) training camp in Rakka, Syria, on the night of October 8.</p>
<p><i>Assaut contre agresseur</i> Assault against Bataclan aggressors</p>	<p><i>Au lendemain de l'assaut mené par le RAID à l'angle de la rue de la République et de la rue du Corbillon à Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis) mercredi 18 novembre, au cours duquel les policiers ont tiré près de 5 000 munitions, les enquêteurs attendaient avec impatience les conclusions des constatations sur place et l'issue du travail d'identification des corps des personnes tuées.</i></p>	<p>The day after the assault led by the RAID at the corner of rue de la République and rue du Corbillon in Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis) on Wednesday 18 November, during which the police fired nearly 5,000 rounds of ammunition, investigators impatiently awaited the conclusions of the findings on the spot and the outcome of the work to identify the bodies of those killed.</p>

Table 7. (Continued)

<i>Ressenti national</i> National resentment	<i>"Au bar du village, on ne parle que de ça "</i>	"At the village bar, we only talk about that"
<i>Témoignage</i> Testimony	<i>En fait, se souvient Louis, " mon cerveau essayait de se connecter, de comprendre pourquoi on m'avait tiré dessus." Il n'a pas pensé d'emblée à un acte terroriste, mais plutôt à un fou.</i>	In fact, Louis remembers, "my brain was trying to connect, to understand why I was shot." He did not immediately think of a terrorist act, but rather of a madman. "

Table 8. Preliminary codes used to label passages from articles published 19 June 2016 in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*

Open coding – label	Example
Watch lists	Rival measures from Republicans and Democrats to be taken up on Monday seek to address the so-called "terror gap" allowing people on terrorist watch lists to buy firearms, and to expand background checks for purchases at gun shows and online.
Legal precedents	In 2004, Congress allowed the 10-year ban to expire amid lobbying by the NRA and gun-rights advocates in Congress. John Kerry, the Democratic nominee for president that year, accused President George W. Bush of failing to do enough to win passage of an extension.
Portrait of candidate	Contrary to what many of his followers insist on believing, he is not a self-made man. Over the course of his career, Mr. Trump appears to have been more of a grifter than a businessman, as recent investigations by <i>The Times</i> and <i>U.S.A. Today</i> have shown, racking up four corporate bankruptcies while continually enriching himself at the expense of stockholders, contractors, employees, and customers.

Table 8. (Continued)

Other failed attacks	Belgium Says It Blocked Attack on Soccer Viewers
Aggressor childhood	Omar Mateen was that chunky kid with glasses, remembered more for his scrapes with other classmates than for his academic performance. Early on, the same schoolboy who could wear a broad smile and a Power Rangers T-shirt in his school portrait could also engage in "much talk about violence & sex," according to a school assessment.
Aggressor work history	Denied the right to wear one uniform, Mr. Mateen soon dressed in another -- that of a security guard. He completed a training course, passed a background check, and began working for a security firm called G4S. At one point, perhaps as part of a G4S contract, he was working as an intake officer at a Florida juvenile assessment center. At another point, he was providing security after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, during which an undercover documentarian recorded a few of his cynical observations.
Aggressor religious beliefs	The mosque's imam, Syed Shafeeq Rahman, insisted that Mr. Mateen had never heard teachings at the mosque that would have radicalized him. "There is nothing that he is hearing from me to do killing, to do bloodshed, to do anything, because we never talk like that," the imam said.

Table 8. (Continued)

Aggressor history with FBI	Though far-fetched and even contradictory -- he claimed connections to Al Qaeda, the Sunni extremist group, and ties to its near opposite, the Shiite Hezbollah -- his comments were troubling enough for the county sheriff's office to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The bureau's subsequent inquiry was inconclusive.
Aggressor intimate relationships	He had connected online with a young woman named Sitora Yusufiy, an immigrant from Uzbekistan, who initially found him to be a nice, funny man who treated his family well and had aspirations of becoming a police officer.
Domestic violence	Soon after their marriage in April 2009, Ms. Yusufiy said, he began beating her and isolating her in their Florida home. With the help of her parents in New Jersey, she fled within the year.
International relations	The confusion and division are emblematic of NATO's inability so far to deal comprehensively with threats washing up on its southern tier: terrorism, radical Islam, anarchy in North Africa and uncontrolled migration.
Public policy agenda	By proposing to bar people from certain regions rather than religions, Mr. Trump had avoided the sticky issue of testing someone's faith.

Table 8. (Continued)

Post-9/11 policies	For a time after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, people from predominantly Muslim countries arriving in the United States were fingerprinted and questioned for a special registration, and immigrants from those countries already living here had to register as well.
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The preliminary codes were used to label passages in the entire corpus of data for each national newspaper articles. Because of the large numbers of articles to analyze, the coding method of what is colloquially called “lumping” was used because it is a more expedient way to analyze data and it still allows for more detailed subcodes later in the process (Saldaña, 2013, p. 20). Tables 9 and 10 show the axial coding used for the entire data set. Axial coding refers to the links I drew between different codes and the associated data (Allen, 2017). These codes were generated based on the preliminary codes. A codebook and a detailed list defining these codes were generated based on my understanding of these frameworks (see Appendix C and D). Data were color-coded and collated according to potential themes. For example, passages from data that are addressing potential motivations for the Bataclan attacks and the Pulse shooting, were coded under the umbrella term “perpetrator.” After coding the entire data set, the following thematic groupings were created: (1) references and comparisons to other “terrorist” events; (2) militaristic intervention abroad and international relations on terrorism; (3) politics of national identity; (4) criminological identification of radicalism; (5) psychological figure of terrorism; (6) religious identities and the Muslim experience.

Table 9. Example of codes used to analyze articles published in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* 13 to 20 November 2015

Axial coding – label	Open coding – label (french/english)	Example
<i>Définisseurs principaux</i> Primary definers : Que sont-ils ?	<i>Politiques autres pays</i> Policies other nations	<i>Depuis quelques jours, la Turquie se montre particulièrement active dans sa traque anti-Daech.</i>
	<i>Expertise sécurité</i> Security expertise	<i>Ces efforts s'accompagnent d'une prise de conscience, au sein des renseignements turcs, du risque sécuritaire posé par les combattants étrangers qui vont et viennent entre la Syrie et l'Europe via la Turquie.</i>

Table 9. (Continued)

	<p><i>Responsabilités institutionnelles</i></p> <p>Institutional responsibilities</p>	<p><i>Ces mois de préparatifs ; ces multiples allées et venues, de la zone grise de Molenbeek (dans ce qu'on appelait voici dix ans déjà le "Bruxellistan") à nos propres ghettos suburbains ; ces véhicules chargés d'armes et d'explosifs ; ces appartements conspiratifs ; l'agitation d'individus dix fois fichés, repérés, parfois condamnés... sans que nul ne s'en avise vraiment dans le renseignement intérieur français ?</i></p>
<p><i>Autres</i></p> <p>Others</p>	<p><i>Autres bombes suicidaires</i></p> <p>Other suicide attacks</p>	<p><i>Samedi soir, un kamikaze s'est fait exploser lors d'un assaut des forces antiterroristes contre un appartement de Gaziantep, ville proche de la Syrie</i></p>

Table 9. (Continued)

	Charlie	<p><i>Un exemple : les Kouachi rôdant et repérés autour de Charlie Hebdo ; les Kouachi entreprenant de se procurer des fusils d'assaut et des cagoules ; les Kouachi volant un véhicule et le chargeant de tout un mortel outillage ; ces mêmes Kouachi, dix fois fichés et signalés, cheminant, fortement armés, vers leur cible. Cela peut, doit, se détecter. La police a essayé et échoué. Mais Coulibaly, déjà connu, y compris comme artificier d'une cellule terroriste : comment a-t-il pu totalement échapper à la vigilance des services ?</i></p>
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Table 9. (Continued)

<p><i>Agresseurs</i> Perpetrators</p>	<p><i>Agresseurs Bataclan</i> Bataclan attackers</p>	<p><i>On s'interroge sur les raisons qui ont, de nouveau, permis à des délinquants faisant l'objet d'une fiche S, de pouvoir préparer et conduire des opérations terroristes en pleine capitale.</i></p> <p><i>Présenté comme ayant "joué d'évidence un rôle déterminant," dans les attaques de vendredi, Abaaoud n'en est pas à son coup d'essai. Comme l'a révélé Bernard Cazeneuve, ce personnage "semble impliqué dans quatre des six attentats évités ou déjoués par les services de renseignement français depuis le printemps 2015"</i></p>
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Table 9. (Continued)

	<i>Radicalisation</i> Radicalization	<i>Née dans les Hauts-de-Seine et âgée de 26 ans, La jeune femme s'était rapidement radicalisée. "Jver biento aller en syrie inchallah biento depart pour la turkie" (sic), écrivait-elle dans un message publié sur Facebook le 11 juin dernier.</i>
	<i>La folie</i> madness	<i>Une fêtarde "un peu fofolle"</i>

Table 9. (Continued)

	<p><i>Rationalisation Bataclan</i></p> <p>Rationalization Bataclan</p>	<p><i>Élément humain : toujours ou presque il s'agit de criminels fanatisés basculant dans la rage homicide. Élément collectif : de Merah en Kouachi et en Abdeslam, on constate une prédominance de fratries dans lesquelles s'instaure ce que la psychiatrie nomme un "délire à plusieurs." Élément topographique : toujours en cause, comme lieu de naissance ou de vie, comme bases de prédatons et de repli, les territoires de la "politique de la ville," trop souvent devenus des pépinières à fanatiques.</i></p>
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Table 9. (Continued)

<p><i>Militaire</i> Military</p>	<p><i>Affrontements</i> Confrontation</p>	<p><i>Le même jour, quatre personnes identifiées comme des militants de l'organisation EI ont également été tuées par l'armée turque, à l'approche d'un poste militaire frontalier avec la Syrie.</i></p>
	<p><i>Occupation militaire</i> Military occupation</p>	<p><i>Lancée par la force "Barkhane" le 26 octobre, l'opération "Vignemale" prendra fin ce dimanche. Menée simultanément au Niger et au Mali, elle se singularise à la fois par sa durée - un mois - et son volume - un millier d'hommes. La force "Barkhane," présente dans cinq pays du Sahel, cherche ainsi à juguler les flux interfrontaliers des groupes terroristes et, au Mali, à empêcher les katibas djihadistes qui avaient occupé le nord du pays pendant près d'un an d'y reprendre pied.</i></p>

Table 9. (Continued)

	<i>Guerre</i> War	<i>Nous entrons dans une nouvelle ère, notre président l'a dit ; nous voilà en guerre. Les mots sont lourds de sens, les conséquences aussi.</i>
	<i>Armement de la police</i> Arming the police	<i>HORS SERVICE et quand même en service. Depuis ce jeudi, les policiers qui le souhaitent peuvent rester armés en permanence. Telle est la décision prise par la Direction générale de la police nationale qui vient de publier une circulaire dans ce sens.</i>
	<i>Bombardement armée</i> Army bombardment	<i>La France a bombardé le camp d'entraînement des Français et francophone de l'Etat islamique (EI) à Rakka, en Syrie, dans la nuit du 8 octobre.</i>

Table 9. (Continued)

<i>Nationalité</i>	<i>Xenophobie</i>	<i>Ils veulent plus de répression sur</i>
Nationality	Xenophobia	<i>le mode : "s'il y a trop d'étrangers, on ne peut pas laisser passer tout le monde, on est infiltrés." Pour illustrer son propos, l'élu raconte une anecdote. Avant même les attentats, ce maire qui penche "plutôt à droite " avait voulu accueillir des réfugiés dans sa commune de 70 habitants. "On m'a répondu OK si ce sont des chrétiens, j'ai laissé tomber," soupire-t-il.</i>
	<i>Ressenti national</i>	<i>"Au bar du village, on ne parle</i>
	National resentment	<i>que de ça"</i>

Table 9. (Continued)

<p><i>Urgence</i> Emergency</p>	<p><i>Description État d'urgence</i> Details State of emergency</p>	<p><i>Les premières sont limitées au temps que durera l'état d'urgence. En l'occurrence trois mois. Elles sont plus rigoureuses que n'importe quel contrôle judiciaire classique. Ne serait-ce que parce que l'obligation de motivation reste très légère.</i></p>
	<p><i>Consensus état d'urgence</i> State of emergency consensus</p>	<p><i>État d'urgence : quasi-unanimité à l'Assemblée; Les députés ont voté la prolongation jusqu'en février 2016 de ce dispositif exceptionnel, pour faire face aux attentats.</i></p>

Table 9. (Continued)

<p>Religion</p>	<p><i>Laïcité</i> Secularism</p>	<p><i>PAS DE "MENU DE SUBSTITUTION" dans les cantines scolaires ni crèches de Noël dans les mairies : l'Association des maires de France (AMF) a défendu mercredi une application très stricte du principe de laïcité dans son guide de "bonne conduite laïque."</i></p>
	<p><i>Appel Musulman</i> Call from Muslims</p>	<p><i>Nous, musulmans de France, sommes des citoyens français à part entière, faisant partie intégrante de la Nation, et solidaires de l'ensemble de la communauté nationale.</i></p>

Table 9. (Continued)

Bataclan	<i>Assaut contre agresseur</i> Assault against Bataclan agressors	<i>Au lendemain de l'assaut mené par le RAID à l'angle de la rue de la République et de la rue du Corbillon à Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis) mercredi 18 novembre, au cours duquel les policiers ont tiré près de 5 000 munitions, les enquêteurs attendaient avec impatience les conclusions des constatations sur place et l'issue du travail d'identification des corps des personnes tuées.</i>
	<i>Témoignage</i> Testimony	<i>En fait, se souvient Louis, "mon cerveau essayait de se connecter, de comprendre pourquoi on m'avait tiré dessus." Il n'a pas pensé d'emblée à un acte terroriste, mais plutôt à un fou.</i>

Table 10. Example of codes used to analyze articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* 12 to 19 June 2016

Axial coding	Open coding – label	Example
Laws	Watch lists	Rival measures from Republicans and Democrats to be taken up on Monday seek to address the so-called "terror gap" allowing people on terrorist watch lists to buy firearms, and to expand background checks for purchases at gun shows and online.

Table 10. (Continued)

	<p>Legal precedents</p>	<p>In 2004, Congress allowed the 10-year ban to expire amid lobbying by the N.R.A. ¹⁹and gun-rights advocates in Congress. John Kerry, the Democratic nominee for president that year, accused President George W. Bush of failing to do enough to win passage of an extension.</p>
	<p>International relations</p>	<p>The confusion and division are emblematic of NATO's inability so far to deal comprehensively with threats washing up on its southern tier: terrorism, radical Islam, anarchy in North Africa and uncontrolled migration.</p>

¹⁹ In reference to the National Rifle Association, number one lobbyist and benefactor organization through which donations and contributions to the war on terrorism do not need to be public knowledge to imagine that N.R.A. "jubilates" in times of terror like the ones that took place at Pulse that night, and also in France the year prior. More on that later.

Table 10. (Continued)

Candidate	Portrait of candidate	
		<p>Contrary to what many of his followers insist on believing, he is not a self-made man. Over the course of his career, Mr. Trump appears to have been more of a grifter than a businessman, as recent investigations by <i>The Times</i> and <i>U.S.A. Today</i> have shown, racking up four corporate bankruptcies while continually enriching himself at the expense of stockholders, contractors, employees and customers.</p>

Table 10. (Continued)

	Public policy agenda	<p>But they said that putting it in place would take an ambitious bureaucratic effort not likely to move nearly as quickly as the candidate envisions. And it would make sweeping use of executive authority to enact the sharpest restrictions on immigration since 1965, when the United States abandoned longstanding quotas designed to exclude people from much of Asia and from southern and Eastern Europe.</p>
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Table 10. (Continued)

Perpetrator	Aggressor childhood	Omar Mateen was that chunky kid with glasses, remembered more for his scrapes with other classmates than for his academic performance. Early on, the same schoolboy who could wear a broad smile and a Power Rangers T-shirt in his school portrait could also engage in "much talk about violence & (sic) sex," according to a school assessment.
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Table 10. (Continued)

	Aggressor work history	<p>Denied the right to wear one uniform, Mr. Mateen soon dressed in another -- that of a security guard. He completed a training course, passed a background check, and began working for a security firm called G4S. At one point, perhaps as part of a G4S contract, he was working as an intake officer at a Florida juvenile assessment center. At another point, he was providing security after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, during which an undercover documentarian recorded a few of his cynical observations.</p>
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Table 10. (Continued)

	Aggressor religious beliefs	<p>The mosque's imam, Syed Shafeeq Rahman, insisted that Mr. Mateen had never heard teachings at the mosque that would have radicalized him. "There is nothing that he is hearing from me to do killing, to do bloodshed, to do anything, because we never talk like that," the imam said.</p>
	Aggressor history with FBI	<p>Though far-fetched and even contradictory -- he claimed connections to Al Qaeda, the Sunni extremist group, and ties to its near opposite, the Shiite Hezbollah -- his comments were troubling enough for the county sheriff's office to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The bureau's subsequent inquiry was inconclusive.</p>

Table 10. (Continued)

	Aggressor intimate relationships	He had connected online with a young woman named Sitora Yusufiy, an immigrant from Uzbekistan, who initially found him to be a nice, funny man who treated his family well and had aspirations of becoming a police officer.
	Domestic violence	Soon after their marriage in April 2009, Ms. Yusufiy said, he began beating her and isolating her in their Florida home. With the help of her parents in New Jersey, she fled within the year.
Comparisons	Other failed attacks	Belgium Says It Blocked Attack on Soccer Viewers

Table 10. (Continued)

	Post-9/11 policies	For a time after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, people from predominantly Muslim countries arriving in the United States were fingerprinted and questioned for a special registration, and immigrants from those countries already living here had to register as well.
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To refine and define these codes, I collated passages with corresponding thematic categories that I now explain in more detail before sharing an overview of the chapter.

To begin, codes were systematically generated by breaking down information from newspaper articles and by evaluating the ways articles, or passages from articles, overlapped. Coding allowed to process the selected quotes and fragments of text in an effort to saturate the thematic categories, explained next. Saturation occurs, according to Testerman (2015), “when a theme is developed and then all articles are resorted with consideration of that theme” (p. 45), which is achievable through the iterative process in comparative thematic analysis. For this research, I interrogated the entirety of the data and constantly edited the interpretation of coded dataset within the conceptual orientations and methodological toolkits guiding this study. Saturation occurs at the point where no new themes were found in subsequent articles. In other

words, after I assigned a category for all the newspaper articles, saturation was achieved. Data were coded by drawing from the sequences of moral panic to bring into focus the themes elevated in the study of newspaper representation of terrorism and to deconstruct the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks.

Once the axial codes were selected by grouping open codes, the final themes were elevated by collating axial codes and by gathering relevant data for each theme (see phases of thematic analysis in Table 6). Themes were then refined through analysis and revisions after being discussed with my advisors. For instance, the first theme brings together the categories: perpetrators and Bataclan following the analysis of articles published in *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* and the categories: perpetrator and comparisons following the study of articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. I will now preview the themes elevated for this study before going over the results in the following chapters.

The first theme shows how newspaper representations of terrorism were complicit in *the construction of the identity of the perpetrator as folk devils*. Following the Bataclan and the Pulse attacks, the national press came across as a vehicle to fuel a certain hostility towards the perpetrators, and towards people who emerged as a result of an amplification of the “threat-potential” in society (Hall, p. 223). This theme interprets the textual attitudes of newspaper accounts that call back what was explained earlier, the strategies of newspapers that provide simplified complex explanation (Alsultany, 2012) in stories told about the perpetrator. From the perspective of signification spirals in a moral panic, this theme shows how newspaper representation of terrorism simplified, “acts which pose[d] a challenge to the fundamental basis of the social order itself” and “signified as constituting a threat to the future existence of the whole state itself” (Hall et al., p. 225). From the sequences in the concept of moral panic, it is

possible to understand how newspaper representation of terrorism reinforced Orientalism in the amplification of an escalating threat (Hall et al., p. 222). In other words, this theme brings into perspective how these major political events and the ensuing pursuit for the identification of a threat were represented in newspaper representation as a reinforcement of Orientalism. The codes used in newspaper instantiated significant breaches as acts of “radical Islamic terrorism,” and amplified the prophecies that had predicted these “scenarios” and other vindictive expertise that resonated within a state-controlled assessment of threat posed by a specific type of terrorism.

With this first theme, it is possible to understand how newspaper representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks and the 12 June 2016 shooting, reinforced Orientalism with specific discursive arrangements of identity and the contrast with the identification strategies that, recalling Silva (2016), “form a system of consensus surrounding identity that naturalizes the system of racialized hierarchies” with “popular tropes of identity” (Silva, p. 51). As a trope of identity at the center of newspaper representation of terrorism following the attacks studied in this dissertation, is the stereotype of folk devils, to borrow the expression from studies in moral panic. The stereotype of mad and barbaric “folk devils,” natives of France and of the U.S.A., travelling across borders, and who appeared to be have become “bad” Muslim (Alsultany, 2012, p. 110). A trope that cut across newspaper representation the moment when, in a moral panic sequence, interests converged to use similar labels in the identification of other threats posed by terrorism post-Bataclan and post-Pulse, and of the ways to assess this threat.

The second theme analyzes *the articulation of warlike security discourse* that was elevated as central in the study of newspaper representation of terrorism that reinforced Orientalism discourse following the 13 November 2015 attacks and 12 June 2016 shooting.

Warlike refers here to the metaphors, similes, anthropomorphisms, that upholstered newspaper representation of terrorism sets of discourses that articulated the weaponized arms of nation-states, built on settler colonialism and imperialism, and the dominant responses of a secular security complex falls prey to terrorism. This theme becomes an opportunity to bring into perspective the newspaper representation of presidential performances in the war on terrorism within the logic of amplification illustrated in the previous theme. This second theme pays specific attention to the newspapers discursive formations that transformed policing practices and that illustrated how terrorism was regulated in France and the U.S.A. at the time.

Variations of the theme also interrogate the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse and what cut across newspaper representation of terrorism as a biopolitical frame of surveillance and securitization (Puar, p. xii). The facet of Orientalism discourse of politics and cultural power relations that appeared to have been reinforced in newspaper representation of terrorism when, Simon Browne explained, “enactments of surveillance reify boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines, and where the outcome is often discriminatory treatment of those who are negatively racialized by such surveillance” (p. 16). That is one of the reasons why this research can be useful for those who wish to understand the apparent differences and undeniable similarities in processes of racialization between France and the U.S.A. This theme interrogates how newspaper representation signified a “racializing surveillance” and amplified the reification of borders in a paradoxical secular security context.

Finally, the third and final theme deals with how newspaper representation of terrorism reinforced Orientalism in its signification of *the paradoxes that the national press and public politicians appeared to be facing* at the time of the events. In this theme, I dissect newspaper representations of terrorism that self-contradicted or that conflicted utopian democratic ideals of

tolerance, inclusion, and peoplehood within the weaponized secular security context of France and the U.S.A. The paradoxes signified in newspaper representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks, reinforced Orientalism discourse in the moral panic sense that these innumerable paradoxes provided a sense of ideological closure. Moments in the moral panic when nationalism logics were strongly signified in the appeals to “tradition, national or religious identity, patriotism,” an attitude that Said had already questioned about the U.S.A. and Libya in the nineties war on terrorism (Said, p. 327). This is a moment when the “phalanx of guardians” who simplified and protected “one or another creed, essence, primordial faith,” and when “one fundamentalism invidiously attacks the others in the name of sanity, freedom, and goodness” (Said, 1993, p. 327). Said added that “A curious paradox is that religious fervor seems almost always to obscure notions of the sacred or divine, as if those could not survive in the overheated, largely secular atmosphere of fundamentalist combat” (p. 327). The next chapter illustrates how this paradox cuts across newspaper representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks in the secular context of France post-Charlie. It questions the simplification of the complexity of the 13 November 2015 attacks that, once instantiated in news as terrorism, concomitantly vilified Muslims and depicted non-Muslim Western identity in position of authority to deny the responsibility to cure the root causes of terrorism, political violence.

CHAPTER FOUR:
THE ENDURANCE OF A DISPROPORTION:
NEWS REPRESENTATION OF TERRORISM IN FRANCE AFTER THE BATACLAN

Introduction

This chapter contends that newspaper representation of terrorism reinforced Orientalism discourse in the context surrounding the tragic 13 November 2015 series of attacks that took place in between Saint-Denis and Paris, France. I begin with an analytical summary of the events that unfolded that night of 13 November 2015 events. I continue to interrogate the vilification of people who identify with Islam and the Islamic worldviews, geographies, and cultural traditions. This chapter points out the postcolonial significance of time in the presidential addresses, media accounts, and other releases from public officials about these acts marked as terrorism. These presidential performances, and the subsequent ones performed for days after the events, resonated in the newspaper as evidence to the thesis of this dissertation. Orientalism was surely reinforced in the newspaper representation of the Bataclan. It was also the foundations, the maps and fields of meaning made (in)visible communicative practices of colonial legacies and contemporary interest convergence in the subject of terrorism, within the toxicity of White Supremacist discourses of the War on terrorism. The study starts by following the 13 November 2015 attacks and their representation as terrorism in a qualitative/interpretive approach to the

selected newspaper articles. This chapter contends that Orientalism discourse was at the inceptions of these tragic events, and of the unfolding newspaper representation of terrorism.

Newspaper Representation of the 13 November 2015 Series of Attacks

On the evening of Friday, 13 November 2015, three suicide-bombs exploded intermittently near the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, France, where Germany and France were playing a friendly international soccer game. A few minutes after the first bombing, a series of shooting started a few kilometers south of Saint-Denis, in downtown Paris, France. A group of shooters opened fire on people sitting outside bars and restaurants located in the 10th and 11th arrondissements, or city boroughs, of the capital before another group of shooters killed and took others hostage inside the Bataclan, a concert hall where Eagles of Death Metal was performing that night. It was confirmed, days later, that 129 people died that night, and 354 others were injured as a result of this series of attacks (Extract # 176).

Immediately after the attacks, for about a day or two, newspapers reported how the events unfolded. Even though the emergency services were still struggling to provide first aid and “*sauver les rescapés dans un indescriptible bain de sang,*” – the English translation of this passage is as follows, “to save the survivors in an indescribable bloodbath” (Extract # 8) – , newspaper reporters and editors were already qualifying “these attacks” as “*‘complexes’ au regard du modus operandi [...], plusieurs assaillants [qui] se déplaçaient pour semer la terreur*” (Extract #20), which translates in English as, “‘complex’ with regard to the modus operandi [...], several attackers [who] were moving to sow terror.” The partial descriptions of these multiple and complex attacks remind the readership, at least in this last cited article, of the unprecedented nature of the attacks, “*inspirées d’une forme de violence ayant cours depuis plusieurs années*

dans des zones de conflit telles que l’Afghanistan, l’Irak ou la Syrie, où règne une forme de violence dont la France se croyait jusqu’alors protégée,” or, “inspired by a form of violence that has been going on for several years in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, where a form of violence reigns from which France believed to be protected.” In this news account, Orientalism had already sedimented the discourses that consisted in making of nations, the victims of a form of violence “*dont la France se croyait jusqu’alors protégée,*” or, “from which France believed to be protected” (Extract #20).

The three themes developed in this chapter then allow us to understand the depth of the anchor that is Orientalism in newspaper representation of terrorism. We begin with the theme that challenges the stereotypes and tropes of Orientalism that reinscribe a fixed understanding of religion and the simplification of anything that has to do with Islam, the tropes of the folk devils that are communicated in news made by comments like the one cited above, reinscribing into the imaginary of media consumers the sentiment of a threat still at risk, of a foreign-born threat circulating feely among “us” citizens. The role played by news in the escalation of fear and the enduring sentiment that the threat perdured for some time after the attacks at the Bataclan, translates how deep the scope of Orientalism has been anchored in newspaper representation.

One of the textual attitudes of Orientalism that undercut newspaper representation of terrorism was, as you will notice in this chapter, the way the nation-state of France came across as “immunized” against the threat, reinscribing into the consciousness of media consumers the language that communicates the need for “medicalization” in a nation still at prey with the threat posed by terrorism. The deconstruction of the questions of identity made central to the news challenged the stereotypes of a “homegrown” folk devils “on the loose” that came across newspaper representation in the sets of word images of pools of blood, scattered body parts, and

teared human flesh and souls. Throughout this entire chapter, we keep in mind the conscious labor of interpreting data to understand how Orientalism served as anchor to newspaper representation of terrorism at the time of the events. We will then turn to the warlike discourse and the depiction of acts weaving into the fabric of society a sentiment of inertia that results out of the traditional canvas made of violence signified in newspaper representation of terrorism.

Theme 1: The Construction of the Identity of the Perpetrators as Folk Devils

Following the Bataclan attacks, newspaper representation of terrorism invited the readers to accuse the “dihadistes,” or, “islamistes” - read as, fundamentalist Islamists - who are already and always posing a threat to the European democracies. A simple search for terms like “Islam” in the word document that holds the compilation of the 210 articles, shows that the term and others with the same roots - like “*islamistes*” or “*islamique*” or “*islamisme*”, - appeared 312 times. What comes in stark contrast with the fixation on Islamism, is the ways newspaper reverberated strongly what it meant to be French, or *français* following the attacks. In comparison, the term *français* was printed at least 286 times in articles collected for this research. The limited juxtapositions of Islam as a monolithic entity with terrorism contrasts greatly with the juxtaposition of French-ness as this ideal experience, represented in the news as the epitome of democratization processes. One should not have to be Muslim to realize this disproportional attention limits what may be the experience of being Muslim. In other terms, there is a unidimensional representation of Muslims and Islam that does not admit variations.

Soon after the 13 November 2015 attacks, readers of *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* learned more from detailed accounts about the events. A series of articles give specific details about the perpetrators of the tragic acts. For example, the article redacted by an editorial team at *Le Monde*

and published on 15 November 2015 that gave an account of a survivor who faced the aggressors said: *“J’ai vu deux fous, arriver en riant : “Ce que vous faites à la Syrie, on va vous le faire” “, témoignera un peu plus tard une femme, blessée.”* This passage translates as, “I saw two madmen, arriving laughing: ‘What you are doing to Syria, we are going to do it,’ a wounded woman would testify later, hurt.” First, this passage gives an example that shows how discourses of madness were reinforced in newspaper representation of terrorism post-Bataclan. Second, this passage demonstrates how Orientalism discourse was reinforced in the testimonies of survivors who are repeatedly used to frame madness.

One example of survivor testimonies resonated with this madness theory, in the article *“Louis Samka, 26 ans: ‘J’étais en mode survie’”* published in the international section of *Le Monde*. Another evidence of a use of a survivor testimony that invited readers to immerse in the narrative of madness and to become a framing hypothesis used to label the crimes committed by the perpetrators. The article notes: *“En fait, se souvient Louis, “ mon cerveau essayait de se connecter, de comprendre pourquoi on m'avait tiré dessus ”. Il n'a pas pensé d'emblée à un acte terroriste, mais plutôt à un fou,*” which translates as, “In fact, Louis remembers, ‘my brain was trying to connect, to understand why I was shot.’ He did not immediately think of a terrorist act, but rather of a madperson.” Madness becomes the frame used by the journalist to frame the introduction of the article. What comes after is a series of paragraphs in which the journalist must have asked the survivor to give an account of the events. An account by a survivor who seemingly consented to give detailed memories about “facing death” after finding oneself in the middle of “scenes of war”. Next, the journalist must have received consent from the mother who then was quoted as feeling resentment or, in other words, was experiencing “incomprehension in the face of barbarism” (Extract # 209).

These examples are important for understanding how newspaper narratives depicted perpetrators through survivor testimonies. By survivor testimonies, I refer to the stories told by people who encountered the perpetrators, who bore witness to these acts of extreme violence, and who are quoted in the news. In that sense, it could be interpreted that, consumers attentive to news might have a window open into what Mbembe names best, a representation of terrorism within already existing "death-worlds" (Mbembe, 2003, p. 40). In fact, the abovementioned passages, quoted from the data, only shows a glimpse at how survivor testimonies are to evoke madness in the newspaper representation of terrorism post-Bataclan. I use the term *diagnostical* to remind the reader of this project, of the politics of resentment traditionally expressed in the dominant response to acts of violence legally marked as violent and the way vehicle of news in the scheme of justification for sovereign legitimacy over the nonlegal use of violence (Mbembe, 2019). One cannot omit the exertion of power in the discourse of madness as a quintessential framework for the logic of Orientalism to prevail. This trend of emitting the madness hypotheses is ultimately at the core of Orientalism discourse but here, through testimonies coming from people who witnessed and suffered from the trauma of a brutal act of violence. The critique is to question the role played by newspapers in framing these accounts as part of the justificatory schemes that make of state use of political violence non legal yet justifiable.

Since Orientalism relied, principally, on a logic of essentialization and objectification that buttressed imperial regimes, it is important to understand the role of survivor testimonies in the representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks. I turned to Baroni (2018) who taught us that the narrative framework of newspaper articles might neutralize *“l’immersion et la mise en intrigue [...] au profit d’une représentation objectivante et généralisante, visant à rendre compréhensible un événement ayant introduit une forte discordance dans le flux de*

l'actualité" (p. 119) - a passage that translates as follows, "the immersion and intrigue [...] in favor of an objectifying and generalizing representation, aiming to make comprehensible an event having introduced a strong discordance in the flow of the news". According to Baroni, this journalistic trend can be found in the first days following the attacks of 13 November 2015, when numerous articles narrated the "protagonists" and more particularly the "aggressors" and which more often relate to their functions ("suicide bombers" or "Commandos" for example) than their unique identities. This representation invites readers to perceive a threat made palpable through media narratives (see the category of perpetrators, Table 9). I contend that these passages reinforce Orientalism discourse for how journalists and editors reify the assumptions that Islam should be perceived as a "looming threat and destabilizing power" (Elgamri, 2008, p. 49). This way of narrating the events of the Bataclan works in tandem with the way the media have focused on the identity of the scapegoats. This association also corresponds to the second characteristic of moral panic, that is, the hostile reaction towards the community considered responsible for the acts. The definition of the threat sketched out by the condemnation of a global enemy, amplified in the national press, made visible Muslims and those who identify with Islam, often called by the national press and politicians to condemn the acts committed by "djidahistes" or, "jihadists" (Extract #17).

It is possible to notice differences and similarities in the ways national print press reverberated and amplified the call to unity in the backdrop of the warlike climate resented in the wake of these tragic attacks. Beyond the usual qualifications (of "commandos" and "assailants"), we can see a tendency of the right-wing press to infantilize certain aggressors (described as "*petits voyous et d'illuminés*," "*petits délinquants*," "*malfrats français*" terms which translate as follows, "little thugs and crackpots," "petty delinquents," "French thugs") and to affix a foreign

origin (“Syrian migrant”) to others (Extract # 65). This trend is found as the central theme of an article published in *Le Figaro* on 16 November 2015 by Mevel, who was the expert for the newspaper on issues related to Eastern Europe. Mevel wrote:

Le scenario de tueurs se mêlant au flot incontrôlable des quelque 800 000 hommes, femmes et enfants débarqués cette année de Turquie en Grèce donne, depuis longtemps, des sueurs froides aux polices du Vieux Continent. Une confirmation [que le passeport appartient à l'un des assaillants] accrédirait aussi une planification de longue haleine des attentats par l'État islamique, à l'opposé des « loups solitaires » incriminés lors de l'attaque du Musée juif à Bruxelles et de l'attentat déjoué contre le TGV Bruxelles-Paris.
(Extract # 31)

This passage is translated in English by the author in the following block quote,

The scenario of murderers mingling with the uncontrollable flow of some 800,000 men, women and children who landed this year from Turkey in Greece had been giving police in the Old Continent, cold sweats. Confirmation that [the passport belongs to one of the attackers] would also accredit a long-term planning of the attacks by the Islamic State, a the opposite of “lone wolves” incriminated during the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels and of the foiled attack on the Brussels-Paris TGV.

This passage illustrates a tendency of the dominant responses post-Bataclan in the use of the metaphor of an "uncontrollable flow" to describe an "immigration crisis" as a causal link with the terrorist threat. A practice that reinforces the hypothesis of "the figure of the migrant [that] has come to be seen as a potential terrorist in the West," part of the world where migrants and refugees are already continually characterized as taking place in "a destructive and even militarized war against Western civilization" (Nail, 2016, p. 160). With this passage, the reader

is invited to stand in "cold sweats" alongside police of the "old Continent" and other institutions in charge of tracking down the "homegrown," "radical Islamic terrorists," some of whom were still on the loose in the days that followed the attacks.

Media consumers found themselves immersed in birds eye views of journalistic accounts that followed the tracks of institutions invested in the arrest of the perpetrator, in charge of "hunting down the radical Islamic terrorists" still running loose. An alarmist report published on *Le Figaro* by Cornevin on the 19 November 2021 invited the readers to make sense of, "*la traque hors norme menée pour neutraliser les complices des sept kamikazes qui ont frappé le coeur de la région parisienne*" (Extract # 145). In English, this passage translated as follows, "the extraordinary hunt carried out to neutralize the accomplices of the seven suicide bombers who struck at the heart of the Parisian region." Readers were then suddenly compelled to fear that the Double, as the author claims, "*un extravagant nid de terroristes, l'un des plus venimeux que la France n'ait jamais abrité en son sein, qui a été mis au jour en plein quartier historique de Saint-Denis, à deux pas de la Basilique des rois et à moins d'un kilomètre du Stade de France visé par trois opérations suicides.*" A passage that, once translated, illustrates how the Double was constructed following the 13 November 2015 attacks, subject of the next subsection and discussion of the second theme of this chapter. The passage reads in English, " an extravagant terrorist nest, one of the most poisonous that France has ever housed within it, which has been unearthed in the historic district of Saint-Denis, a stone's throw from the Basilica of the Kings and at least one kilometer away from the Stade de France targeted by three suicide operations." The front cover of *Le Figaro* published that; investigators counted approximately 5000 ammunitions on the scene of this hunt while the in-depth coverage of the police assault played the immersive role of describing veritable "scenes of war" (see the category of war in Table 7).

The reader is left with the imaginations of orders shouted, sounds of gunfire, explosives, sirens, and other sonic manifestations of war that surely terrorized at least part of the population living in the neighborhood.

The immersive journalistic accounts of the police raid published in *Le Figaro* gave the impression of closure and return to security for people in France when news confirmed by the perpetrators were killed during the assault.²⁰ Readers of *Le Monde* were not that deeply immersed in the police raid and were instead invited to understand how police forces obtained intelligence information about the whereabouts of Abaaoud and one other accomplice of the 13 November 2015. Only the investigation of the assault and the publication months later of an internal report showed that the assault did not happen the way Bernard Cazeneuve, and the people in charge of the raid, said happened (for details, see Martinet et al., 2016). It was discovered that there were not 5000 ammunitions, but three times less, mostly coming from the weapons of officers. It was reported that the terrorists could only fire approximately fifteen bullets and could not possibly have fired a Kalashnikov, as reported by primary definers in the media. It was also reported that police officers were crossing fire with each other and that some had been shot as a result of fratricidal fires. The canine unit in charge of snooping around the debris was also shot dead by the police. It was finally discovered that the police officers on duty during the assault were reported firing weapons long after one the perpetrators self-detonated an explosive device, killing everyone inside the apartments instantly. I contend that the construction of the figure of the Double coupled with the exaggeration of facts (read, lies) by the Minister of the Interior about the assault against the perpetrators, reverberated in media in a sense that

²⁰ Indeed, the articles reported the deployment of 110 officers for that specific raid of the police, and a total of approximately 800 investigators employed since the 13 November 2015 attacks.

provided very little explanation or in-depth understanding of the violence at the core of the 13 November 2015 and the responses to it.

Despite efforts from public officials to make the identity of the perpetrators central to media representation terrorism following these acts, the readers were left with no solutions to understand the perpetrators or what prompted the perpetrators to resort to violence in the first place (see categories of rationalization Bataclan, madness, radicalization, and Bataclan attackers in Table 9). I contend that media representation played a role in steering the attention of the readers away from the deeper societal concerns related to violence underlying the 13 November 2015. According to Mbembe, "the problem is neither the migrants nor the refugees nor the asylum seekers" - onto whom the burden of terrorism has been reflected in France and in Europe modes of governance post-Bataclan - but borders more specifically "borderization" (p. 99). Borderization, Mbembe questioned if that does not stand for the complex processes "by which world powers permanently transform certain spaces into impassable places for certain classes of populations;" "the conscious multiplication of spaces of loss and mourning, where the lives of a multitude of people judged to be undesirable come to be shattered;" "a way of waging war against enemies whose means of existence and survival we have previously destroyed;" "a plethora of bombs, absurd demonstrations of untold destructive power - in short, ecocide" (pp. 99-100). It is with the intellectual consciousness of Mbembe that I turn to the second theme of this chapter. Mbembe leaves us with a better understanding of the immersive experience that positioned the readers of news as witnesses to the role played by media in offering simple explanations about the acts and also about the dominant responses to the acts. The interpretation of the language of war and the security imperative communicated by elected public officials are discussed in the next subsection.

Theme 2: The Articulation of Warlike Security Discourse

To understand this second theme central to the newspaper representation of terrorism post-Bataclan, necessitates tracking back to the moment when the perpetrators triggered the explosive mechanisms of the bombs near the Stade de France, in Saint-Denis, France, and when the president was "extirpated" from the stadium, instants after the first detonation (Extract #9). Before first responders could even confirm the number of deaths, and before the police concluded an assault that would end the hostage situation at the Bataclan, then-president of the U.S.A. Obama was the first to react to the acts. He stated that,

Once again we've seen an outrageous attempt to terrorize innocent civilians. This is an attack not just on Paris, it's an attack not just on the people of France, but this is an attack on all of humanity and the universal values that we share (Obama, as cited in Garunay, 2015).

Ready to "*traduire les terroristes en justice*" (Extract #16; see also category of rationalization Bataclan in Table 7), or in English, "translate the terrorists in justice," the appeal to universality and assumed shared understanding of the human experience claimed by Obama, appeared to align with the subsequent comments made by then-president Hollande in reactions to the acts.

In two successive addresses to the nation one 13 and 14 November 2015, Hollande's call for unity came in tandem with declarations of war not unlike Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric (Van Reybrouck, 2015). Demanding the necessity to be at war with the people responsible for committing such violent acts, Hollande (Isos, 2015) stated on 14 November 2015 that,

Ce qui s'est produit hier, à Paris et à Saint-Denis près du Stade de France, c'est un acte de guerre. Et, face à la guerre, le pays doit prendre des décisions appropriées. C'est un acte de guerre qui a été commis par une armée terroriste, Daech,²¹ une armée djihadiste, contre la France. Contre les valeurs que nous défendons partout dans le monde. Contre ce que nous sommes. Un pays libre qui parle à l'ensemble de la planète. Un acte de guerre qui a été préparé, organisé, planifié, de l'extérieur et avec des complicités intérieures que l'enquête permettra d'établir. Un acte d'une barbarie absolue.

This passage is translated in English by the author in the following block quote,

What happened yesterday, in Paris and in Saint-Denis near the Stade de France, is an act of war. And, in the face of war, the country must make appropriate decisions. It is an act of war that was committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, a jihadist army, against France. Against the values that we defend everywhere in the world. Against what we are. A free country that speaks to the whole planet. An act of war that has been prepared, organized, planned, from the outside and with internal complicity that the investigation will establish. An act of absolute barbarism.

The speeches by Obama and specifically the ones by Hollande, were amplified in both national public broadcast television and also in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. The article, "*Attaques terroristes sans précédents en plein Paris*," which translates as "unprecedented terrorist attacks in the middle of Paris," made the headlines of *Le Figaro*. An article published the day after the attacks recalls that, "*onze mois après la tuerie de Charlie Hebdo, la France replonge dans l'horreur*," "eleven months after the Charlie Hebdo massacre, France is plunging back into

²¹ *Daech* is the term preferred by the French government to refer to what the United Nations calls the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

horror" which was caused by “*l’équipée sanglante [de] terroristes [...], la pire tragédie jamais endurée par le pays depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale,*” a passage that translates as, “the bloody team [of] terrorists [...], the worst tragedy the country has endured since World War II” (Extract #8).

In days following the attacks that ended at the Bataclan, newspapers seized the language of war, and other war-like metaphors used in public addresses. A total of 247 utterances of the term *guerre*, or war, appeared in the articles selected for this analysis (see the category of war in Table 9). Although some uses were meant to describe the war waged against the Assad régime in Syria at the time, the imagery of war was also prominent to show how some experts qualify the state of siege imposed by the Bataclan attacks. In an article published in *Le Figaro* by Cornevin and Leclerc, we read about the “dark scenario” feared by many experts in counterterrorism, “*celui d’un attentat multiple frappant le coeur de Paris ainsi qu’un site hautement symbolique, est devenu réalité vendredi soir*” (Extract # 8, see also category of war in Table 9). A passage that read in English as follows, “that of a series of attacks hitting the heart of Paris as well as a highly symbolic site, became reality on Friday evening.” The reality of this dark scenario mentioned here wasn’t fully comprehended – or, “attended” if we were to continue with the metaphor of a macabre theater – that it was already compared by the authors to “*la pire tragédie jamais endurée par le pays depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale,*” or in English “The worst tragedy ever the country ever endured since the World War II.” Even though the superlative tracing back to WWII may not have been used much, other analogies signified to the reader the horror of made possible by the 1939-1945 war. For example, the term *kamikaze* was mentioned 130 times by newspapers selected for analysis.²² This comparison was further supported by

²² In French much like in English, the etymology of the term *kamikaze* traces back to the use of airplanes by Japanese aircraft soldiers who would deliberately crash into a target. Both the Centre National de Ressources

other journalists, including an article published a day later by the press agency at Le Monde which read, “*les rues de Paris se sont vidées comme si la France connaissait vraiment la guerre et ses couvre-feu*” (Extract #25), or in English, “the streets of Paris emptied as if France really knew about war and its curfews.” For many people cited in the news, or for journalists themselves, the perpetrators of the series of attacks committed brought Paris in a state of siege.

The threat then materialized into reality when the coordinated attacks of 13 November 2015 by young people from France and Belgium – a series of bombing targeting people attending a symbolic (celebration of an armistice) international friendly soccer game between France and Germany at the Stade de France, shootings of people sitting at the patio of selected bars and restaurants in different arrondissements of Paris, and the shooting and hostage situation at the Bataclan concert hall – brought into the imagination of people who consumed media at the time, an image of war that was, arguably before the Charlie events of January 2015, perceived as impossible to take place on French soil. The description of the acts and the rhetoric of war embraced by the president, prime minister, and other political leaders as a response to these acts, invite readers of the news to perceive the threat, and draw the portrait of the perpetrators as terrorist who invite a war from *over there, here*, in the nation of human rights. War, then, appeared to have been used in ways that went beyond the metaphorical.

As mentioned previously, the prolongation of the state of emergency, deployed by Francois Hollande the night of the Bataclan attacks just minutes before the police intervention to rescue hostages inside the concert hall, was voted unanimously a few days later. Even though the vote took place on 20 November 2015, only *Le Figaro* reported on the voting process that locked

Textuelles et Lexicales and The Oxford English Dictionary traced the roots of the term back to the late 1800s, meaning a powerful wind, said to be gift from the gods; gales that destroyed the fleet of the invading Mongols in 1274 and 1281.

in the state of emergency. There were not many articles in *Le Monde* at that time, that commented on the prolongation of this measure. Thus, it is possible to understand how newspaper representations of terrorism post-Bataclan were marking security measures permanently into the fabric of French society. Considering the political orientation of the editorial line at *Le Figaro*, it is not surprising, then, to read that it published three (3) articles on 20 November 2015, dedicated to explaining what is the state of emergency (see the category of state of emergency in Table 7), and what are the organizations (e.g., the police) that gravitate around and who claim a stake in its application (Extract #193).

Very few articles published during the week after the attacks and selected for analysis appear to question this exceptional measure, and most of the articles only appeared to describe what the state of emergency entails (see category of emergency in Table 9). Criticisms of the measure were only perceived through the representation of members of the *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (NPA), a far-left coined “radical” political party in the article by Chabrouit (Extract #77) published in *Le Figaro*, but as a side note under a rubric with, as title, a quote from Le Pen’s reactions to the measure, titled “*bonnes inflexions*,” or good inflections (see also category of emergency in Table 9). An article by Gonzalès (Extract #114) titled, “*Les magistrats mettent en garde à propos des limites de l'état d'urgence*” offered a glimpse at the issues with the provisions embedded in the measure. The title is best translated in English as follows, “Magistrates warn about the limits of the state of emergency.” However, the ways the article was framed, through the lens of people working in the legal field dedicated to the war on terror in France, only serve as a platform for the toughening of measures in ways that the recent intelligence law (see Vétois, 2015) did not address. In fact, the article suggest that the state of emergency is welcome by people in the magistracy. The impingement on human rights and civil

liberties do not appear to pose a problem, despite what human right activists and scholars might say (Vauchez, 2018). Originally drafted in 1955 as a temporary response by then-imperialist French colonial state at a time when people in Algeria struggled for independence, the state of emergency provided the rights for administrators to benefit from the same authoritative rights than that of the judiciary branch, notably in investigating people and in limiting freedoms. The meaning of the law today has not changed much since its inception; so far as it is an extension of the judiciary branch that allows public administration officers at the regional level (*préfets* in French, prefects in English) to command the police to conduct house searches and arrests, among other processes, under the purview of the law.²³

Readers of *Le Figaro* might have felt compelled to celebrate this security measure that relies on assessment of risks related to terrorism and the increase of surveillance practices on populations that have always and already been the targets of such policies. The following example highlights how people in positions of power use the legal articulation of the state of emergency to assert authority:

Le texte est assez flou et succinct pour permettre aux préfets - et non plus aux magistrats - d'« ordonner des perquisitions à domicile de jour comme de nuit ». Dans les départements les plus concernés par le trafic d'armes et le radicalisme religieux, entre trois et cinq perquisitions se déroulent tous (sic) les nuits actuellement. (Extract #190)

This passage translates into English as follows,

The text is rather vague and succinct to allow prefects - and no longer magistrates - to "order searches at home day and night." In the departments most concerned with arms

²³ See the actual text of the law, *Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence*. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350>. Since January 11th, 2018, prefects are also given the right to "prohibit the movement of people or vehicles in places and times fixed by the decree."

trafficking and religious radicalism, between three and five searches are taking place every night now.”

As the passage above demonstrates, the “vague-ness” of the text “allows” people in positions of power to conduct house arrests and searches based on assumptions - not actual evidence – that people being searched and arrested pose a threat to the public. The numbers illustrate this demonstration of power. In the lead of the same article, the author lists that a total of “*414 perquisitions, 64 interpellations dont 60 gardes à vue*” - in English, “414 searches, 64 arrests, 60 of which in custody” - have been conducted between Saturday 14 November and Wednesday 18 November 2015. Arrests, as the previous example showed, that were conducted at any time of day and night. These numbers become an issue when one considers what it means for the 350 house searches that have not led to any arrests. From a more quantitative perspective, only 15.46% of house searches resulted in arrests, which illustrates the paradoxical responses to terror “by the force of the law” praised by Hollande, topic of the next subsection.

Theme 3: The Paradoxes that the National Press and Public Politicians Appeared to be Facing²⁴

The third and final theme central to this analysis should help in understanding that Orientalism discourse was an anchor of newspaper representation of terrorism since way before the Bataclan and, in a chronologically logical sense, before Pulse, too (see the following chapter). So far, this project has been investigating the role of the newspaper in amplifying a

²⁴ According to CRNTL, paradox could be defined as followed, "Affirmation surprenante en son fond et/ou en sa forme, qui contredit les idées reçues, l'opinion courante, les préjugés." The Oxford English Dictionary lists the following as the definition of the logic of paradox: An argument, based on (apparently) acceptable premises and using (apparently) valid reasoning, which leads to a conclusion that is against sense, logically unacceptable, or self-contradictory; the conclusion of such an argument. Frequently with a descriptive or eponymous name. See also: Putnam et al. (2016).

state-sponsored definition of the threat. By state-sponsored, I refer to how newspaper represented the need for the amplification of the definition of the threat posed by a suicidal approach to Self (in body, flesh, soul, spirit, and political consciousness) and the ways newspaper representation instantiated the events that breached different expectations about violence in society. In this section, I contend that the role played by news representation of terrorism post-Bataclan was like that of a conduit that buttressed a self-generating warfare logic scheme orchestrated (consciously or unconsciously) between the perpetrators and principally, the primary definers like elected officials, with relative control over whose life is grieve-able.

The processes of racialization that manifested in the newspaper representational tendencies, attitudes, of reverberating the depoliticization of naming the events as "radical Islamic terrorism," "barbarism," and anything in-between. The reaction by Hollande was but an example of how first definers turned the events of 2015, including the Bataclan, as an inevitable series of attacks that newspapers instantiated as terrorism. The word images fixated, over time, on the villainy of acts and the identification of the threat posed by terrorism. One could possibly argue that consumers of representation of terrorism were hailed in with a signification of a racialized threat. The paradox, in France, reached a turning point when ideal of "*vivre ensemble*" were threatened by an understanding of terrorism that had already been anchored in the imaginary of French society, or at least the readers of the news selected here. The ideals of democracy that were chanted after the mass murders at Charlie, the hostage situation at a Kosher supermarket in January of that same year. The perpetrators of the Bataclan, or more specifically what is made of their identity in newspapers that one week, reverberates sets of discourses that were already fueled by fantasies of Orientalism. What scholars have already described as a security secular turn in contemporary France manifested on the streets very differently, and

relegated concerns about the state complicity in terrorism (remember, state terrorism is but a facet of the incommensurable puzzle that solidifies the matrices of domination orchestrating White Supremacy in late modernity).

The paradox is to consider the responses, in the context of the Bataclan, that contributed to an understanding of how nation-states assessed the threat differently, and that agitated debate in the European Union and that contributed to discussion about the responsibilities of member states in the endorsements of the use of war as political response to the acts. For example, the article titled, "*La France n'est pas seule, l'UE est à ses côtés,*" or, "France is not alone, the EU is on its side" by Ducourtieux published in *Le Monde*, 19 November 2015, transcribed an interview with Pierre Moscovici, then European Commissioner for the Economy, who reassured the readers that security was a priority and the France could count on the mobilization of other member states in the European Union to increase security measures at the borders (Extract #173). The paradox is, from a perspective that only Said could really understand, explain, and challenge, in the irreconcilability of conditions of secularism as an already existing paradox in French society. Here, the securitized arm of secularism showed how, surely, the cyclical constructions of a threat and the fabrications of an essentialism that shoves under one stroke Islam, and eventually any possibility to interpret Islam, in the backdrop of a nation state implication in state terrorism.

An article published in *Le Figaro* on 16 November 2015, G. Tabard (Extract # 44) explains that,

Avec le recul, sont apparues les limites, les illusions voire les tromperies du fameux « esprit du 11 janvier ». La belle communion nationale d'un jour avait parfois servi de paravent pour ne pas regarder en face les causes profondes de la radicalisation

fondamentaliste, au sein même de la société française. L'impératif d'unité avait parfois servi d'alibi pour refuser d'affronter certains tabous. L'exécutif avait pris des mesures fortes ayant quand même permis de déjouer certains projets sinistres. Mais la nécessité de dénoncer le terreau du terrorisme avait vite cédé la place à l'éloge d'un « vivre ensemble » idéalisé au nom du refus de toute « stigmatisation » et de tout « amalgame ». Imposer un nouveau « Je suis Charlie » n'était plus possible.

The English translation of this passage is as follows,

In hindsight, the limits, illusions and even deceptions of the famous “spirit of January 11” appeared. The beautiful national communion of a day had sometimes served as a screen so as not to face the root causes of fundamentalist radicalization, even within French society. The imperative of unity had sometimes served as an alibi to refuse to face certain taboos. The executive had taken strong measures which nevertheless made it possible to foil certain sinister projects. But the need to denounce the breeding ground of terrorism had quickly given way to the praise of an idealized “living together” in the name of the refusal of any “stigmatization” and any “amalgamation”. Imposing a new “*Je suis Charlie*” was no longer possible.

This rather lengthy paragraph illustrates the sentiment of indignation following the Bataclan. In this article, it appears that the spirit of a 01/11 spirit haunts a society at prey with and, paradoxically, fertile ground for terrorism (see also categories of institutional responsibilities and Charlie in Table 9). What is perhaps troubling with these statements is the way Tabard continues to highlight the paradoxes of the dominant discourse post-Charlie – the call for *laïcité* as a tool to reinforce values of the French Republic – to justify the stigmatization of a community already stigmatized since before Charlie, people who identify as Muslims in

France. The last sentence of this passage then reads like a euphemism; denouncing terrorists becomes an imperative, beyond a call for unity, in which the refusal to make amalgams is not possible anymore. This passage implies that desire to stigmatize Muslims or people who identify as such becomes an undeniable possibility in the face of terror.

Conclusion

Attentive to and interactive with these theories and the news collected as a dataset, this chapter deconstructed how national newspapers in France deployed the notion of terrorism the week following the 13 November 2015 series of attacks in Saint-Denis and Paris, France, and the ways that Orientalism discourse was reinforced following these tragic events. More specifically, this chapter shows how the newspapers, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, represented terrorism in ways that reinforced Orientalism for days after Saint-Denis and Paris were made the centerstage of a tragic series of attacks that combined suicide-bombings, mass murders, hostage situations, and police standoffs. The spotlights of newspapers made of the post-Bataclan moment a dramatic event marked as terrorism, that reinforced Orientalism discourse in many ways.

First, the questions about issues related to identity at the center of newspaper representation of terrorism following the Bataclan were interpreted through the sequences of a moral panic. This can be seen in the tendency for newspaper to amplify dominant responses in the public sphere and the confusion about naming the acts. From a critical standpoint of Orientalism discourse, the apparent institutional preoccupation only served to reinforce control over the use of sovereign power. This chapter, I hope, showed how newspaper depiction of the perpetrators might reinforce assumptions about the escalation of a “Brown threat” posed by a deterministic, objectivizing, and generalist worldview on terrorism and its contemporary folk

devils (Silva, 2016). The Islamophobic blankets of Orientalism discourse hold a key to reinforcing assumptions that the fear of terrorism passes through the media narratives of folk devils, a work of simplification in the tradition of media narratives that simplify the reasons why the perpetrators committed suicide using explosives and others used weapons of mass murders freely. What is simplified (read as, uncontested or unchallenged as problematic) in these situations, at least through representational modes and media narratives about the perpetrators studied here, is the logic that underlies the response to these acts of extreme violence. What is simplified is the broader notion of violence and the attention given to societal concerns related to its breach in society (political, symbolic, divine).

This dissertation thus must continue to interrogate the ways in which *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* immersed the audience in a logic that consisted in displaying a demonstration of force, of all the means (military, police, politicians) necessary to "hunt down" the perpetrators. It is common knowledge, at least in the critique of state response to acts of such violence, that the state is implicated in perpetuating the use of political violence and in justifying its use (Butler, 2016). Newspapers, in reverberating governmental identification of the perpetrators within this frame of terror, played a role in focusing the readership attention away from the actual concerns about violence and towards justification narratives in state use of violence as a response to the acts of already extreme violence. As if the only response is violence. The dominant responses to the 13 November 2015 attacks, although somewhat necessary to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice for committing such horrific acts, illustrated what Agamben (2005) calls a state of exception, which is "not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law's threshold or limit concept" (p. 4). A kind of violence that is non legal because it operates outside of the legal regime that is considered

violence - "radical Islamic terrorism" - a sovereign right to reinforce racialized ordering. One could argue that the representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks obfuscated responses to the acts that could legitimately fall under the purview of what is taken-for-granted and that often goes unchallenged: state terrorism (Alsultany, 2012).

In addition, the news attention or sensitivity towards the life of the perpetrators, refers to the media role played in contemporary landscape of capitalism that consists in building marketable news value. One could hypothesize that media profit off terrorism when assuming the role: to force-feed terrorism over and over again (at least for a week), by inviting punctual or daily subscribers to regurgitate scenes of symbolic political violence – of deaths, war, chaos, suffering –, scripted words – spoken, recorded, written, published – and staged performances that might procure – in images, imageries, and imaginaries - the impression of hearing the sound of bloody living bodies, dying corpses, and burned souls. We have seen the recurrent tropes that normalizes scapegoating, or the identification of and publication of media narratives that suggest that a "*djihadiste*," a "radical Islamic terrorism" threat, persisted in the aftermath the events. From the perspective of studies in moral panic, there are reasons to believe that newspaper representation of terrorism reinforced an escalating threat disproportional to the actual threat posed by terrorism (Kumar, 2017).

Following this breach in the thresholds of violence of French society, the impression of an endurance in the escalation of threat came across newspapers when connecting other events and the responses to face the threat. The prolongation of the state of emergency is one example of the ascendancy to the sovereign ideals of the recourse to political violence. By analyzing the post-Bataclan moment through the sequences of a moral panic, this chapter shows how these selected stories giving the impression of folk devils, reinforced Orientalism discourse in the

warlike security discourse. A strategic turn that, from a critical perspective, fuels the terrorism-religion nexus that animates dichotomies in Orientalism discourse and the making of modern homegrown terrorist, object of knowledge established in newspaper representation as a “dominated discourse about the Orient;” an “established [...] body of texts that brought about a discursive identity of the Orient making it unequal to the West” (Elgamri, 2008, p. 24). The dichotomous control of an essentialism that reduced people identifying with Islam and the Middle East, to exoticism and barbarism, and the concomitant universalism that elevated people identifying with what is not Islam and the Middle East, to ideals of progressiveness and democratic liberalism.

CHAPTER FIVE:
PLATFORM OF HOSTILITY AND VOLATILE PANIC:
NEWSPAPER REPRESENTATION OF TERRORISM IN THE U.S.A. AFTER PULSE

Introduction

Early on Sunday 12 June 2016, Omar Mateen entered Pulse, a popular gay nightclub located downtown Orlando, Florida, shortly after 2 am. Opening fire on the dancing crowd celebrating Latin night inside the club, Mateen murdered dozens of patrons before holding dozens of others hostage, trapped inside the nightclub for close to three hours. Some clubgoers who managed to escape, searched city streets for help. A few hours after the first gunshots were fired, at approximately 5 a.m., police officers broke the wall and breached inside the club early Sunday morning, killing Mateen and freeing hostages from the hands of the perpetrator. Fifty people died, including Mateen, while 58 were wounded that night in Florida. One clear observation is that Pulse, which was marked profusely as terrorism, consumed and ended the life of Queer Black and Brown bodies living in the moment, at a dance club.

In this chapter, we begin with an analytical summary of the events that unfolded in newspaper representation of terrorism following that night of 12 June 2016. We continue to interrogate the vilification of people who identify with Islam and the Islamic worldviews, geographies, and cultural traditions. This chapter shows how the identification of the perpetrator

as a terrorist threat, someone who self-identified to public authorities the night of the event, began years prior to the attacks at Pulse. We continue by showing how presidential performances saturated media during the days that followed the mass murder of forty-nine people inside Pulse. Combined with the understanding that the appearances of consensus about the threat posed by terrorism post-Pulse, this chapter also brings into question the volatility of a moral panic. The sensation of a panic subsided and vanished with only traces of a legal challenges that failed to instantiate the moment. The impression left in newspaper representation of terrorism post-Pulse was that the fabric of society in France and the U.S.A. remained unchanged despite an escalating hostility generated in the identification of the threat.

Before exploring these themes, the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse could be traced back to the hours that preceded the tragic mass murders of people who were targeted by Mateen that night of 12 June 2016, at Pulse. I take advantage of the method to include in this thematic analysis, articles published certainly hours before Mateen entered Pulse. I interpreted the eight articles from dataset that were published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* and the significance of the representation of terrorism in the context of the U.S.A. in 2016. I chose to interpret the articles published the day of the event because they offer insights about the context in which the events at Pulse occurred. It provides the lens through which to understand the ways in which newspapers zoom in and out of different national contexts. Contrary to the previous chapter, I focused on these articles from the main dataset because they also offer a lens into the moment in between the attacks that ended at the Bataclan and leading to Pulse.

Newspaper Representation of Terrorism Following the 12 June 2016 Shooting

In *The New York Times* (*Times*, from now on) articles published on 12 June 2016, readers were invited to consider terrorism as a threat from abroad. That day, an article reported about the threat posed on civil liberties in Bangladesh, where over 3000 people were arrested for their role in fueling “a climate of terror,” suspected of killing “, bloggers, freethinkers, religious minorities, foreigners, gay activists, followers of more liberal strains of Islam” (Extract #213; see also category of international relations in Table 8). The *Times* also reported on the strikes organized by labor unions and other activists demanding rights and privileges for people who work in garbage disposal management systems in France, in the midst of what the author coined, “the city’s mean season of terrorist attacks” (Extract #214). Of interest for the greater purpose of this dissertation is the way this article seemed to be relegating the actual societal concerns of violence underlying terrorism to conversations about other uses of political violence that emanated from a strike because of the context of the acts marked as terrorism in France that year. This is an important connection to draw because *The Washington Post* (*Post* from now on) draws perhaps even more problematic ones on that day. That is an interpretation for Chapter Four, however.

What cut across articles published in the *Post* is the resonance with the articles by the *Times* and what is made of as a travelling, loose, border-crossing, phenomenon of violence. For instance, the *Post* published an article about the difficulty of certain nation-states at prey with the threat of terrorism. That, in critical perspective, becomes a textual attitude in newspaper representation that conversely depicted the convergence of interests in the definition of the threat posed by terrorism and the sets of discourses that appeared to have maintained control over discourse of the war on terrorism. What these articles signified, at least to the consumers of both

outlets, is a symbolic ascendancy to violence. An escalation of violence, to be more precise, in the response to the acts marked as terrorism by influential moral entrepreneurs of modern times (presidents, magistrates, journalists, editors, politicians, military officials, police officers, to name a few) who come to consensus in the use of a violence as a response mechanism to the Pulse attacks.

Notably, there appeared to be a deep investment in what was coded as the Manbij offensive, or what were the hands of the U.S. military in a civil war in Syria. Here is a brief passage,

Envoy Brett McGurk said the operation to surround the city of Manbij, astride the only remaining access road to Turkey, has been "one of the most complex military maneuvers we've seen in some time."

Once the city itself is taken, he said, "it will entirely cut off [the Islamic State's] ability to move from Raqqa and threaten us." He noted that planning and personnel for the recent terrorist bombings in Brussels and Paris had come from Raqqa, through Manbij.

The attitude of this specific passage - published right after the lead paragraphs - reinforced Orientalism discourse in the following way. The dots drawn here by "Envoy Brett McGurk" as a point on a map where military forces are deployed, not counting the "forces have been additionally aided by 300 U.S. Special Operations forces, who, among other assistance, have trained the rebels to call in airstrikes, using coordinates and visuals displayed on tablets that they then communicate to the Americans." This was an unsurmountable obstacle, namely, to try to control an area under the threat of a "terrorist cell." This assumption and action pointed to the Western rationality of primary definers of situations in that they are who here appeared to have drawn connections between the "recent" attacks marked as terrorism in France and the U.S.A.

The *Post* appeared to have been focused on the implications of the U.S.A. in the fight against terrorism as a concern during the primaries that had just ended at the time of the attacks at Pulse. Indeed, Clinton emerged as the official candidate for the Democratic party, running against Trump who emerged as the incumbent for the Republican party. A *Post* article reveals, in passing, that terrorism is the center of concerns for people in Iowa, U.S.A. (Extract #218; see also category of candidate in Table 10). The *Post* also reported about counterterrorism warfare taking place in Iraq. Detailing reports of a mission to secure areas in the city of Fallujah that relied on “U.S.-led coalition for air cover”, the article invites the reader to map out how special forces and “tribal fighters trained by the United States in bomb-disposal techniques” in different areas of the city (Extract #220). Yet, in another article published by the *Post*, we learn that the fight against terrorism is sanctioned by the U.S.A. The *Post* reported the story of Amin al-Baroudi who was sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty “to conspiring to export U.S.-origin goods to Syria in violation of federal sanctions” (Extract #221). In hindsight, the way Western rationality was centered that day as a logic in the discursive formation of terror that led to the Pulse moment, it is an entry point into how newspaper representation reinforced “Orientalism fantasies” (Szpunar, 2018). A stepping board to understand the ways news framed the identification of Mateen within traditional narratives and images of a threat (Szpunar, 2018) foreshadowed by primary definers and other stakeholders in the public sphere at prey with terrorism. So, when Mateen decided to execute at point blank and hold hostages dozens at Pulse, the focus zoomed in on the threat posed by terrorism in the U.S.A. But, how was the events perceived and represented by media?

Theme 1: The Construction of the Identity of the Perpetrator as Folk Devils

As we learned, details about Mateen's life, the perpetrator of the attacks in Orlando, started being represented in the *Times* and the *Post* as early as the day following the events. Often described by newspapers as "the gunman," Mateen's history of immigration, employment, domestic violence, religiosity, sexuality, and potential ties to terrorism were the most salient of representation in newspapers (see category of perpetrator in Table 10).

Scholarships that interrogated news representation of Pulse already showed how national television broadcasted news services frames the perpetrator in various ways (DeFoster, 2017). In the first two days following the attack, both newspapers referred to Mateen as the son of immigrant from Afghanistan, often juxtaposing Mateen's national identity and the allegiance to ISIS pledged during the attack. For example, an article by Martin published by the *Times* informed the readers that, "The suspected gunman, Omar Mateen, was an American who declared allegiance to the Islamic State and was the son of an immigrant from Afghanistan" (Extract #222) while an article published that same day by Tsukayama, Berman, and Markon of the *Post* read, "The gunman was identified as Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old security guard who was born in New York to Afghan parents." (Extract #232; see also category of the perpetrator in Table 10). These are two of many examples of how news coverage of the events at Pulse solidified the nexus of terrorism and religion. While the former indicated how news covered the revendication made by the perpetrator, the latter illustrated how news representation centered towards revealing the perpetrator's experience with employment in the U.S.A. The common thread in these two passages extracted from data, is the ways news represented terrorism following Pulse by associating Mateen's national identity to a family experience with immigration. This type of news representation was not as present towards the end of the week.

Rather, it was Mateen's employment history as a security guard for almost nine years that shifted media attention, at least the one of newspapers selected for this research. In the first day that followed the attacks, fleeting reports about the life of the perpetrator started to pour in about G4S, which in 2013 was the world's third largest private employer after Walmart and FoxConn (Hammer, 2013). A company that was not aware that Mateen was under investigation while under employment. It could be argued that politicians and media pundits alike may have omitted the level of responsibility of G4S for not taking seriously the issues faced by Mateen during his time as an employee. The employment history of Mateen was a central subtheme that immersed the readers into the racialized experience of a perpetrator who nurtured ambiguous relationships with colleagues, employers, and government agents employed by the FBI. For days after the events, readers were left without the possibility to question the role played by these same institutions in letting Mateen "slip through the cracks."

In media, the impression of a collision occurred between stories told through the lenses of former colleagues, intimate partners, and relatives of the perpetrator (see category of perpetrator in Table 10). A collision that symbolically emerged from news as a formation of consensus view of the motives that led Mateen to commit these acts of extreme violence. Not unlike in the representation of the acts at Pulse in televised news (DeFoster, 2017), newspapers representation focused briefly on politicians' attention to homegrown terrorism and qualified Mateen, a lone wolf, like in the article published in the *Times* on 15 June 2016 by Apuzzo and Lichtblau who wrote, " the F.B.I. is investigating 1,000 potential "homegrown violent extremists," the majority of whom are most likely tied to or inspired by the Islamic State" (Extract # 277). A cumulation of stories that buttressed the figure of a "lone wolf" and the myth of a perpetrator whose sexual orientation and professional experience stood as the standard up against which every Muslims in

the U.S.A., probably the world, were compared to at the time of the events. The mass murder, hostage situation, police negotiation and standoff moment took place at a time when people were at Pulse for Latin Night. The facts pile up to feed the white supremacist myth that the perpetrator was a sexually frustrated perpetrator who acted alone as a non-hetero lone wolf who had gone so deeply Muslim as to escape from the vigilance of security experts for years until that night.

In the media, the construction of the identity of the perpetrator illustrated the forms of denial (cf. Chapter Two) that gives the impression of an impossibility for readers to question the responsibilities of an employer (e.g., G4S) and the FBI, among other institutions. The reader is simultaneously invited to reject the possibility that G4S - a global corporation specialized in security services and responsible for training people in the manipulation of what I presume to be an arsenal of weapons - and the FBI - a domestic intelligence and security agency - are responsible for failing to act on signs that Mateen would turn "terrorist." For instance, an article published in the *Times* opened with the headline, "Security Giant where Mateen worked said it knew of 2013 FBI investigation" (Extract #259) The statement read, "we learned that Mateen had been questioned by the FBI but that the inquiries were subsequently closed. We were not made aware of any alleged connections between Mateen and terrorist activities and were unaware of any further FBI investigations" (Extract #259). Further in the article, the author revealed that G4S had removed any statement made public by Kenning and refused to acknowledge responsibility in knowing about the fact that Mateen was subjected to state surveillance.

The dominant representation of the perpetrator showed Mateen's experience with the FBI and the responsibilities of the agency of "letting go" of the perpetrator despite the years of subjecting Mateen to surveillance. From a feminist praxiological standpoint, surveillance refers

to the logic that focuses on maintaining a systematic attention to and measurement of certain populations considered a threat to the state (Smith, 2015). The very first day after the attacks, newspapers reported profusely about the life of Mateen (see category of perpetrator in Table 10). In the article cited above by L. Alvarez et al. (2016), “Praising Isis, Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead in Worst Shooting on U.S. soil”, it is reported that Mateen was investigated in 2013 “when he made comments to co-workers suggesting he had terrorist ties” and in 2014 “for possible connections to Moner Mohammad Abusalha, an American who became a suicide bomber in Syria.” It is reported that the connection between Abusalha and Mateen was suspected based on the fact the two perpetrators attended the same mosque. From a critical perspective, this suspicion underlies deeper issues of surveillance practices in the U.S.A. Although both perpetrators committed terrible acts of violence, their “possible” connections might invite readers to assume that Muslims in Fort Pierce, FL, are somehow connected to terrorism because both perpetrators resided there at some point in their life.²⁵ A form of generalization that categorizes and equates Muslims as culprits.

It is only after a few days following the Pulse shooting that, full reports started emerging, written in the form of biographies with accounts from close relatives, friends, and people who may have met the perpetrator at some point. Accounts that offer an in-depth understanding in the making of a mass murderer that focused on Mateen’s religious background and offered an insight into Mateen’s romantic relationship, subjects of the next subsections. What is perhaps more compelling in the accounts given of Mateen’s life than this generalization is the ways newspapers showed how the FBI let go of Mateen. As mentioned above, Mateen was able to

²⁵ The focus of this dissertation is on newspaper accounts of terrorism following the acts at Pulse and on the role of newspaper to reverberate accounts given by primary definers. The connection between the two perpetrators with the mosque may have been coincidental but legally an investigation of this possible connection was necessary.

continue working as a security officer for G4S and buying weapons despite years being under surveillance. A failure in the surveillance system that was approached by newspapers as a problem only insofar as the agency was overwhelmed with the responsibility of assessing the threat of terrorism. A week after the attacks, a questionable article, “The FBI was correct not to arrest Omar Mateen” published by Greenwald, read as follows,

based on what we know, the FBI acted properly. Agents have the power they need, and they were right to close the case on Mateen. Just because someone successfully carries out a mass attack does not prove that police powers were inadequate or that existing powers were misapplied.

This passage illustrates, in my opinion, the ways newspapers align with the ideological framework set forth by the war on terror. In a sense, it shows how news reports may justify yet another transfer of responsibility on behalf of the agency. To push the argument further, I would argue that such a passage further erases the history of the FBI in processes of racialization. What Alimahomed-Wilson (2019) describes as the processes that continue to exacerbate the lived experiences of Muslims; a process of “racialization [that] informs media and political conversations and provides a framework for comprehending or explaining everyday engagements with topics that have become exclusively racialized” and “constituted through a multi-faceted racial project that distorts Muslims as the potential enemy” (p. 876). By associating Mateen with Abusalha, and by putting Mateen under the surveillant gaze for years, the FBI and subsequently the news media, buttressed what Alimahomed-Wilson coined racialized state surveillance, “to specifically hone in on the state’s explicit role in racializing Muslims as objects of surveillance” and “to emphasize the state’s (in this case the FBI) policies and practices that

manufacture ordinary Muslims as suspicious” (p. 877).²⁶ An analysis of newspaper representation about Pulse as terrorism may not be sufficient enough to fully understand how Pulse became a means by which FBI and other agencies increased surveillance. However, it is possible to contest how newspaper rally behind the FBI for letting the perpetrator of the attack “slip” through the cracks (Bahney, 2018).

The lengthy articles “From Troubled Child to Aggrieved Killer” (Extract #379) published in the *Times*, written by Barry et al., or the article “The Volatile Life of Omar Mateen” (Extract #391) published in the *Post* and written by Sullivan and Wan, both illustrate how newspapers worked diligently to show the motives of the perpetrator, from citizenship to religion, sexuality, and a history of domestic violence. Before these articles, and as early as the day after the shooting, 13 June 2016, newspapers explained how Mateen’s allegiance to ISIL was pledged over the phone with first responders shortly after the beginning of the shooting. Although newspapers aligned in their representation of Mateen’s claim, each approached the confusion over the perpetrator’s religious background in different ways. For example, Dvorak reported in the “METRO” section of the *Post* on 14 June 2016 that, “No, Mateen didn't kill people because he was a Muslim. He killed people because he was an angry, unstable person who apparently beat his former wife and was outraged when he saw two men kiss in Miami” (Extract # 260). This passage may be just a snippet of the numerous way news represented the perpetrator, but it also shows a tendency, for the majority of articles analyzed, to depoliticize the subject in terms of religion. That is, an invitation is offered for readers to think about the tragedy at Pulse as

²⁶ It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine how the FBI used cases like the Pulse shooting and Mateen to surveil larger groups of Muslims with little evidence of a specific threat. However, it would be possible to critique the FBI for not doing more to prevent the shooting at Pulse and for using an attack by a specific individual to justify greater surveillance of a whole group of people (without specific evidence of threat like that which existed in Mateen’s case).

means to create a barrier with religion. The barrier posed by newspaper representation of Mateen's pledge to ISIL was further confounded when reports emerged from Mateen's first wife, S. Yusifiy, in the lengthy article by Sullivan and Wan (Extract #370). In it, it is reported that, "Yusifiy said Mateen was not a devout Muslim and preferred spending his free time working out at the gym. She said she never saw signs that he held radical beliefs."

Meanwhile, the *Times* focused on existing F.B.I. suspicions about the possible threat posed by that same perpetrator, Mateen, for years before attacks. The story by Lichtblau and Apuzzo published the same day explained how the F.B.I. "sought help from Saudi intelligence officials to determine whether Mr. Mateen had contact with any known terrorist suspects during his travels for the umrah in 2011 and 2012" (Extract #244). The authors go on to mention that "F.B.I. agents in Florida used multiple investigative tools, including an undercover informant who made contact with the suspect, wiretapping his conversations, and pulling personal and financial records on him." This specific article also listed a track of records filed by agencies that gave detailed accounts of interviews with Mateen. For some, quoted passages might have read like the summary of an episode of the wire. For others, it shows how agencies supposedly in charge of vetting and assessing the meaning of threat at the national and international level, took an exit strategy in the definition of responsibility for having let go of Mateen.²⁷ And for people like Trump, this passage detailing the surveillance practices used against Mateen had indicated that certain agencies don't do counterterrorism surveillance well. Arguably, this was a way to appeal to audience ready to invest in fueling, even more, the infamous war on terror (Extract #332).

²⁷ A few days after Pulse, newspapers revealed that the F.B.I. had been sitting on piles of documents that had been archived and left unaccounted for. The article "Decades Later, Big Brother Comes Out of Hiding" published in *The New York Times* by J. Goldstein explained that surveillance documents of the "anti-communist 'Red Squad'" tracing back from mid-1950s to early 1970s were recovered during a routine inventory (Extract #332).

The newspaper reports were even more perplexed when reports about Mateen's orientation to sexuality started to emerge in newspapers, four days after the attacks,

Mr. Mateen had voiced hatred of gays, minorities and Jews, and had claimed links to Islamist terrorist groups; during the siege at the nightclub, he declared allegiance to the Islamic State. But investigators were also looking into reports that he might have been gay himself. (Extract #284)

Mateen's presumed hatred towards people who identify on the LGB spectrum, coupled with the assumptions of same-sex desires, became the focus of investigators and newspapers alike in the days following the event. Already casting the perpetrator as mentally ill, unfit for labor, and erratic, newspapers' attention to Mateen's sexual orientation highlighted the complexity of the situation. It could be argued that this type of representation limits complex understanding of religion and sexuality. The challenge is to deconstruct the racializing processes that unfold following Pulse when consider the deaths of people who were already surviving the clear-cut normative assumptions about sexual orientation; people whose ontologies and epistemologies might and could have inspired liberation, self-empowerment, and organically oriented notions of community; people who might have challenged the dichotomous patriarchal conventions of understanding gender fluidity; or, people who might have had to hold on to the myth of the Christian-based faith-oriented American Dream as a means of survival for being in the world; people whose lived experiences might have already been subjected to dominant representation of sexuality following Pulse. It is important to remember the changes in laws and reforms generated by the 12 June 2015, decision from Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) that made the banning of same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the year prior to Mateen's assault at Pulse. A milestone in progress for human rights tarnished by the violence committed at Pulse and

permeated by false, deceitful, depoliticized appeals to belongingness signified in dominant responses.

In addition, Mateen's marital relationships were scrutinized right after the attacks. At the core of newspapers representation were the depiction of Mateen as a violent domestic partner. The representation of violent outbreaks and abusive personality of Mateen at home disclosed by Yusify, coupled with how news focused on Mateen's hatred towards homosexuality, the lack of gun reforms, the increase in security measures, illustrate what Haider (2016) coined the dominant, albeit invisible, frame of toxic masculinity. The issue of domestic violence, it could be argued, was sidelined and only served to portray the perpetrator as another "bad" and violent Muslim man (see category of perpetrator in Table 10). By paying attention to homophobia and the overwhelming account of the terrorism frames, as sharing an underlying toxic masculinity, Hayder argues, that

Frames homophobia as the problem, asking all communities and populations to consider this prejudice [...] raises the question of patriarchy and patriarchal constructions of a heteronormative masculinity that regards violence as both natural and integral [and] opens up a discussion of the patriarchal underpinnings of securitocracy and the agencies and industries of a capitalist order in which food and water shortages plague the world, yet the manufacture and sales of firearms and other weapons offer ever more lucrative il/legal routes to making "a killing." (p. 557)

Such an in-depth understanding of how to comprehend the acts at Pulse – that is, through the frame of homophobia – is important when we consider how politicians appropriated the acts for political gain. It is even more necessary when we consider that the term homophobia was used only twelve (12) times by newspapers in the week following the Pulse shooting even

though the president of the U.S.A. recognized the dimension of hate crime of the acts committed by Mateen. From the perspective of moral panic, it supports the claim that media and politicians maintain strategic areas of silence. In the next subsection, I approach the ways in which this absence in framing homophobia symbolizes deeper issues rooted in the socio-political fabric.

Theme 2: The Articulation of Warlike Security Discourse

It is undeniable that, when an event is marked as an act of terrorism, concerns emanating in the public sphere reach astonishing proportions. The day that followed the attacks, both the *Times* and the *Post* quoted security and terrorism experts, survivors of the tragedy, activists from around the U.S., and responses from the president and other political candidates in ways that showed the impossibility for people to anticipate such violent acts. The articles published by the *Times*, “Trump Seizes on Massacre and Repeats Call for Ban on Muslim Migration” by Martin (Extract #222; see also category of public policy agenda in Table 8) and “For Gays Across America, A Massacre Punctuates Fitful Gains” by Stolberg et al., (Extract #223), indicated the heightened tensions. The headline of the former article explains how Trump used the attacks to repeat a call for a travel ban, seizing on violent acts to perpetuate anti-Muslim rhetoric and political agenda. The latter article shows how such an attack impinges upon the progress made by and for people who identify on the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual Queer Intersex Asexual spectrum and who are continuously fighting for equal rights. Articles published in the *Post* that same day represented concerns that coincided with this dynamic. The article “At D.C. pride festival, tears and resolve” by McCoy et al. (Extract #231), quoted D.C. mayor Bowser who called for unity and love. Governors from Virginia and Maryland were quoted for aligning with the state of emergency enacted by then-governor of Florida Rick Scott. In another *Post* article,

“50 killed at gay club in Fla.” by Tsukayama et al. (Extract #232; see also category of laws in Table 10), the confusion and concern were further confounded by the description of the horrific “hellish scene” encountered by first responders who intervened at Pulse. The intensity of the responses represented in media, such as state of emergency, call for unity and love, and presidential addresses, highlights the consensual essence of responses to acts of terror. “Like other threats” Walsh (2017) explains, “terrorism may produce significant albeit fleeting, displays of patriotism, unity, and loyalty” (p. 649). In the wake of Pulse, calls for unity and fleeting displays of patriotism were, in a sense, reminiscent of 9/11, subject of our next sub-section.

One of the most salient ways in which newspapers covered the massacre at Pulse was by associating the massacre with an exceptional act of terror that is reminiscent of 9/11. Of the sixteen (16) newspaper articles published 13 June 2016 about terrorism, fourteen (14) dedicated their content to report on the acts at Pulse by citing reactions from people across the U.S.A., including Trump, Clinton, Obama, and human rights activists from different states. Coining repeatedly the Orlando shooting as what then-President of the U.S. Obama called “an act of terror and an act of hate”, newspapers also participated in representing the events as a type of terrorism reminiscent of 9/11. Many news reports referred to the attacks as “the worst shooting in U.S.” and some frequently reported the attacks as “the worst act of terrorism on American soil since Sept. 11, 2001” (Extract # 225; Extract #270; see also category of comparisons in Table 10). The international terror framework of post-9/11 was buttressed by then-presidential candidate Clinton who rallied in Cleveland, OH the day following the attacks. Both the *Times* and the *Post* reported on the presumptive democrat candidate’s call for national unity, reminiscent of “the spirit of 9/12”, even praising then-President Bush for sending “a message of

unity and solidarity' to Muslims” a few days after the attacks on the World Trade Center (Extract #248).

There are, in my opinions, two underlying consequences to representing the acts as the worst shooting in U.S. soil and as the worst act of terror since 9/11. First, following the latter would erase the genocidal history and other massacres that took place in the U.S.A. The article “Orlando Attack Brings up History of U.S. Massacres” by Pérez-Peña (Extract # 366) published in the Times interrogated the use of superlatives by news reporters and editors and explained that coining the shooting at Pulse “the worst” in U.S. obfuscates the history of massacres. Yet, experts were cited in this article to debunk the myth of comparisons and still, confusion remains:

Disputes over how to define mass shootings are serious enough that experts disagree about whether they are on the rise. Some researchers exclude domestic attacks, but not others. Some say that only the acts of lone gunmen can qualify; others say that a small group of people can carry out a mass shooting if they prepare and act together.

What is relevant in this passage, is the ways experts seem to forget the implications of U.S.-sanctioned acts of terror, or state terrorism, and the discursive formation of the U.S.A. that terrorized native and indigenous peoples (Writer, 2002). As Writer (2002) explained from a critical race theoretical perspective,

What has been forgotten or unrealized is the United States' historical formation, set within the context of terrorism against this nation's Indigenous peoples. Forgotten or ignored are the United States' colonization, deculturalization, and oppression of Indigenous peoples through acts of terrorism. For over 500 years, terrorist acts have been carried out yet erased from the consciousness of the non-Native United States population and its forms of media. (p. 320)

Addressing the dominant representation of the 9/11 attacks, Writer challenges the privileges of defining terrorism in ways that erase first nations' histories, which leads to my second point.

Second, the comparison made by newspapers to 9/11 brings about a sense of nostalgia reminiscent of 9/11, with all of its patriotism, call for unity, and possible resentment towards Arabs and Muslims. I mention possible here because of the way news portrayed and depicted reactions from people who identify with Islam in somewhat positive ways. As I demonstrate further in the second section of this chapter, narratives of Muslims in the U.S.A. who reacted to Pulse highlight discursive strategies that might reify Orientalism. Before we analyze in more depth how news used these narratives, it is important to go back to the level of concern inherent in moral panic processes, and the ways Muslims in the U.S.A are made the target of oppression following the attacks marked as “radical Islamic terrorism” by people in positions of power. A recent study published by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University San Bernardino showed that hate crimes rose in 2016 and 2017, and that there is “a sustained levels of anti-Muslim prejudice in the high thirty to mid forty percent range in the United States, a level higher than after 9/11” (Levin & Grisham, 2017, p. 13). This report raises concern for the well-being and rights of people who identify with Islam in the U.S.

As if the resurgence of anti-Muslim acts and the appeal to 9/11 used by people in positions of authority to make sense of the acts at Pulse were not enough, newspapers informed about ongoing repercussions of post-9/11 securitization, including the breach of human rights in the imprisonment, torture, and indefinite detention of people considered enemy combatants at Guantanamo. Four days after the attacks, in a *Post* article “Saudi Suspected of Wanting to Join 9/11 Hijackers Seeks to Leave Prison” by Goldman (Extract #290), readers learn that Obama was still trying “to close the U.S. military prison and transfer out as many of the 80

[Guantanamo] detainees remaining as possible” but that there exists long-lasting challenges to do so. That day, Mohammed al-Qahtani sought to be released from Guantanamo and appeared in front of a review board after being detained fourteen years for possible ties to the organization of 9/11. “But,” as Goldman explained in the article, “the Qahtani case is among the most complex facing the administration because the military thinks he was linked to the 9/11 conspiracy, but his ill-treatment and medical issues make a trial all but impossible.” If by “ill-treatment” Goldman refers to the years of abuse and torture underlying the treatment of people accused of association with terrorism, it is perhaps downplaying violence.²⁸ A symbolic and political violence that dehumanizes people with mental health issues for the sake of national security. At the time these pages were written, al-Qahtani was still considered a significant threat to the security of the U.S. by the interagency review board, despite medical expertise that diagnosed the detainee with schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorders, and other physical trauma.

Newspaper representation of terrorism after Pulse reinforced what I want to call a nostalgic securitization when, six days after the Orlando shooting, Mazzetti and Shane published an article in the *Times* under the title, “A Saudi Imam, 2 Hijackers and Lingering 9/11 Mystery” about the efforts by official agencies in the U.S.A. to reveal what the authors show, as “the Sept. 11 plot [that] officially remains an open case” for the FBI (Extract #330). The same day, the *Times* also reported in the article “Advocates for release of 9/11 documents worry about potential delay” by Hulse (Extract #335), asserting that more recent reports about 9/11 are still to be declassified because they implicated Saudi Arabia. Still on 17 June 2016, the *Times* published an article that appeals to 9/11 sentiments when Wilson reported, “Funeral at Last for Fire Chief Lost to Twin Towers” (Extract #338). This is not even counting the ways newspaper showed

²⁸ Some Republicans (and most Democrats) acknowledged that these acts were torture (Cooper & Santora, 2007).

Mateen's whereabouts during 9/11. The ways for the *Times* and the *Post* to represent terrorism after Pulse invited the readers to consider 9/11 as the point of reference, marking the acts as another exceptional event that requires strong securitization measures. It also reminded the audience of how people in positions of authority define responsibility to acts marked as terrorism, the focus of the next sub-section.

The representation of terrorism by newspapers amplified hostility towards the perpetrator of the acts. Following such acts, the platform offered by newspapers to politicians and security experts fueled the dichotomous assumptions about good and evil (Walsh, 2017). The exceptionality of the events represented in newspapers by the appeals to previous tragic events, are confounded by what was happening in the U.S.A. then. At the time of the 12 June 2016 attacks, the presidential campaign in the U.S.A. was underway, turning political realm into a dramatic theatre of more than a mere war on words with, at its center, the struggle for partisan leaders to name the events at Pulse an act of "radical Islamic terrorism." The platform offered by both the *Times* and the *Post* for Trump's anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric became one of the most salient aspects of the newspaper representation of terrorism following the shooting in Orlando. Yet, in both papers, Trump's response to the attacks was the focus of newspapers.²⁹ Most of the newspaper articles reported on and were critical of Trump for coining the attacks at Pulse as radical Islamic terrorism.

For example, the article "Trump's Broadside After Massacre Shakes Islamic Group" published in the *Post* by Achenbach and Beachum (Extract #301; see category of candidate in Table 10) accused the candidate of blaming people who identify with Islam of complicit relationship with the perpetrator, and for collapsing religion and national identity with terrorism.

²⁹ Trump's name was referenced by newspapers a total of 678 times whereas Clinton's was mentioned 273 and Obama's 377 times.

Another article published in the same paper by DeYoung and DelReal (Extract #318), “Trump Says His Insinuation About Obama and Terror was Right,” debunk the candidate’s claim that Obama was inherently tied to terrorist organizations. The article “Trump’s speeches on Muslims fire up his base, but may prove costly in election” published in the *Times* by Burns and Kaplan (Extract #349) revealed the growing anxiety by possible voters, and shows that “strong majorities of Republican voters supported Mr. Trump's suggested ban on Muslim immigrants.” This strategy would prove to be profitable when Trump was appointed President months later and signed an executive order as a president.

However, some reports indicated that the various call made by Trump aligned with current concerns in the U.S.A about the threat of terrorism. The article “When a phrase takes on new meaning: ‘Radical Islam’, explained” by Fisher (Extract #305; see also categories of law and candidate in Table 10) published in the *Times* offered more legitimacy to the rhetoric used by Trump. In it, Fisher shows how experts of the Islamic World like Shadi Hamid and Will McCants criticized the demand to call the acts radical Islamic terrorism. Even though Fisher forgot to draw from the primary definition of the term radical, that relates to the fundamental nature of something, the roots of something, Fisher still debunks the use of the terms in the context of Pulse. Still, as early as 14 June 2016, Fisher, an international columnist for the *Times*, was also reporting on the diverging perspectives at the center of the dominant responses to the attacks. In the article, “Gays, guns and jihad: Motives blur on closer scrutiny” Fisher (Extract # 238) remarks,

Mr. Trump, by citing "radical Islam," urges a narrative of clashing civilizations and war on terror. Mr. Obama, meanwhile, has focused his outrage on what he sees as the laxity of America's gun laws. And gay rights groups have placed the attack within a long

history of homophobic violence [...] The "radical Islam" narrative, of all those available, offers perhaps the clearest appeal. It portrays attackers and potential attackers as a monolith, identifiable by common features that are alien to America's non-Muslim majority. And it frames terrorism within the familiar context of a war – something that can be won. [...] Mr. Obama's emphasis on access to deadly weapons, however, presents terrorism as an extension of crime and therefore something that can only be managed. Still, this approach offers its own villains – politicians and lobbyists who oppose tighter gun regulations – as well as a simple way for thinking about the threat and how to curtail it.

The passage above exemplifies how the use of the term “radical Islamic terrorism” dominated newspaper representation the week after Orlando. Although Fisher demonstrated how the use of the terms “radical Islamic terrorism” was outlined by Trump in a form of accusation, blaming Obama for being politically correct, the article reads like a means to support the anti-Muslim rhetoric set forth by Trump. Without explicitly supporting Trump’s assertion, the appeal to specifically name this kind of new terrorism (Ditrych, 2014), this passage appeared to legitimize the ways in which the Republican candidate turned president perpetuates the myth of a clash of civilization. A tenet of Orientalism that I explain in more details in Part II.

This section showed how news representation focused primarily on defining the events from within the realm of terrorism discourse, as an exceptional event, incomprehensible. We also learned how newspapers may have become the necessary platform for presidential candidate like Trump to fuel hostility towards Muslims. The following section analyses the third theme elevated from thematic analysis of newspaper articles published by national press, by drawing the portrait of the perpetrator of the acts. As people around the world rallied behind slogans like

“We are Orlando” and “Pray for Orlando”, explanations about the motivations of Mateen surfaced.

Theme 3: The Paradoxes that the National Press and Public Politicians Appeared to be Facing

A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub not only because he wanted to kill Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens because of their sexual orientation.

It is a strike at the heart and soul of who we are as a nation.

It is an assault on the ability of free people to live their lives, love who they want and express their identity.

It is an attack on the right of every single American to live in peace and safety in their own country.

Donald Trump, speech given at the Saint Anselm College New Hampshire Institute of Politics, 13 June 2016 (as cited in “Transcript,” 2016).

In this final theme, I discuss the paradox faced by media and politicians following Pulse, between the call for unity and perceived hostility. Throughout this essay, I have shown how Orientalism served as an anchor to newspaper representation of terrorism post-Pulse. The ways the portrait of the perpetrator of the acts was drawn by news reporters the week following the exceptional act of terror committed at Pulse, reinforce what Maira (2009, see also Mahmood, 2002) calls the “bad” Muslim narrative. The way people “are made into public exemplars of anti-Western enemies by state allegations of threats to national security and U.S. democracy; hysterical media coverage [...] and often distorted accounts of their activities and politics” (p.

636). Although Mateen might have been a prey of bullying, Islamophobia, and lived with invisible disability, that does not excuse the mass murder of patrons at Pulse. Accounts of Mateen's life as the bad Muslim only props up the accounts of "good Muslims" represented in the news, the contrasting stories of Muslims published in the *Post* three days after the events titled "Muslim students report bias amid terror wave" (Extract # 291) and another published by the same newspaper four days after the massacre, and titled, "Seeing urgency, Muslims plan to fight Trump with vote" (Extract #317), which invite the readers to consider performance of Muslim Americans as "good citizenship" (Maira, 2009, p. 634). Accounts reported in the news that read like a support to the theory of madness (as the understanding that madness underlies contemporary civilizational discursive practices), like a cursor that worked in tandem with other appeals in the news. Newspapers appeared to have dressed the portrait of a terrorist threat by representing Mateen's "failed" masculinity (with the representation of the personal life of the perpetrator by drawing irrational behavior, violent, homophobic, and inclined to misplaced patriotism because of immigration). A representational nod which, in hindsight, might bury deeper the anchor of Orientalism.

As stated previously, leaders of different nation-states shared concerns, griefs, and outrage shortly after the attacks at Pulse, by situating the events within the realm of terrorism. For instance, the *Post* reported comments from Pakistan's prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, who called the Pulse shooting "a "gruesome act of terrorism" and an "inexcusable act of inhumanity". Other leaders' responses were also reported, like the Prime minister of India Narendra Modi use of Tweeter to share condolences. In France, people like Le Pen, leader of the far-right then-*Front National*, wrote on Facebook that, "terrorism has killed. This time, those targeted were targeted because they were homosexuals, and we know to what extent homosexuality is attacked in the

countries that live under the Islamic yoke. We must fight with all our strength this dark barbarism" (Extract #258; see also category of international relations in Table 8). Ironically, this quote comes from the leader of the far-right in France who opposed same-sex marriage and continued to exacerbate the lives of Muslims in France during the 2017 presidential election.

This passage by Le Pen is important for the purpose of this dissertation about French and U.S. news discourse. It illustrates how newspapers relied on the use of social media by people in positions of authority who, conversely, benefitted from the platform offered by media. This represents an overlap in the representation of interests related to terrorism, a stage for the injunction to resort to violence against non-Christian nations. Such an authoritative response misses the fact about the tragic acts in Orlando that were conducted by a single person on U.S. American soil. A slippery slope is present that invites the readers to imagine all non-Christian nations as barbaric, devoid of cultural richness, and in need of intervention, as if the genesis of such violent acts couldn't implicate the state in producing and staging so-called "barbaric" terror. As mentioned in the previous chapter about news representation of the 13 November 2015 attacks that ended with a hostage situation and a mass shooting at the Bataclan concert hall, the use of the term barbaric has become normalized for most of far-right politicians and a major part of people across the political spectrum, including the population, in France. A derivative of the term was also used by Clinton during the 13 June 2016 campaign speech in Cleveland, OH, when then-Democratic presumptive nominee and former Secretary of State declared that, "[w]hatever we learn about this killer, his motives in the days ahead, we know already the barbarity that we face from radical jihadists is profound" ("Hillary," 2016). This short passage from the speech represented the supposedly moderate response like the one launched by Clinton, could be interpreted from a critical perspective as a more latent way to emulate Orientalism than

the manifest ways in which Le Pen, for instance, or Trump are given a platform to do so after the Bataclan and Pulse. That is, by casually fueling the myth of a clash of civilization.

Inspired by Lewis and made popular by Huntington towards the end of the cold war, the thesis of a clash of civilization supports that “the conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). To summarize, Huntington’s assertions was reinforced by various assumptions about what might be the cause of this conflict, including: differences in histories, language, and religion among others as the genesis of long and violent conflicts, increased interactions between people, the weakening of national identity due to modernized economics and social change, the threat posed to and from within the West by indigenous epistemologies, the danger of fluid, dynamic, and multidimensional identities, and the development of economic relations between non-Western states (Huntington, 1993). This represents a set of questionable assumptions that made of differences in value and belief systems a means to cast Islam at odds with the West, which was normalized and revived before 9/11. The platform offered Trump, as explained in this chapter, thus legitimized the perpetuation of civilizational discourse. An example of how this myth was fueled by people in positions of authority following the Pulse shooting was the support given to Trump and the accusations made to Obama for refusing to do so, ultimately leading conservatives to demand the resignation of the president. Once again, readers are confronted with the paradoxes faced by politicians, between the rallying call of unity to a nation about to elect a president and the anti-Muslim rhetoric communicated by candidates like Trump,

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analyzed how newspapers represented the acts at Pulse as an exceptional act of terrorism and deconstructed the ways news dressed the portrait of the perpetrator. I explained how the marking of the acts as terrorism were reminiscent of a 9/11 nostalgic securitization. I also showed how newspaper represented the perpetrator in ways that aligned with racialized state surveillance. The thematic analysis of newspaper articles indicated that the moral panic processes were triggered in the wake of the shooting at Pulse to a certain extent. Considering the socio-political context, however, the responses to the tragic 12 June 2016 mass murder coincided with an already existing frame of reference deeply rooted in the construction of terrorism since before 9/11. This is where, with the identification of the perpetrator and the association of Muslims with terror through the good and bad Muslim narrative, newspapers reify Orientalism. I have pointed out how responses by people in positions of power employed linguistic devices to tie the genesis of the acts to barbarism, depicting Islam as non-civilized, and backward. People in positions of authority who, by coining the acts a dark barbarism, constructs the Brown body as primitive and perpetuates the assumption that nations like France and the U.S. are, “sexually exceptional: less homophobic and more tolerant of homosexuality [...] than the repressed, modest, nudity-shy Middle-East” (Puar, 2007, as cited in Calafell, 2017). An exceptionality that was taken up by Trump in the speech given the day after the event, as shown in the passage above.

It is now irrefutable to claim that Trump used the attacks as a political platform to bring people who identified on the LGBTQIA+ spectrum into the fold of the nation. A nation in which, in the four years after the attacks and the subsequent election of Trump to presidency, efforts have been made to deny rights to and discriminate against people who identify as LGBTQIA+

("The Discrimination," 2017). This is in addition to the actual travel ban enacted in early 2017, and to the numerous rules on immigration and detention put in place by the administration. I recognize that this chapter may not have taken into account and deconstructed the erasure of people who were the targets of the attacks at Pulse. At the center of concerns is the violence committed against people whose tragic deaths reflect lived experiences that taught others, including myself, a lot about the fluid, multidimensional, and complex understanding of identity. People who, arguably predominantly, have lived through the racialized experience in the U.S. (including, the shooter). In conclusion, I am left wondering about the topic of violence, what Bhabha (2004) wondered about colonization, violence, and the formation of the modern nation in the foreword of Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, "how do the oppressed discover the enduring strength to found a free and just society, a national consciousness, if they are continuously aware of their own anxiety and fragility?" (p. xxxi). It is possible to contend that Pulse represented, in all of its symbolism, this possibility for people in the community who were used to attend the nightclub as a space to discover such an enduring strength.

CHAPTER SIX:
ORIENTALISM REINFORCED:
DIFFERENTIAL TEXTUAL ATTITUDES IN THE PANIC AFTER THE BATACLAN IN
FRANCE AND PULSE IN THE U.S.A.

"Nous, musulmans de France, réaffirmons notre rejet catégorique et sans ambiguïté de toute forme de violence ou de terrorisme qui sont la négation même des valeurs de paix et de fraternité que porte l'islam.

Nous, musulmans de France, sommes des citoyens français à part entière, faisant partie intégrante de la Nation, et solidaires de l'ensemble de la communauté nationale. Nous, musulmans de France, proclamons notre attachement indéfectible au pacte républicain qui nous unit tous. Nous, musulmans de France, proclamons notre adhésion totale aux valeurs de la République. Les musulmans de France élèvent leurs prières vers Dieu, le Très Clément et le Très Miséricordieux, pour qu'Il préserve et qu'Il bénisse la France ! Les musulmans de France formulent tous leurs vœux de paix, de sécurité et de prospérité pour leur patrie, la France."

Extract # 187 (published in *Le Figaro*, 20 November 2015)

English and French are world languages, and the logics of border and warring essences are totalizing, so we should begin by acknowledging that the map of the world has no divinely or dogmatically sanctioned space, and of humanly constructed and interdependent histories that are fundamentally knowable, although not through grand theory or systemic totalization.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct newspaper representation of terrorism by examining the tradition, in both French and English news writing, that perpetuates the “logics of border” evoked in the epigraph, especially following the 13 November 2015 and 12 June 2016 attacks. In Chapter Two, I explained how this border logic unfolded in France and in the European Union, and came across in newspaper representation of terrorism, as totalizing ways of divinely and dogmatically sanctioned space. In simpler terms, this chapter traces the depths of Orientalism discourse. For this chapter, I ground the lived experiences shared with readers of *Le Figaro* in the epigraph, as a way to unearth the “somewhat elusive oppositional mood, and its emerging strategies, as an internationalist counter-articulation” (Said, 1978, p. 311). The message from Said prompted me to open with lessons learned from the quote published by Guénois under the title, "L'appel solennel" qui sera lu dans 2 400 mosquées." The selected passage in the epigraph came across as one of the only sources that challenges Orientalism discourse, in the face of the readers. Translated in English, the epigraph reads,

We, Muslims of France, reaffirm our categorical and unambiguous rejection of any form of violence or terrorism which is the very negation of the values of peace and brotherhood that Islam carries. We, Muslims of France, are full French citizens, forming an integral part of the Nation, and united with the whole of the national community. We, Muslims of France, proclaim our unwavering attachment to the republican pact which unites us all. We, Muslims of France, proclaim our total adherence to the values of the Republic. Muslims of France raise their prayers to God, the Most Merciful and the Most

Merciful, that He preserve and bless France! Muslims of France express their wishes for peace, security and prosperity for their homeland, France.

Although I do not know what it is like to grow up Muslim in France, I found the turn to religion at the end of the passage an inspiring intellectual response that challenged directly the nationalist paradigm deployed since the attacks that vilified Muslims in France and in the U.S.A. through the prophetic claims of nationalism, in the traditional canvas of this "new" yet not-so-new terrorism (Ditrych, 2014; Wilson, 2017).

People who contributed to the publication of this "*appel solennel*" wrote in plain English and French to illustrate how Orientalism discourse is recycled, or reinforced. This public announcement, as opposed to newspaper representation of terrorism, came across as one of the few liberating expressions of solidarity made visible in the news, one that publicly challenged the message from public officials and other media pundits who continued to attribute to Muslims in France and from around the world, the burden of terrorism. For instance, in the U.S.A., Trump attributed this burden in explicit ways whereas Clinton, among others, have done so latently. In France, a similar division was observed between politicians (see category of nationality in Table 9 for explicit manifestation of Orientalism). The witty response quoted in the epigraph reminded me of "Talking Back," as per the title of a seminal literature in Black Feminist thinking published by hooks (1989). Talking back, or the movement from silence to speech that is "for the oppressed, the colonized, the exploited" - I would add, the vilified - "and those who stand and struggle side by side a gesture of defiance that heals, that makes new life and new growth possible," an "act of speech, of 'talking back,' that is no mere gesture of empty words, that is the expression of our movement from object to subject- the liberated voice" (p. 9).

This dissertation brought into comparison themes analyzed in newspaper representations of terrorism to understand how Orientalism functioned like an anchor in narrativizing what led the perpetrators to commit these acts and how it was reinforced in the different scripts that contributed to the making of the radical Islamic terrorists and the veiling of state use of political violence -- state terrorism. In that effort, Chávez (2010) offers support to this line of reasoning, stating,

This particular historical moment, constituted by neoliberalism and post-9/11 insecurity, has re-emphasized the importance of secure borders - moral and national ones. Migrants and queers emerge as the prototypical threats to those borders, in part because they are figured within the national social imaginary as strangers. (p. 138)

With that understanding of the context of belonging and citizenship in mind, newspaper representation of terrorism contextualized in this project illustrated how societies in France and the U.S.A. expatiated the mythical need for the securitization of moral and national borders. Readers of the news were left to instantiate the events with these distorted myths of Arabs, Muslims, migrants, queer, and everyone who identifies from near and far in-between and at these intersections of identity and whose existence were made "prototypical threats."

In this chapter, I conclude with a synthesis of the two thematic analyses interpreted in the two previous chapters. The differences and similarities in the sequences of a panic that have made reactions in the public sphere a focal point in newspaper representation of terrorism, are discussed as elements in the ascendancy of Orientalism in between 2015 and 2016, in France and the U.S.A. In the second section of this chapter, I circle back with an interpretation of the dogmas of Orientalism that have been reinforced in the newspaper representation of terrorism in the West.

Endurance of Disproportionality in France and the Volatility of a Panic in the U.S.A.

This first part questions the elements of panic by returning to the warlike security discourse that saturated the national press in France and in the U.S.A. I examine the similarities and differences contributing to heightened concerns about the terrorist threat as well as the supposed expectations of the population in terms of public policies that make panic volatile. First, it is important to clarify that one of the main differences, between the dominant discourses in response to the Bataclan attacks and those in response to the Pulse attack, is the volatile effect of panic. Indeed, post-Bataclan rhetoric seem to be anchored in the long term and the media convey justifications for the enactment and prolongation of the state of emergency. In the U.S.A., the effects of panic wear off much faster over time.

In this second case, the attempt and failure to pass a law to prevent the purchase of firearms from people on the "watch lists" comes to end the sequence (Corso, 2017). A difference which shows the specificities of the moral panic specific to the French and U.S. socio-political contexts. Although the manner of transcribing the Pulse attacks is similar to those often used to frame terrorism in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks, the security responses in the media are not as salient as those observed post-Bataclan. For example, the dominant responses to the 13 November 2015 attacks illustrated the threat posed by terrorism and the need for politicians to face it at home and abroad (see categories of military and emergency in Table 9) whereas, in the U.S.A. following the 12 June 2016 shooting, the responses came across as confined (see category of law in Table 10). Debates in the post-Pulse national press cover a fundamental aspect of U.S. society, the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees the right to carry guns, but also exposes some of the limits of moral panic. Indeed, there is a consensus in the public sphere that agrees to condemn the atrocity of the Pulse attacks, to strive not to stigmatize Islam and to

debate how to counter (or not) the easy access to weapons of war. The comparison between post-Pulse and post-Bataclan war speeches shows a difference in the war on terror as a means of control. Indeed, in the U.S.A., the state of emergency is deployed by the mayor of Orlando, and it is broadened by the governor of Florida to allow an increase in security measures for LGBTQIA + nightclubs in the region.

In contrast, the deployment of the state of emergency was a central theme of post-Bataclan media representations. The way in which the media transcribed the promulgation of a state of emergency in France and its extension at the end of the period studied here, highlights the dynamics of a growing fear of terrorism, and the needs to address this fear. This also highlights the volatile effect of moral panic. Briefly, this measure extends to prefects' powers previously reserved for magistrates, such as ordering home searches at any time. The declaration of a state of emergency illustrates a "legislative fever" (Chalkiadavi, 2015, cited in Boutin & Paulussen, 2015, p. 235), a "contagion" (Hamilton & Berlusconi, 2018) contracted by a presidential figure. A president who now appears as a "hawk" - an image used several times by the national press in France to question the role of warlord assumed by the president - and which reinforces the hypothesis that the institutional responses to the terrorism (state of emergency, military interventions) fuel the escalation of panic over time (Walsh, 2017). Sporting and "cultural" events were canceled, gatherings banned, and public places (e.g., churches, mosques, schools) guarded by soldiers. It is possible to interpret the promulgation of the state of emergency as a characteristic element of moral panic, the passage of a law which testifies to an ambient fear generated by these attacks and amplified in the media through the invocation of a "Charlie effect".

While it is important to remember that these attacks were very different -- they took place in different cities and nation-states; one was a coordinated series of attacks while the other was perpetrated by a single shooter in a unique site -- these differences remain a few among many. Comparing the way the media focuses on war rhetoric, we find that the moral panic "bubble" is dissipating in the U.S.A. as a result of the refusal to legislate on access to semi-automatic weapons. A volatile effect, paradoxical in a way, but which contrasts sharply with the dominant post-Bataclan responses, represented in the French national press, and which advocate a large-scale response and a state of emergency capable of extending into time. There is then the enduring effect of a moral panic that sets in over time with the lasting installation of a state of emergency.

In hindsight, this research dissected the different elements of the sequential model of moral panic in the analysis of questions of identity and of the war discourses that have fueled concerns in France and the U.S.A. In this last part, we explain the differences and similarities in the paradox that the media organizations and the political authorities are confronted with, which makes it possible to highlight the limits in newspaper representation of terrorism, assenting to the escalation of violence in the public as a sequence in a moral panic that reinforced Orientalism

Many articles in the French national press rekindled the collective trauma of Charlie Hebdo. However, the comparisons between the expected post-Bataclan responses and those mentioned after Charlie are regularly formulated in such a way as to shed light on the logic of preventing terrorism and exploiting anxiety in the face of future attacks. Many political figures such as Nicolas Sarkozy or Alain Juppé, or even experts, such as Gille Keppel, all interviewed by *Le Figaro* in the aftermath of the 13 November 2015 attacks, recall the justified and justifiable needs for security decisions facing the threat of terrorism.

A feeling of indignation gripped moral entrepreneurial figures, politicians and journalists after the Bataclan. This seems to show that the post-Charlie spirit haunts a society plagued by terrorism. What is perhaps troubling about these statements is how Tabard, in his writings (see Chapter 3), exemplifies the paradoxes of the dominant post-Charlie discourse. These writings take place in the recurring discourse on the place of religion in France - an implicit or explicit call to secularism as a tool for strengthening the values of the French Republic but also as a means of justifying the stigmatization of people, already stigmatized long before Charlie, who identify as Muslim in France. The last sentence of this passage then reads like a euphemism; denouncing terrorists becomes an imperative, beyond a call for unity, in which the refusal to mix it up is no longer possible. This passage implies that the desire to stigmatize (here, Muslims or people who identify as such) becomes an undeniable possibility in the face of terror.

The press in the U.S.A., for its part, focuses more fully on the fear of the victims of the Pulse attack, often attached, but little recognized, to the intersectional experience, and more generally, to the real and lived fear of the people who identify with the victims of these tragic events (Vaccaro & Koob, 2019). This unique, multidimensional experience was taken into account by many journalists the day after Pulse. The speeches of leading political figures converge to integrate into the core of national identity people who are subjected, even marginalized, by the normative processes linked to sexual orientation and gender. Puar evokes, in order to deconstruct homo-nationalist discourse in the post-9/11 U.S.A. (2017), the system of assimilation which would allow a category of the population, until now marginalized by heteronormative discourse, to be rehabilitated as a citizen within a nation invested in a modern multiculturalism against the backdrop of the war against terrorism. Obama's response, cited as an example at the beginning of this article, would approach post-Pulse homonationalism in a

repeated call for core values that signify belonging to a unique US experience. But it is mostly Trump's words that evoke homonationalism post-Pulse. It should be remembered that almost a year ago, "the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender Americans, and those working to advance their rights". The press does not hesitate to show how the presidential candidates recognized, in 2015 following the Pulse attack, the need to highlight the problems experienced by marginalized people, mostly racialized, in the intersection of sexual orientation, gender, and religion. This was a short-lived recognition since Trump, then president, questions and bars access to care for transgender people, to cite just one example, even though he declared the day after Pulse, "I will fight for you".

We also see how the media appeal to people who identify or are identified as Muslims to testify on the presidential candidacy, for example. From a critical point of view of Orientalism, this way of narrating the lived experience of Muslims in the U.S.A. supports the dualistic hypothesis characteristic of discourses according to which there is a "good" and a "bad" Muslim (Maira, 2009; Mamdani, 2002). Take, for example, an article in the *Post* published on 15 June 2016 titled "Sensing urgency, Muslims plan to fight Trump with vote" (Extract #317). In this example, students from metropolitan Washington, DC, urged the readership to categorize Muslims as "good" citizens when they take on the civic role and bear witness to the blessings of the American multicultural experience. This contrasts with the example of the "bad" "Muslim" citizen in the person of Mateen, who is often identified as such, while it is very often reported that the perpetrator of the Pulse attacks was not religious. Comparatively, this dichotomy could also be perceived in the context of France post-Bataclan; the statement in the epigraph aligns with the Orientalist discourse of the "good" Muslims in France.

Responses from experts, authority figures, and other figures considered legitimate to describe the attacks carried out on 13 November 2015 and the killing sponsored by Mateen on 12 June 2016, would be expected, if not desired, by the perpetrators of the killings. According to Walsh's work, the "provocative" role of the attackers is therefore to exploit "modern societies" defining properties to unsettle political order and sociality" (p. 652). Here, the case of insurgents in the modus operandi makes the prevention of political violence all the more difficult as these scapegoats would have already been subjected to surveillance practices (in the case of Mateen, in particular). In the light of the work of Crone (2016) on radicalization, this recourse to violence demonstrates "intellectual transformation" on the part of those responsible, a passage to the terrorist act which implies "an embodied know-how, an enacted or practical kind of knowledge about how to act [...] that enables the perpetration of violence" (pp. 600-601). In other words, the authors would bring an epistemology of "terrorist" violence, a violence that would transform not only those responsible for these acts into actors of moral provocation but also of the moral fabric of societies. In addition, it can be assumed that abusers are aware of the amplifying role of the media (Leśniczak, 2017; Murray, 2017; O'Loughlin, 2016). With this in mind, shouldn't we distance ourselves from the reductive hypothesis, often assumed by presidents, experts, or even the media, according to which religion and extremism are always and already entangled?

Although it is difficult to be able to demonstrate the volatile effect of moral panic, I believe that the analysis of the political orientations represented in the selected national press regarding terrorism makes it possible to differentiate between an escalation of panic in France and its evaporation in the U.S.A. In both cases, on the other hand, the injunctions made to Muslims, would be based in my opinion on Orientalizing discursive processes which would fuel hostile reactions.

Dogmas

The interest of this entire dissertation project was to provide a comparative perspective and procedural interpretation that placed the complexities of media representations in the socio-political contexts of French and American societies. In France, the almost unanimous decision to extend the state of emergency, the surveillance practices that this exceptional measure induces, and their media representations, demonstrate how the definition of a problem has come to be based on growing anxieties linked to the attacks of 13 November 2015 and fed by the press. In the U.S.A., the interest shown by the national press to represent the efforts, and consequently, the failure of a legislation supposed to regulate, even to bar, the access to certain weapons to the people listed on "no-fly" and/or other watchlists, paradoxically demonstrate how the panic subsided.

This section of the dissertation now seeks to answer the last of the three research questions that asked, in what ways do national newspapers in France and the U.S.A. reinforce Orientalism? In this section, I begin the climb back from the immersive experience of a comparative thematic analysis of national newspaper articles, up the interpretive ladder and towards the critique of Orientalism and its reinforcement. Orientalism was very much alive at the inception of the events and for centuries that preceded the events and representation as terrorism, studied here. What this section discusses is the widening scope of Orientalism discourse and the underlying logic that media plays a role (conscious or unconscious) in its reinforcement. In France, for instance, I opine that Orientalism discourse materialized in news representation of *terrorisme* with the perpetuation of the myths that function like a logic always and already attributing people who identify as Muslims or are identified as such, the burden of terrorism.

As is explained in this open-ended discussion, this study simply attempted to show how newspaper representation perpetuated this myth through what Alsultany had called simplified complex explanation (cf. Chapter One). To illustrate how simplified complex explanation buttressed Orientalism in news representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse, I use the image of the spotlight which I think helps to navigate data interpretation. The repercussion of the acts at Pulse and the failure of media to authenticate with their spotlight, testify against, serve as watchdogs for the struggle against hate crime illustrates the depth of Orientalism discourse. The erasure of a possibility for news readers to engage with the hate crime dimension of the attacks at Pulse manifested as evidence of deeper issues in the U.S.A. (Hancock & Haldeman, 2017). For instance, Meyer (2020) exposed the tendency of counternarratives published on popular lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer websites to reinforce stereotypes of Latinx communities and the intertwined ideologies of family and faith that recentered whiteness following the Pulse attack (pp. 262-263). The following block quote by Hancock and Haldelman (2017) adds a psycho-social understanding to complement the discussion started in the first theme about the vilification of a perpetrator - the possibility that Mateen might have been struggling to identify both Muslim and on the LGB spectrum, as the son of a family from Pakistan living in the U.S.A. - and the politics of denial to discharge the FBI from any responsibilities for letting the "radical Islamic terrorist" on the loose:

There were individuals who claimed to have had romantic relationships with Mateen (e.g., CBS/AP, 2016). Mainstream media, though, did not pursue this information or ignored it entirely— perhaps because it was difficult to prove or substantiate or because of the influences described above. However, the picture that this information would have provided is more complicated and nuanced, would very likely have taken a bit more time

and care to investigate, and may have been considered by reporters to be too much for the inquiring public to digest. The inclusion of the hate crime aspect of this tragedy (i.e., Mateen's homophobic remarks juxtaposed with multiple visits to the Pulse and his use of gay websites) again would have painted an intersectional picture—a picture in which profound conflicts emerge among multiple identities. This would have resulted in a deeper inquiry regarding his having selected Latino night for this shooting. (p. 156)

It is hard not to disagree with an understanding that connects to Al-Sultany's concept of simplified complex explanations, although, a critique of Orientalism might fear that, by insisting for media representation to focus on the sexual orientation of a perpetrator like Mateen, one might reinforce this idea that hate crime and terrorism dimensions of these acts of violence, can only be tried by drawing all sorts of hypothesis on a person who is dead.

The fear is that dogmas of Orientalism might be reinforced if we focus intellectual attention and commitment towards the critique of Orientalism discourse following this postulate by Hancock and Haldelman (2017). Orientalism, as overtly and covertly manifested as it was in the wake of both events studied here, resuscitated what Said listed as follows:

[O]ne is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, underdeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a "classical" Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically "objective." A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom

something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible). (Said, p. 301)

Focusing the intellectual energy to counter Orientalism discourse by insisting to know more about the sexual orientation in the cases of Mateen might get dangerously close to that third dogma. This is to say that while Orientalism is evidenced in newspaper data for this project, the conclusions and realizations that I have arrived at can be extrapolated to the ways in which power and Orientalism is understood from a distance *and* functioning in our immediate, every day, intellectual and political life. Finally, this entire dissertation project challenged the taken-for-granted use of the term, "terrorism" and its representation in newspapers as a key term that also indicated, through a critical compassionate lens, the complexity of emotions in communication.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

DISCUSSION

In this discussion chapter, I begin by addressing how this study (a) contributed to critical studies on terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism. I continue with a (b) reflexive section attentive to the limitations of this project. I follow these sections with the (c) theoretical and practical implications, and then (d) present my conclusion.

Contributions

Theoretically, my dissertation contributes to critical studies on terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism. I specifically attended to the calls for "the necessity of racialized rhetorical criticism to include and understand anti-Muslim racism" (Yousuf & Calafell, 2018, p. 315). I expanded on that call by deconstructing terrorism in the news through the sequences of moral panic and the theoretical lens of Orientalism that transcends U.S. and French borders. By conducting a comparative thematic analysis of U.S. and French newspaper accounts of two different acts of terrorism, this dissertation expands upon a topology of discursive representations and circuits of power across the globe, an unusual but promising feature of this communication scholarship for critical cultural studies anchored in qualitative methodology. Beginning with studies on terrorism, this project examined in-depth, within a constrained period of time, newspaper reports about terrorism following acts of extreme violence and demonstrated

how journalistic practices often simplified the story told about these events by honing in on victims'/perpetrators' narratives (Walter et al., 2017). In my study, terrorism is conceptualized as co-constituted communicative acts of political violence implicating state, insurgent actors, and media (Stohl, 2008).

I contend that the journalistic practices simplify the complexity of the events studied in this project in particular, and terrorism in general, without questioning the broader societal, political, economic, and cultural factors that contributed to make these acts a tragic reality. There has been increased scholarly interests in the acts at the Bataclan and Pulse from different corners of communication, in France and the U.S.A. For instance, Alexander and Weems (2017) dedicated a special issue of *Qualitative Inquiry* to poetic responses to the 12 June 2016 shooting at Pulse. My research contributed to the understanding put forth by the editors in the introduction of this special issue who stated that, "terrorism, as the defense against terrorist, conflates identities as collective culprits that restrict borders/border crossing/border identities as a method of containing controls is a terror invoking act itself, bearing arms against difference" (p. 485). While the authors addressed state terrorism, or counterterrorism, following the acts at Pulse, this definition also resonates with the dominant responses to the 13 November 2015 attacks in France. My research thus was to keep up, even so remotely, with the "hearts, bodies, and critical minds on the pulse" of a research agenda set against homophobia, sexism, racism, and islamophobia (p. 486).

In my francophone research, scholars have also mobilized to interrogate discourses post-attacks and the resonance of acts marked as terrorism in society. In the introduction to a special issue published in *Mots. Les langages du politique*, Truc et al. (2018) stated that

[L]es attentats sus-citent une production symbolique extrêmement riche et diverse qui, si elle ne suffit évidemment pas à effacer la violence (ni même à la faire cesser), remplit des fonctions anthropologiques fondamentales. Il est clair notamment que ces discours précipitent la formation d'une communauté émotionnelle en réaction à l'attaque et activent des sentiments de commune appartenance, à commencer par le sentiment national, sur lequel le discours politico-médiatique dominant met prioritairement l'accent. (p. 14)

This passage is best translated in English as follows,

[T]he attacks trigger an extremely rich and diverse symbolic production which, while it is obviously not sufficient to erase violence (or even to put an end to it), fulfills fundamental anthropological functions. It is particularly clear that these speeches precipitate the formation of an emotional community in reaction to the attack and activate feelings of common belonging, starting with national feeling, on which the dominant politico-media discourse places the priority accent.

Thus, my research contributed to this understanding of what Truc et al. (2018) referred to as, an orchestra without conductor, or communication about attacks in media that framed and produced dominant responses best suited in these moments of crisis, in the days that followed these acts of extreme violence marked as terrorism.

Second, the diverse and interdisciplinary aspects of my research interrogated the use of terrorism in francophone and anglophone media and contributed to the sequences of moral panics useful to understand the reinforcement of Orientalism. By drawing from Orientalism, I sought to understand its relevance today and to challenge the ways in which Islam was represented as a monolith in the wake of these attacks. Orientalism thus exposed the ways

Whiteness prevails as a set of discursive practices that continue to hierarchize people through citizenship and belonging today. Now, more than five year after these tragedies, the manifestation of Orientalism discourse underlie this onto-epistemological moment in which the confluences of discourses and materialities helps us to build knowledge through being and understanding the world. As evidenced in the previous chapter, I combined Orientalism with moral panic, a framework that can be defined as the sequential process of identifying a threat in the wake of an event that breached societal expectations about the use of violence; the ensuing vilification that project onto a group of people who are blamed for these acts; the consensus to identify the threat as felt and real; the disproportional reactions from moral entrepreneurs; and the volatility of the panic through its atrophy or its endurance. Examples presented in this dissertation include the distinction between the volatile effect of the panic, even though it is not sufficient to understand its effects in depth.

This study revealed similarities and differences in journalistic trends that pose concerns for the study of identity, communication, and culture, specifically the similar ways media amplified the threat and vilified people who identify as Muslims in France and the U.S.A., or people who are identified as such, folk devils. The ways journalists and editors instantiated these acts of extreme violence illustrated how deeper societal concerns are often relegated to the background of the politico-media agenda. Following Walsh (2017), it is possible to question whether these acts do not benefit the perpetrators as much as it benefits "spectacle hungry media outlets" and other moral entrepreneurs (such as politicians, public/private security organizations, surveillance and policing agencies) from the moral panic paradigm. From this paradigmatic approach to moral panic, the state of exception that emerged in France specifically following the 13 November 2015 attacks, afforded politicians and media the social, political, and cultural

currencies to legitimize increased security measures. This connection between legitimacy and security (Smith et al., 2019) validates claims made by the perpetrators, or folk devils, who in turn questioned and provoked the legitimacy of the nation-states like France and the U.S.A. Indeed, as Walsh (2017) opined, "fearful, retributive, and vengeful reactions to terrorism undermine the very conditions - security and democracy - they are purported to protect and preserve" (p. 658). It is possible to question the acts and the dominant responses by politicians and media pundits as an auto-generating mechanism that contributed to the making of terrorism as taken-for-granted phenomenon. In that sense, it is possible to challenge the role played by media as working parallel to the doing of nation-states.

The prolongation of the state of emergency in France speaks to the endurance of the disproportional responses to the 13 November 2015 attacks in France and, conversely, the failure to implement laws banning access to guns following the 12 June 2016 demonstrates the volatility of a panic. As this study has shown, "there is legitimate tension between the actors, despite overlapping interests in perpetuating the conflict or exacerbating public fears. U.S. politicians and defence [sic] industry affiliates do not support" organizations like ISIL or their "objectives and seem to sincerely hope to bring about their destruction (and vice-versa), despite both groups benefiting from the existence of the other" (Smith et al., 2019, p. 164).

Third, I contribute to critical studies on Orientalism. The tensions and overlapping interests mentioned in the section above, specifically between security and legitimacy, stressed varying degrees of intensity in the dominant responses to these acts. I contend that these variations reinforced the three tenets of Orientalism discourse discussed in Chapter One. These three tenets are: (1) a distinction between various forms of knowledge and the politics of knowledge production in/about the study of terrorism, (2) the methodological devices used by

newspapers to dehumanize the Oriental Other, and (3) the personal dimension of journalists and politicians perpetuating processes of identification that are permeating the everyday lived experiences of people in France and in the U.S.A. Orientalism is not new but how it is manifest today in the discourses and materialities of terrorism and nation-states' responses to contemporary acts of terrorism is different. As Orientalism perpetuates the unequal power relations between the rationality of Western nations and the barbaric backwardness of Arabs and Muslims, it does so in the construction of the identity of perpetrators as folk devils. By combining moral panic and Orientalism, this study has also shown the varying degrees in which Orientalism is reinforced in different national contexts.

Specifically, this research contributed to understanding the distinctions between the various forms of knowledge produced in and about terrorism by media. Through immersive narratives, detailed description of perpetrators already subjugated to surveillance and policing, and accounts of hypothetical links with other perpetrators (the terrorist cell hypothesis), newspaper reports contributed to fuel "old myths" about terrorism (Stohl, 2008), including the myths of a clash of civilizations.

In sum and understandably, this interdisciplinary research necessitated more than just a study of newspaper uses of terrorism with regard to the actors and also the underlying political dynamics not only in terms of nation-state. Before addressing limitations and implications, it is important to understand how the consistency of this research contributed to answer questions about issues at the intersections of racialized identity, including and not limited to gender, national identity, religion, and sexuality. The 14 July 2016 truck attack in Nice, France, and the 22 May 2017 bombing in Manchester perpetuated the on-going religion-terrorism nexus; the 23 April 2018 Toronto van attack and, to a certain extent, the 6 January 2021 storming of the U.S.

Capitol illustrated how this nexus is reinforced with rampant toxic masculinity at the inception of acts of extreme violence (Haider, 2016). In the following sub-sections, I draw back from what motivated this research to begin with, offering critical insight into the significance of this study in the ongoing struggles against racism.

Limitations

It is worth noting a few important limitations to this project. The first limitation is the amount of data and timeframe for this study. While this interdisciplinary research sought to challenge dominant Western assumptions about terrorism that are reinforced in the news in France and the U.S.A., the data collected for this dissertation did not necessarily allow me to understand fully the confluence of terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism.

Although I could delve into the ways in which, for instance, national newspapers published in France reinforced Orientalism following the Pulse attacks and, conversely, the ways national newspapers published in the U.S.A. reinforced this logic following the series of attacks that ended at the Bataclan, I could not go in depth nor could I have access to the people--as journalists, terrorism victims, politicians, and other stakeholders—at the heart of the journalistic accounts. As such, it is possible to consider this dissertation project to be the starting point for a more comprehensive interpretation of the role of national newspapers to rely on simplified complex explanations (Alsultany, 2012) on the inevitably globalized stage of news production about acts of extreme violence marked as terrorism.

Another limitation is the newspaper outlets selected for this research. This project could not claim to encompass the broader discourse of Orientalism that might underlie representation of these events as terrorism in other national news outlets, alternative news, regional news, cable

news networks, and social media accounts as well as memorials built in commemoration of the victims of the attacks (Niemeyer, 2018). For instance, a more thorough account could offer a deeper understanding of the scope of Orientalism discourse following these attacks and the outreach of various outlets that target a broader audience.

Finally, I have not placed these acts of violence fully with the ongoing and current acts marked as terrorism that took place in these specific nations and around the globe. Since the 2015 attacks in France and the 2016 shooting in the U.S.A., many other acts have taken place.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

As mentioned previously, this research drew from and contributed to critical studies in terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism. Since Orientalism was developed and expanded as a theoretical framework, the hope was that a dualistic East/West divide would not necessarily exist anymore or, at least, not in the way Orientalism was originally theorized. Globalization has brought an expanded set of antagonistic relations that still are delineated by race, ethnicity, nationality, and other differences but also are increasingly politicized by class in the United States, France, and other parts of the world. People in positions of power who frame acts as terrorism have a vested interests in labelling such acts in these ways to keep their positions of status and privilege. These interests and their relationships to power and control dynamics become visible when evidenced in the analysis of newspaper representations of terrorism through the lens of moral panic. Although it is difficult to be able to demonstrate the volatile effect of moral panic, the analysis of the political orientations represented in the selected national press regarding terrorism made it possible to differentiate between an escalation of panic in France and its volatility in the U.S.A. In addition, further research should take into consideration the

processes and effects of such volatility in critiques and especially in a classed critique of how profitable the wars on terrorism are for particular groups in nations and throughout the world.

While I could not study this in-greater depth, it is important to note that one of the strategies used by newspaper like *Le Figaro* to vilify Muslims as barbaric Others was by blaming the immigration policy of Belgium and, in doing so, use a fictionalized name of a city that connects Molenbeek, Belgium, to any non-Western nations ending with the suffix, "-stan." For instance, the article written by Mével and published in *Le Figaro* reveals the depth of Orientalism. The title of this article reads, "*Au coeur du Molenbeekistan*" (Extract #112; see also category of institutional responsibilities in Table 7) -- a title best translated in English as follows, "At the heart of Molenbeekistan" -- was the only example in the data to show evidence of strategies used by newspapers of simplified complex representations (Alsultany, 2012). While Alsultany (2012) conceptualized the following: "fictionalizing the Middle Eastern or Muslim country" as a representational strategy used in television shows like *The West Wing* or *24*, here the journalists invite the reader to blur the distinct lines between reality and fiction (pp. 25-26).

This news article reveals the depth of Orientalism, once more, in its use of an actual neighborhood of Brussels, Molenbeek, in Belgium and associating with it the suffix necessary to essentialize nations like, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and others. This manifestation of latent Orientalism opens with a detailed description of a reality that brought antiterrorist police forces back into a neighborhood to target and arrest Salah Abdeslam, suspect of the 13 November 2015 attacks still on the run at the time. A failed police intervention that did not deter the journalist from drawing a link between, for instance, perpetrators of the 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 2015 attempted attack on Brussels-Paris train. A series of hypothetical connections made about folk devils and a vilified community of people facing economic

deprivation, surveillance, and policing practices. Limiting the representation of this neighborhood of "Europe's capital," Molenbeek is marked as the fertile ground of "radicalization" from which the "carnage" of the 13 November 2015 took root. This fictionalized reality holds serious pragmatic, and to a certain extent, theoretical implications for journalists that I address later.

The discussion of radicalization -- that could not possibly be a part of this dissertation -- holds serious implications because it is closely tied to the third theme about the paradoxes faced by politicians and journalists discussed in this project. While it is reported that the governments of Western nations like France and the U.S.A. take deradicalization as a serious project, the failures to finance efforts by non-profit organization contradict these projects. In France, for instance, an article published in *Le Figaro* exposed how the government failed to finance, as promised, a non-profit organization dedicated to the processes of deradicalization; the organization, originally operating under the authority of the prefecture of police, was reported to have closed (Extract #188; see also category of radicalization in Table 7).³⁰ Worse, the issue of radicalization often came across as a problem that comes from outside of the borders of the nation-states under scrutiny, France and the U.S.A. For instance, when former Prime Minister from 1995 to 1997 Juppé responded to a question by *Le Figaro* journalists Garat et al. that asked, "*Après ces attentats, qu'attendez-vous de la communauté musulmane de France?*" (Extract #122) - a passage that is best translated in English as follows, "after these attacks, what do you expect from the Muslim community in France?", Juppé answered,

Je les appelle à une prise de parole forte. Pour expliquer que ces actes odieux n'ont rien à voir avec leur religion, pour condamner les terroristes, combattre la radicalisation et

³⁰ The founder and president of the non-profit was later tried and condemned to four-month suspended prison sentence for embezzlement (Mouly & Vincent, 2017).

défendre les valeurs républicaines dans lesquelles ils se reconnaissent. Il faut que les autorités religieuses se prononcent, fortement. Elles sont les plus crédibles à le faire. Ce n'est pas les stigmatiser que de le dire.

This response can be translated in English as follows,

I call on them to speak out loudly. To explain that these heinous acts have nothing to do with their religion, to condemn terrorists, fight radicalization and defend the republican values in which they identify with. The religious authorities must speak out, strongly.

They are the most credible to do so. It's not stigmatizing them to say it.

This passage refers to significant theoretical implications upon which I expand in this chapter since the quote demonstrates that radicalization as a problem is deferred back and projected onto a Muslim-only problem and that, from a critical race perspective, Whiteness prevails.

Specifically, postcolonial and whiteness studies scholarships have recently interrogated Whiteness as a "cultural hegemon" and complicated Whiteness as a problem that is "both aesthetically desirable and pragmatically necessary," "a product of the so-called civilizing mission of colonialism" (Lopez, 2005, pp. 17-18). In the example cited above, Juppé illustrates how colonial traces of whiteness linger in contemporary French society through the demands of a cultural assimilation to Republican values.

Based on these findings, I contend that my research has pragmatic implications for students in communication and mass communication as well as for students of political science and people who hold positions of power in various institutions invested in (counter)terrorism. Methodologically, this dissertation sought to contribute to the interpretive/qualitative turn called for by scholars in comparative research (Downey, 2020; Wagener, 2017). The use of comparative thematic analysis as a method to analyze newspaper articles and the theoretical

lenses of critical studies in terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism serve as a solid foundation to complicate the dominant understanding of representation in different national contexts through seminars and workshops.

Following the calls for an ethics of multiculturalism (Meer & Modood, 2011), my research also urges media to play a role in the transformative possibilities that the representation of violence should not limit Islam to a monolith (Elgamri, 2008; Richardson, 2004). The responsibilities of journalists to do the work of multiculturalism are especially important considering the ways in which discourse of security unfolding in the wake of such events as the one studied here have often become synonymous with the national paradigm of secularism, citizenship, and immigration. And even though people in the public sphere like decision makers, media pundits, and politicians, appear to claim that we live in an era of multiculturalism, scholars should continue to question the role of newspaper in reinforcing a Western-centric multiculturalism that is exclusionary of people who identify with Islam. By drawing from elements of a moral panic to study news representation, future research can continue to challenge the climate of fear and outrage that shape the everyday life of people in Western societies.

From a pragmatic standpoint, one could argue that journalistic accounts and narratives about acts of extreme violence do not necessarily engage with the root causes of such acts. Once again, I do not condone such use of violence, but if politicians and media took a moment to listen to grievances of the perpetrators, such acts might be prevented in the future. Very few articles published after the 13 November 2015 and after the 12 June 2016 attacks consider these grievances. Additionally, a recent article published by the Public Health Institute commented on a study conducted by the Berkeley Media Studies Group (Bakal et al., 2018) and stated that, "shrinking newsroom budgets and tight deadlines in today's always-on media environment make

it increasingly challenging for journalists to tell broader stories about violence that include social factors such as poverty, disinvestment, or trauma" ("Improving," 2018). In the case of the events in France and in the U.S.A., one might question the ways in which newspaper might consciously, or not, overlook deeper societal issues such as suicide, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and homophobia. From a critical standpoint, one could argue that the role of news media organization to be(come) watchdogs by interrogating the role of politicians in addressing (or not) these concerns.

In hindsight and with regard to addressing theoretical implications and drawing out practical applications, I am left wondering about the possibility to expand on the study of acts marked as terrorism and the ways media reinforced Orientalism discourse by conducting a critical ethnographic project that would gather together semi-structured interviews with actors in "counter-terrorism" effort such as employees of governmental agencies invested in addressing issues related to terrorism (e.g., radicalization, imprisonment) and with politicians temporarily assigned to public policy surrounding terrorism. If media play the role of gatekeeper and not the one of watchdogs, what is the role of researcher in asking the questions to politicians, media pundits, and other stakeholders on the War on Terror? Finally, I also think that it would be important to conduct a comparative thematic analysis of peer-reviewed articles published using the term terrorism since 2015, if not before.

Conclusion

I began this project with the desire to study terrorism through the lens of Orientalism based on the thoughtfulness of mentors, professors, and of a respondent to a panel on Islamophobia at the National Communication Association convention in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, U.S.A., in 2016. At the time, the Charlie Hebdo attacks of January 2015 and the responses by politicians and media pundits raised a lot of concerns about what it meant to be French (Raymond, 2018). My interests in the socio-political repercussions of such events were sparked when the 13 November 2015 and 12 June 2016 took place. This is both a personal and professional project that has transformed the way I perceive the world today. Yet, it is impossible not to feel a sense of urgency after such a project.

Recent statistics showed that reports of Islamophobic acts have increased in between 2014 and 2016 in the U.S.A. (Kishi, 2017). In France, the year 2015 marks a turning point in the sense that, according to the *Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France*, islamophobia mutated from within the security dimension made possible by such policing practices as house arrests provided by the state of emergency. The examples of the security context in France continue to legitimize violence against and surveillance of people who identify as Muslims or are perceived as such, since the veil law of 2005, which has made Islamophobia a predominantly gendered act of racism (Bogain, 2017; "Rapport CCIF," 2017). These statistics both in France and the U.S.A. are without counting the acts that are unreported, including ones committed by people working in public and private organizations, in colleges and universities, and so on.

Having kept these deeper issues that mark the everyday life of people who identify as Muslims, it is my hope that my project encourages future and current scholars to pursue this type of research that consisted in doing comparative research with applied communication practices and more contextualized methodologies. My main hope is that this dissertation offers some advocacy and invites people to consider feasible solutions towards reducing Orientalist orientations and promotion of moral panic in journalistic reports. On a more reflexive note, I paraphrase Said who challenged readers to consider that one does not have to identify as Arab

Palestinian to challenge Orientalism discourse in media. Today, in my opinion, this lesson still resonates at a time when nation-states like France and the U.S.A. continuously deny humanness to people from Palestine.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: References of Analyzed Articles From Dataset by Extract

Table A1. *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* Between 13 November 2015 and 20 November 2015

#	Date	Newspaper Outlet	Byline / Author.s (Last, First Name)	Section	Title
1	11/13	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Oberlé, Thierry	International	Zoom; Beyrouth: plus de 37 morts dans un attentat
2	11/13	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barthe, Benjamin & Sallon, Hélène	International	Sérieux différends avant la conférence de Vienne
3	11/13	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent	France	COP21 : le ministère de l'intérieur affiche un dispositif sécuritaire renforcé
4	11/13	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ducourtieux, Cécile & Smolar, Piotr	International	Israël dénonce l'étiquetage par l'UE de produits de ses colonies
5	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Politique	Le scénario noir tant redouté par les forces de l'ordre et les services de renseignement
6	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Minoui, Delphine	International	Le dossier syrien s'impose à la table des discussions du G20 en Turquie
7	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Rizk, Sibylle	International	Le Liban reste l'otage du conflit voisin
8	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe, Gonzales, Paule, & Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Politique	Attaques terroristes sans précédent en plein Paris

Table A1. (Continued)

9	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Du Limbert, Paul-Henri	Politique	François Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence
10	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Rovan, Anne	Politique	François Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence: Le président de la République a convoqué un Conseil des ministres extraordinaire dans la nuit
11	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Jaulmes, Adrien	Politique	1500 soldats en renfort en Ile-de-France
12	11/14	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barthe, Benjamin	International	En difficulté, l'EI frappe le Hezbollah a Beyrouth
13	11/14	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent	France	Délinquance : l'enquête qui contredit le gouvernement
14	11/14	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bougnon, François & Bourcier, Nicolas	Planete	" Nous voulons éviter une rivalité stratégique avec la Chine "
15	11/14	<i>Le Monde</i>	S., So	France	Bernard Cazeneuve contourne le secret-défense
16	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	France	Six attaques simultanées au cœur de Paris
17	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	France	Réactions
18	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Zilbertin, Olivier & de Montvalon, Jean-Baptiste	France	L'état d'urgence instauré sur l'ensemble de la métropole
19	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bissuel, Bertrand	France	Ecoles et musées fermés, rencontres sportives annulées
20	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Follorou, Jacques	France	Un attentat « complexe » inédit sur le sol français

Table A1. (Continued)

21	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Vincent, Elise	France	Depuis « Charlie », une série d'attaques ratées ou déjouées
22	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent	France	Renforcés, les services de renseignement restent débordés
23	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	La rédaction du "Monde"	France	Soudain, une détonation retentit
24	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bonnefous, Bastien	France	Des voix dissonantes chez les politiques
25	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	France	François Hollande : " C'est une épreuve terrible qui, une nouvelle fois, nous assaille "
26	11/15	<i>Le Monde</i>	Service International	France	Obama : « Une attaque contre toute l'humanité »
27	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Garat, Jean-Baptiste	Politique	Bruno Le Maire : « Notre combat contre l'islamisme radical doit aller plus loin »
28	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc & Gonzalès, Paule	Société	Des budgets qui ne traduisent pas encore un effort de « guerre »
29	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Gonzalès, Paule	Société	Une justice toujours déficiente
30	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Guénois, Jean-Marie	Société	L'islam de France démuni face à la puissance des réseaux sociaux
31	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Mével, Jean-Jacques	International	En Europe, la crise des réfugiés s'exacerbe; L'hypothèse qu'un terroriste soit venu dans le flot de réfugiés syriens renforce les opposants à leur accueil.

Table A1. (Continued)

32	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Kovacs, Stéphane & Kefalas, Alexia	Société	De l'île de Léros au Stade de France, l'étonnant itinéraire d'un passeport trouvé près de l'un des kamikazes
33	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Unknown	Une	Jours de France : La culture ne doit pas s'incliner devant leurs balles
34	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Société	La traque se concentre sur un réseau franco-belge, La banlieue de Bruxelles a servi de base arrière aux terroristes, dont au moins trois Français. Un membre présumé des commandos est toujours recherché
35	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Mével, Jean-Jacques	Société	Molenbeek, foyer des réseaux djihadistes bruxellois
36	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Négroni, Angélique	Société	Ismaël, petit délinquant radicalisé devenu l'un des tueurs du Bataclan
37	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Renault, Enguérand	Télévision	Les chaînes d'info ont retenu les leçons de « Charlie »; L'extrême prudence et les appels à la solidarité ont été les fils directeurs des éditions spéciales de BFMTV, i-Télé et LCI.
38	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Santis, Sophie	Société	L'Est parisien, épice de la vie nocturne visé par l'EI
39	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Ferran, Benjamin	Société	Les réseaux sociaux, relais instantanés de la terreur et de l'espoir
40	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Ronfaut, Lucie	Société	L'hommage aux innocents assassinés le 13 novembre; La plupart des personnes tuées vendredi soir ont désormais été identifiées.
41	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Galiero, Emmanuel	Politique	À l'Élysée, Marine Le Pen établit un lien entre les attentats et les migrants

Table A1. (Continued)

42	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Jaigu, Charles	Politique	Sarkozy durcit le ton contre le chef de l'État;Le président des Républicains pointe les failles de la politique de Hollande.
43	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Huet, Sophie	Politique	Bartolone et Villepin, deux visions du combat contre Daech
44	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Tabard, Guillaume	Politique	CONTRE-POINT ; La droite tire les leçons des désillusions du 11 janvier
45	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Société	Manuel Valls face au défi de la riposte pénale et juridique; Le premier ministre laisse entendre qu'il pourrait examiner les solutions de la droite, notamment en matière de rétention de sûreté ou de déchéance de nationalité
46	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Coustin, Paul	Société	À l'école, une minute de silence sous tension; Le ministère de l'Éducation, qui veut éviter de nouveaux dérapages, a écrit à tous les enseignants.
47	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Jaulmes, Adrien	International	Comment faire la guerre à l'État Islamique
48	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Malbrunot, Georges	International	La nouvelle stratégie internationale de Daech; Pour porter la terreur hors du califat, l'EI renforce les liens entre sa direction centrale et ses succursales étrangères.

Table A1. (Continued)

49	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Minoui, Delphine	International	Un début de dégel entre Poutine et Obama; Au G20 d'Antalya, les États-Unis et la Russie ont apporté leur soutien à un cessez-le-feu et une transition politique en Syrie.
50	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barotte, Nicolas	International	La politique d'ouverture de Merkel encore plus critique
51	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Mallevoüe, Delphine	Société	L'énigme du Stade de France; Selon l'hypothèse la plus probable, les trois kamikazes avaient bien prévu d'entrer dans l'enceinte sportive. Pourquoi n'ont-ils pas attendu d'être dans la foule pour se faire exploser ?
52	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Garat, Jean-Baptiste & Bourmaud, François- Xavier	Politique	Le président consulte, l'opposition s'organise, les Français se recueillent : récit d'un dimanche de deuil national
53	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Royer, Solenn	Politique	François Hollande veut prouver sa détermination; Le chef de l'État, qui souhaite prolonger l'état d'urgence de trois mois, annoncera lundi après-midi des mesures de riposte, devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès à Versailles.
54	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Huet, Sophie	Politique	Au Congrès, un discours présidentiel suivi d'un débat
55	11/16	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Alexandre, Amandine	Société	Londres a renforcé son arsenal depuis 2005

Table A1. (Continued)

56	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Unknown	Société	À Lunel, « certains ont peur de voir leur gamin à la TV après une attaque »
57	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Pech, Marie-Estelle	Société	Dans les écoles, des élèves stressés; Les minutes de silence se sont globalement déroulées dans une atmosphère recueillie. Les enseignants ont pu échanger avec les enfants, dont beaucoup ont passé le week-end devant les écrans.
58	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Santis, Sophie	Société	Dans l'Est parisien, « la psychose est bien là »
59	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Mascret, Damien	Sciences	Des blessures psychiques possible dans tout le pays
60	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Roy, Soline	Sciences	Identification des morts : l'insoutenable attente; La reconnaissance d'une victime de catastrophe doit répondre à une procédure rigoureuse et très codifiée.
61	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Woitier, Chloé	Médias	La presse passe en édition spéciale; La mobilisation a débuté dès samedi.
62	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Frat, Muriel	Télévision	François Jost : « Les chaînes d'info ont évité le piège des rumeurs »; INTERVIEW Ce fin observateur de la télévision salue la prudence des médias dans la couverture des récents attentats. Malgré quelques dérapages.

Table A1. (Continued)

63	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Galiero, Emmanuel	Politique	Valérie Pécresse (LR) : « Il faut construire un véritable bouclier de sécurité »
64	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Société	Conversion tardive sur le retrait de la nationalité
65	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Société	Une attaque décidée en Syrie et organisée en Belgique; Alors que Salah Abdeslam, rescapé présumé des kamikazes, est recherché, les policiers auraient retrouvé l'appartement conspiratif des commandos, à Bobigny.
66	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Négroni, Angélique, de Mallevoüe, Delphine, Kovacs, Stéphane, & Leclair, Agnès	Société	Trois des quatre kamikazes français identifiés ont été formés par Daech
67	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Gonzalès, Paule	International	L'enquête révèle des ratés judiciaires et policiers; L'un des kamikazes avait rompu son contrôle judiciaire. Un autre avait été signalé par Ankara aux services français.
68	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Malbrunnot, Georges	International	La montée en puissance des cadres francophones a la direction de Daech
69	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Lemenestrel, Christian	International	Salah Abdeslam échappe à la police belge
70	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Mandeville, Laure	International	Lutte antiterroriste: les espions français et américains resserrent leur coopération

Table A1. (Continued)

71	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Berthemet, Tanguy	International	Paris va intensifier ses raids en Syrie; Des chasseurs français ont conduit dimanche ses raids les plus massifs contre le fief de Daech à Raqqa.
72	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Lemenestrel, Christian	International	Avec l'article 42.7, un appel à la solidarité européenne
73	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Lasserre, Isabelle	International	Hollande appelle à une grande coalition contre Daech; Le président français doit rencontrer dans les prochains jours Barack Obama et Vladimir Poutine, pour « unir nos forces ».
74	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Collomp, Florentin	International	Le Royaume-Uni augmente les effectifs de ses services de renseignement et tient les SAS en alerte
75	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barotte, Nicolas	International	Face à la « guerre » contre les djihadistes, l'Allemagne hésite
76	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Minoui, Delphine	International	À Antalya, les membres du G20 font bloc contre le terrorisme
77	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Chabrouet, Julien	Politique	Le PS et ses allies approuvent le discours, la gauche radicale prend ses distances
78	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Huet, Sophie	Politique	La droite veut de l'action, mais pas une réforme de la Constitution
79	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Tabard, Guillaume	Politique	CONTRE-POINT; Les enjeux politiques d'un tournant sécuritaire
80	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Royer, Solenn	Politique	Hollande assure que « la République détruira le terrorisme »; En chef de guerre, le président a prononcé un discours martial et annoncé une batterie de mesures sécuritaires devant le Congrès réuni à Versailles.

Table A1. (Continued)

81	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Pluyette, Cyrille & Visot, Marie	Politique	Hollande s'affranchit des 3% du pacte de stabilité
82	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Gonzalès, Paule	Société	Justice : des peines « significativement alourdies » pour les actes terroristes
83	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Jaigu, Charles	Société	Hollande veut redéfinir l'état d'urgence; Le président souhaite faire évoluer la Constitution en réécrivant l'article 36 qui ne porte que sur l'état de siège.
84	11/17	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Société	Un lance-roquettes découvert lors d'une perquisition
85	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent, Follorou, Jacques, Piel Simon, Seelow, Soren, & Stroobants, Jean- Pierre	France	Un commanditaire belge parti en Syrie
86	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Follorou, Jacques & Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	France	La Belgique au coeur des réseaux djihadistes
87	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	France	Molenbeek, plaque tournante du terrorisme islamiste

Table A1. (Continued)

88	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Vincent, Elise, Borredon, Laurent, & Piel, Simon	France	Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, l'un des kamikazes français du Bataclan
89	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bekmezian, Hélène, Chambraud, Cécile	France	Vers une "revision" de la loi sur l'état d'urgence
90	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Guibert, Nathalie	France	Les missions intérieures de l'armée restent à définir
91	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Guibert, Nathalie & Paris, Gille	France	Des raids français menés en urgence en Syrie
92	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Service France	France	La " drôle de campagne " des régionales
93	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Chambraud, Cécile	France	Les musulmans espèrent échapper aux amalgames
94	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Battaglia, Mattea & Collas, Aurélie	France	A l'école, les enseignants se sont préparés aux questions des élèves
95	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Gurrey, Béatrice	France	Place de la République, une grande prière laïque
96	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Béguin, François & Benkimoun, Paul	France	Les hôpitaux parisiens face à des " faits de guerre "
97	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Chemin, Ariane & Robert-Diard, Pascale	International	Dix mois de "France Charlie"
98	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Mandraud, Isabelle	International	Les Russes affichent leur compassion envers la France

Table A1. (Continued)

99	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	International	" Pour les Libanais, on ne crée pas de bouton sur Facebook "
100	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Kaval, Allan & Barthe, Benjamin	International	Assailli sur ses terres, l'EI frappe tous azimuts
101	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Baumard, Maryline	International	Craintes sur l'arrivée de terroristes avec les migrants
102	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Chastand, Jean- Baptiste & Druelle, Julia	International	Un kamikaze du Stade de France a emprunté la route des Balkans
103	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Service France	France	Plus de cinquante perquisitions en France
104	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bonnefou, Bastien & Revault D'Allonnes, David	France	Etat de guerre: Jusqu'ou peut aller Hollande
105	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bekmezian, Hélène	France	Un Congrès à Versailles organisé en trois jours
106	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	International	Ce qu'il faut savoir
107	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Sallon, Hélène	International	A Vienne, un accord de façade sur la transition en Syrie
108	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ducourtieux, Cécile & Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	International	Durcissement du débat européen sur les réfugiés
109	11/17	<i>Le Monde</i>	Lemaître, Frédéric	International	En Allemagne, les anti-Merkel estiment que " Paris change tout "

Table A1. (Continued)

110	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Périnel, Quentin	Société	Rester, partir ? Dans le XI ^e arrondissement, certains habitants s'interrogent; Si la plupart restent attachés à leur quartier, certains n'ont plus envie de vivre là où s'est déroulé une telle tragédie.
111	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclair, Agnès	Société	Apprivoiser l'angoisse, le nouveau défi des Français
112	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Mével, Jean-Jacques	Reportage	Au Coeur du Molenbeekistan
113	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Société	Un juge antiterroriste aux affaires familiales : qui peut sauver le soldat Trévidic ?
114	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Gonzalès, Paule	Société	Les magistrats mettent en garde à propos des limites de l'état d'urgence
115	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Malbrunnot, Georges	Société	Les « jeunes mariés », les kamikazes chair à canon de Daech
116	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Société	Un neuvième membre du commando est recherché; Il faisait partie de l'équipe qui a ensanglanté les terrasses des cafés de l'est parisien avec Salah Abdeslam, visé par un mandat d'arrêt international et son frère Brahim mort en kamikaze.
117	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Négroni, Angélique	Société	Attaquer une salle de concert, la mission d'un islamiste radical arrêté en août
118	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Avril, Pierre	International	L'aviation russe intensifie ses frappes contre le califat
119	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Bourmaud, Francois-Xavier & Rovan, Anne	Politique	Le gouvernement veut créer un « régime civil d'état de crise »

Table A1. (Continued)

120	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Zennou, Albert	Politique	Les Français prêts à moins de libertés pour plus de sécurité; Selon un sondage Ifop pour « Le Figaro » et RTL, 84 % des Français accepteraient davantage de contrôles. 50 % font confiance à l'exécutif pour vaincre le terrorisme.
121	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Huet, Sophie	Politique	Révision constitutionnelle: embarras à droite
122	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Garat, Jean-Baptiste, Jaigu, Charles, Goulliaud, Philippe, & du Limbert, Paul- Henri	Politique	Alain Juppé : « La France a besoin d'unité »; L'ex-premier ministre met en garde droite et gauche contre « la surenchère d'imagination juridique » dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
123	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Royer, Solenn	Politique	Comment le président s'est mué en « chef de guerre »
124	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Royer, Solenn	Politique	François Hollande en première ligne; Sous pression, le chef de l'État revêt tour à tour son costume de commandant en chef et de père de la nation.
125	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Société	DÉCRYPTAGE; Virage à droite sur la déchéance de nationalité

Table A1. (Continued)

126	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Société	Ce que les experts pensent du plan Hollande; Ils soulignent qu'il faudra attendre deux années pour obtenir la totalité des moyens supplémentaires promis par le chef de l'État et que l'état d'urgence n'aura qu'un temps. À leurs yeux, judiciaireisation des affaires et redéploiement des effectifs s'imposent.
127	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Ronfaut, Lucie	Société	L'application Telegram, casse-tête du Renseignement
128	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Darmamin, Jules	Société	Vidéo de djihadistes belges : Facebook pointé du doigt
129	11/18	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Service international	International	Bombardements français et russes contre Rakka
130	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Fortier, Jacques	Société	Un collégien de 12 ans tué par balle dans un car scolaire en Alsace
131	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Santi, Pascale, Vincent, Catherine, & Cabut, Sandrine	Le Monde Science et Médecine	Après les attentats, libérer la parole
132	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Revault d'Allonnes, David	France	Hollande, la politique en temps de guerre

Table A1. (Continued)

133	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Besse Desmoulières, Raphaëlle, Bonnefous, Bastien, & de Montvalon, Jean- Baptiste	France	Un nouveau régime d'"état de crise"
134	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent & Jacquin, Jean-Baptiste	France	Revirement politique sur la déchéance de nationalité
135	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ducourtieux, Cécile & Roger, Patrick	International	M. Hollande se délivre du "pacte de stabilité"
136	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Guibert, Nathalie & Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	International	La France sollicite l'assistance de ses voisins
137	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Riols, Yves-Michel	International	Sur la Syrie, François Hollande change de priorité
138	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris, Gilles	International	Obama défend sa stratégie contre l'EI
139	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Mandraud, Isabelle	International	Poutine revendique la paternité de la " grande coalition " prônée par Paris
140	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Jégo, Marie	International	Dialogue de sourds au G20 sur le conflit syrien

Table A1. (Continued)

141	11/18	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	Le Monde Science et Médecine	La sécurité à tout prix ?
142	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Chabrou, Julien	Politique	Le tournant sécuritaire ne fait pas l'unanimité a gauche
143	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Collomp, Florentin	International	Des Syriens hébergés sur une île écossaise
144	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Chaballier, Blaise	Télévision	La littérature contre le terrorisme;Le journaliste François Busnel consacre une « Grande Librairie » au rôle des livres pour combattre l'islamisme intégriste.
145	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Société	Le commando neutralisé à Saint-Denis était prêt à « passer à l'acte »; Plus de 110 policiers d'élite ont tué mercredi matin au moins deux terroristes dans un appartement « conspiratif ». Le commanditaire présumé des attaques de vendredi dernier pourrait figurer parmi les membres du groupe islamiste.
146	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Lombard-Latune, Marie-Amélie & Pech, Marie-Estelle	Société	Un femme kamikaze: une première sur le sol français

Table A1. (Continued)

147	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclair, Agnès & Négroni, Angélique	Société	Un commando « jusqu'au-boutiste »; C'est ainsi que le procureur de Paris, François Molins, décrit la cellule terroriste qui a semé la mort dans Paris.
148	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Berthemet, Tanguy	Société	Abaaoud, as de la mise en scène et cerveau terroriste; Selon les services de renseignements, le Belge serait derrière plusieurs attentats ou tentatives d'attentats en Belgique et en France.
149	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclerc, Jean-Marc	Société	Des aéroports passoires pour terroristes; Les ratés du fichier des données passagers PNR font courir un risque majeur aux États. Un scandale européen.
150	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Gonzalès, Paule	Société	Les « béances » des contrôles aux frontières de l'Europe
151	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	de Mallevoüe, Delphine	Société	Des mesures contre la menace chimique; Un arrêté autorisant la fabrication d'un antidote aux « neurotoxiques organophosphorés » est paru le 14 novembre.
152	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Rovan, Anne	Politique	Taubira, un malaise perceptible; La garde des Sceaux a pris ses distances avec la déchéance de nationalité, proposée par Hollande.
153	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Tabard, Guillaume	Politique	CONTRE-POINT ; Bernard Cazeneuve, le maillon fort de Hollande

Table A1. (Continued)

154	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Malbrunot, Georges	International	En Syrie, l'hécatombe des gardiens de la révolution iranienne; En un mois, Téhéran a vu une quarantaine de ses hommes mourir au combat pour défendre son allié Bachar el-Assad. La présence iranienne compliquera les opérations d'une « coalition unique » que François Hollande a proposée pour anéantir Daech.
155	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barotte, Nicolas	International	En Allemagne, la menace persiste et l'angoisse grandit
156	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Picard, Maurin	International	L'Amérique s'entre-déchire sur l'accueil des réfugiés
157	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Rovan, Anne & de Royer, Solenn	Politique	L'exécutif propose de renforcer l'état d'urgence
158	11/19	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Bourmaud, François-Xavier	Politique	Hollande justifie ses mesures de fermeté ; Devant les maires de France, le président a confirmé mercredi « une restriction temporaire des libertés ».
159	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Barthe, Benjamin	International	Les rebelles Syriens prêts à lutter davantage contre l'EI
160	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Dupré, Rémi	France	l'histoire du jour; A Wembley, " La Marseillaise " chantée par les Anglais

Table A1. (Continued)

161	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent, Piel, Simon, Seelow, Soren, & Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	France	A Saint-Denis, l'assaut contre les terroristes
162	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Zappi, Sylvia	France	" On entendait des rafales d'armes automatiques et des tirs isolés "
163	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Unknown	France	Ce qu'il faut savoir
164	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Vincent, Élise	France	L'éternel retour des "pionniers" du djihad
165	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Vincent, Élise	France	"Cannes-Torcy", la cellule terroriste prémonitoire
166	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Benoît, Viktine	France	A Molenbeek, "il est facile d'échapper à la police"
167	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	France	Polémique autour des services belges de l'antiterrorisme
168	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Cazi, Émeline	France	Le travail dantesque de la police scientifique
169	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Cazi, Émeline	France	Les enfants des victimes des attentats pourront devenir pupilles de la nation
170	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Chapuis, Nicolas	France	Régionales: le PS se remettra en campagne le 23 novembre
171	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Mandraud, Isabelle	International	Pour Poutine, la France est devenue une alliée en Syrie
172	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Service Europe	International	Les Européens ne se sentent pas en guerre
173	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ducourtieux, Cécile	International	"La France n'est pas seule, l'UE est à ses côtés"
174	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bernard, Philippe	International	David Cameron relance le projet de frappes en Syrie

Table A1. (Continued)

175	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ayad, Christophe	International	Comment Paris s'est converti à l'interventionnisme
176	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Sallon, Hélène	International	La revendication opportuniste de l'Etat islamique
177	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent, Goar, Matthieu, & Lemarié, Alexandre	France	Sarkozy : " Trop de temps a été perdu "
178	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bonnefous, Bastien & Revault d'Allonnes, David	France	Au Parti Socialiste, silence dans les rangs
179	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Bekmezian, Hélène	France	Spectacle " affligeant " à l'Assemblée nationale
180	11/19	<i>Le Monde</i>	Dutheil, Guy & Jacqué, Philippe	France	La sécurité est à son maximum dans les transports
181	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Minoui, Delphine	International	La Turquie renforce sa traque contre l'État islamique; Longtemps soupçonné de complaisance envers les djihadistes syriens, le régime turc a opéré un tournant vis-à-vis de l'EI.
182	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Baché, David	International	Aux frontières du Mali, l'armée française ratisse le désert; La force « Barkhane » mène jusqu'à dimanche une opération d'envergure pour empêcher les groupes djihadistes de se reformer dans le nord du pays.

Table A1. (Continued)

183	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barluet, Alain	International	Boko Haram : les services de renseignement renforcent leur coordination
184	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Cornevin, Christophe	Société	Abdelhamid Abaaoud : questions sur l'itinéraire d'un terroriste; L'un des principaux instigateurs des attentats a été tué à Saint-Denis lors de l'assaut du Raid.
185	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Négroni, Angélique	Société	De Merah au Bataclan, l'ombre de Fabien Clain
186	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Unknown	Société	La kamikaze présumée s'était rapidement radicalisée
187	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Guénois, Jean-Marie	Société	L'« appel solennel » qui sera lu dans 2 400 mosquées
188	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Mallevoüe, Delphine	Société	La cellule de déradicalisation du 93 fermée; La structure qui « désendoctrinait » les candidats au djihad de la région parisienne, créée en octobre 2014 et placée sous le contrôle de la Préfecture de police, n'est plus. Selon l'association, l'État n'a jamais versé de quoi payer les salaires et les charges. Les autorités invoquent notamment des problèmes administratifs.
189	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	De Mallevoüe, Delphine	Société	Quand un djihadiste détenu placé à l'isolement appelle sa mère au téléphone...
190	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Gonzalès, Paule	Société	Perquisitions, assignations : ce que permet l'état d'urgence

Table A1. (Continued)

191	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Huet, Sophie	Société	État d'urgence : quasi-unanimité à l'Assemblée; Les députés ont voté la prolongation jusqu'en février 2016 de ce dispositif exceptionnel, pour faire face aux attentats.
192	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Leclair, Agnès	Société	Crèches, menus sans porc : la laïcité stricte de l'AMF
193	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Négroni, Angélique	Société	Même au repos, le policier gardera son arme
194	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Waintraub, Judith	Politique	Face au terrorisme, la droite revendique sa « crédibilité »
195	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Barluet, Alain	International	Premiers contacts militaires à haut niveau Paris-Moscou
196	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Louis, Cyrille	International	Nouvelles attaques anti-israéliennes; Cinq personnes ont été tuées jeudi à Tel-Aviv et en Cisjordanie occupée dans deux agressions menées par des Palestiniens.
197	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Mével, Jean-Jacques	Société	La France met Schengen sous pression
198	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	de Mallevoüe, Delphine	Société	Valls veut une nouvelle structure pour désendoctriner les jeunes radicalisés
199	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Pluyette, Cyrille	Société	600 millions en plus pour la sécurité en 2016
200	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Rovan, Anne & Royer, Solemn	Politique	La communication bicéphale de l'exécutif; Hollande et Valls se partagent les rôles : le premier ministre prépare au pire, le président tente de rassurer.
201	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Galiero, Emmanuel	Politique	Pour le Front national, le ressenti des enjeux régionaux « a changé »

Table A1. (Continued)

202	11/20	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Tabard, Guillaume	Politique	CONTRE-POINT ; Régionales : la grande peur de la droite
203	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Follorou, Jacques	France	Les failles de la lutte antiterroriste
204	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Baumard, Maryline & Follorou, Jacques	France	Craintes d'une infiltration par l'EI des routes migratoires
205	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ducourtieux, Cécile & Stroobants, Jean-Pierre	International	L'Europe résolue à agir
206	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Borredon, Laurent & Piel, Simon	International	Confusion après l'assaut de Saint-Denis
207	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Pedroletti, Brice	International	Pékin reste discret sur l'assassinat d'un otage
208	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Besse Desmoulières, Raphaëlle & Jérôme, Béatrice	International	" Au bar du village, on ne parle que de ça "
209	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Santi, Pascale	International	Louis Samka, 26 ans : " J'étais en mode survie "
210	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Fabre, Clarisse, Carpentier, Laurent, & Darge, Fabienne	International	La vie Culturelle reprend ses quartiers, malgré tout
211	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Ayad, Christophe	International	Diplomatie : la voie étroite vers une coalition unie contre l'EI

Table A1. (Continued)

212	11/20	<i>Le Monde</i>	Hecketsweiler, Chloé, Benkimoun, Paul, & Béguin, François	International	Soins d'urgence: les leçons du 13 novembre
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Table A2. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* Between 12 June 2016 and 19 June 2016.

#	Date	Newspaper Outlet	Byline / Author.s Last, First Name	Section	Title
214	6/12	<i>The New York Times</i>	Nossiter, Adam	Foreign Desk	Garbage and resentment pile up in France as union protest labor laws
215	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	DeYoung, Karen	A-section	U.S.-backed fighters cut off ISIS route
216	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Warrick, Joby	A-section	In Albania, concerns over ISIS's emergence
217	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Cuomo, Andrew	Editorial	If you boycott Israel, New York will boycott you
218	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Davis, Aaron C.	A-section	Last in primaries, first in outrage
219	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Mroue, Bassem	A-section	In Syria, bombings near a revered shrine kill 12
220	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Morris, Loveday	A-section	Fighting in a city full of bombs
221	6/12	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Weiner, Rachel	A-section	U.S. citizen helped arm Syrian rebels
222	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Martin, Jonathan	National Desk	Trump seizes on massacre and repeats call for ban on Muslim migration
223	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, Lovett, Ian, Aguilera, Jasmine, & Barbaro, Michael	National Desk	For gays across America, a massacre punctuates fitful gains
224	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Shear, Michael D.	National desk	After another hail of bullets, Obama offers a familiar lament

Table A2. (Continued)

225	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Alvarez Lizette, PÉREZ-PEÑA, Richard, Thompson, Wendy, Neuhaus, Les, Blinder, Alan, Callimachi, Rukmini, Lichtblau, Eric, Schmitt, Erich, Kenny, Steve., Oppel Jr., Richard A, Rojas, Rick, & Victor, Daniel.	National desk	Praising Isis, gunman attacks gay nightclub, leaving 50 dead in worst shooting on U.S. soil
226	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Blinder, Alan, Healy, Jack & Oppel Jr., Richard A.	National desk	F.B.I. studied shooter years before attack
227	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Callimachi, Rukmini	National desk	A tie to ISIS? Uncertainty as a strategy
228	6/13	<i>The New York Times</i>	Stack, Liam	Express	Orlando shooting: What we know and don't know
229	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Weigel, David	A-section	Can libertarian affect presidential race?
230	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Rosenwald, Michael S.	A-section	A deadly convergence between terrorism and mass shootings

Table A2. (Continued)

231	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	McCoy, Terrence, Siddiqui, Faiz, & Nirappil, Fenip	Metro	At D.C. pride festival, tears and resolve
232	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Tsukayama, Hayley, Berman, Mark & Markon, Jerry	A-section	50 killed at gay club in Fla.
233	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Goldman, Adam, Warrick, Joby, & Bearak, Max	A-section	Mateen called erratic, abusive, ‘filled with hate’
234	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Boorstein, Michael	Metro	Is God punishing us with the 2016 election? Some people are seriously starting to wonder
235	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Achenbach, Joel & Holley, Peter	A-section	‘It was just complete chaos’: Orlando massacre survivors on the desperate struggle to stay alive. A frightened, frantic struggle to stay alive
236	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Tumulty, Karen	A-section	When tragedy hits, Americans stand divided
237	6/13	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Eilperin, Juliet, Costa, Robert & Gearan, Anne	A-section	Responses are in keeping with candidates’ styles
238	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Fisher, Max	World	Gays, guns and jihad: Motives blur on closer scrutiny; The interpreter.
239	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Poniewozik, James	Arts; Television	After Orlando shooting, talk show hosts suggest talk is not enough

Table A2. (Continued)

240	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rutenberg, Jim	Business; media	In revoking press credentials, Trump casts himself as punisher in chief
241	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Erlanger, Steven	Foreign desk	Worries over Turkey inflame 'Brexit' debate
242	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Herszenhorn, David M. & Lichtblau, Eric	Not specified	Orlando shooting reignites gun control debate in congress
243	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Healy, Patrick, Bosman, Julie, Smith, Mitch, Seelye, Katharine Q., Lovett, Ian, Fernandez, Manny, Johnson, Kirk, & Peters, Jeremy W.	National desk	After massacre at gay club, an array of opinions about the motive and meaning
244	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Lichtblau, Eric & Apuzzo, Matt	Not specified	Orlando gunman was on terror watchlist, F.B.I. director says
245	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Hulse, Carl	National desk	Orlando shooting is likely to dominate congressional agenda
246	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Haberman, Maggie	Politics	Orlando shooting becomes immediate talking point
247	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rubin, Alissa J.	Foreign desk	ISIS claims responsibility for killing of French police officer

Table A2. (Continued)

248	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Corasaniti, Nick & Flegenheimer, Matt	Politics	Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton's speeches: What you missed
249	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Davis, Julie H.	National desk	Obama attack a case of homegrown extremism
250	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Khan, Ismail, Nordland, Rod, Sukhanyar, Jawad, Alokozay, Khalid	Foreign desk	Heavy gunfire traded across Afghan-Pakistan border, escalating tensions
251	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Healy, Jack & Santora, Marc	National desk	Held hostage in the restroom, and playing dead to stay alive
252	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Luo, Michael	National desk	Another killer who could buy his guns legally, despite the red flags
253	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Mazzetti, Mark, Lichtblau, Eric, Blinder, Alan, Turkewitz, Julie, Mashal, Mujib, Oppel, Richard A., & Apuzzo, Matt	National desk	Twice scrutinized by F.B.I., Orlando killer exposes gaps in fighting ISIS-inspired acts

Table A2. (Continued)

254	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Martin, Jonathan, Burns, Alexander, Chozick, Amy, Preston, Julia, & Rappeport, Alan	National desk	Branding Muslims as threats, Trump tosses pluralism aside
255	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Sisario, Ben	National desk	New reality at public gatherings: Dogs, metal detectors and searches
256	6/14	<i>The New York Times</i>	Yardley, Jim	National desk	In now-familiar rituals, world reacts to massacre with mourning and outrage
257	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Jordan, Mary	A-section	‘We are in shock, horrified’: A mosque feels the spotlight
258	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Adam, Karla & Denyer, Simon	A-section	From around the world, horror, outrage and solidarity
259	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Davenport, Chris & Harwell, Drew	A-section	Security giant where Mateen worked said it knew of 2013 FBI investigation
260	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Dvorak, Petula	Metro	The voice of hatred is amplified by tragedy
261	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Craig, Tim	A-section	Kabul residents view attack as U.S. problem and ‘a completely individual act’
262	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Nakamura, David	A-section	A detour as Obama was preparing to hit campaign trail
263	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Gobbons-Neff, Thomas	A-section	The history, and celebrity, of the AR-15

Table A2. (Continued)

264	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Sullivan, Kevin & Hernandez, Arelis R.	A-section	Latino community hit hard
265	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Milbank, Dana	A-section	'Something going on' is Trump exploiting tragedy
266	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Goldman, Adam, Zepotosky, Matt, & Berman, Mark	A-section	Orlando killer spoke of dying a martyr
267	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Associated Press	A-section	Severed head in Philippines is hostage's
268	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Johnson, Jenna	A-section	'A lot of people think...': How Trump spreads conspiracies and innuendoes
269	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Rucker, Philip, DelReal, Jose A., & Stanley-Becker, Isaac	A-section	Trump expands call for ban on Muslims
270	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Gearan, Anne & Sullivan, Sean	A-section	Trump, Clinton offer dueling strategies for terror threat
271	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Achenbach, Joel & Zepotosky, Matt	A-section	Hostage situation forced police to make a tough decision
272	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Miller, Greg	A-section	Untitled
273	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Demirjian, Karoun	A-section	Bill to ban terrorism suspects from buying guns is revived

Table A2. (Continued)

274	6/14	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Tumultuy, Karen & Costa, Robert	A-section	Trumpism: A personality-fueled movement resonating in an era of anxiety
275	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Taub, Amanda	World	Control and fear: What mass killings and domestic violence have in common; The interpreter
276	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Dwyer, Jim	Metropolitan desk	In a race to rescue a man on the tracks, a reminder of what's good in the world
277	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Apuzzo, Matt & Lichtblau, Eric	National desk	After F.B.I.'s inquiry, a focus on what else could be done
278	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Haberman, Maggie	Politics	Donald Trump, in interviews, seems to abandon a pledge to 'pivot
279	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Healy, Patrick & Kaplan, Thomas	National desk	Old political tactic is revived: Exploiting fear, not easing it
280	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rubin, Alissa J. & Blaise, Lilia	Foreign desk	Frenchman kills 2 in ISIS' name and says so live on facebook
281	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Herszenhorn, David M.	Washington	Spending bill sets off senate debate over gun laws
282	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Fisher, Max	National desk	Trying to know the unknowable: Why attackers strike
283	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Davis, Julie H. & Flegenheimer, Matt	National desk	Obama condemns Trump's response to Florida attack
284	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Stolberg, Sheryl Gay & Pérez-Peña, Richard	National desk	Orlando shooting survivors cope with the trauma of good fortune

Table A2. (Continued)

285	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Poniewozik, James	National desk; critic's notebook	After yet another shooting, talk show hosts suggest talk is not enough
286	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rutenberg, Jim	Business/Financial desk	In revoking credentials, Trumps act as punisher in chief
287	6/15	<i>The New York Times</i>	Stack, Liam	Express	Before Orlando shooting, and anti-gay massacre in New Orleans was largely forgotten
288	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Goldman, Adam, Berman, Mark & Zapotosky, Matt	A-section	FBI investigates whether attacker's wife knew about massacre plan
289	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Wagner, John, Weigel, David, & Philip, Abby	A-section	Clinton, Sanders talk after the former wins D.C. primary
290	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Goldman, Adam	A-section	Saudi suspected of wanting to join 9/11 hijackers seeks to leave prison
291	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	St. George, Donna	Metro	Muslim students report bias amid terror
292	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Markon, Jerry & Goldman, Adam	A-section	FBI scrutinized for dropping probes into terror threats
293	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Milloy, Courtland	Metro	Mind-set is as perilous as a gun
294	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Bogage, Jacob	A-section	Via Twitter hijackings, anonymous hacker goes after the Islamic State
295	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Nutt, Amy Ellis	A-section	Displaced hatred of self can push people to massacres, psychologists say

Table A2. (Continued)

296	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Demirjian, Karoun	A-section	McConnell: GOP 'open' to denying terrorists guns
297	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Jaffe, Greg, Gearan, Anne, & Nakamura, David	A-section	A fight over nation's values
298	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Miller, Greg, DeYoung, Karen, & Tate, Julie	A-section	Documents provide new details of CIA's secret prisons
299	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Wiggins, Ovetta	Metro	'I don't listen to Donald Trump,' governor says
300	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	McAuley, James	A-section	France tense after slayings
301	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Achenbach, Joel & Beachum, Lateshia	A-section	Trump's broadside after massacre shakes Islamic group
302	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Sullivan, Sean & DeBonis, Mike	A-section	Bitter debate over shooting's fallout
303	6/15	<i>The Washington Post</i>	From news services	A-section	Untitled
304	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Steinhauer, Jennifer	Politics	Why the Orlando shooting is unlikely to lead to major new gun laws; News analysis
305	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Fisher, Max	World; middle east	When a phrase takes on news meaning: 'Radical Islam,' explained; The Interpreter

Table A2. (Continued)

306	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Clark, Nicola, Gladstone, Rick, & Youssef, Nour	Foreign desk	Searchers report finding wreckage of Egyptian Air
307	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rappeport, Alan	Politics	Hillary Clinton mocks Donald Trump's national security ideas
308	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Haberman, Maggie	Politics	Trump Takes Heat From Clinton and Obama as a poll hints at trouble
309	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Corasaniti, Nick	Politics	Donald Trump says he would 'accept' visit by Kim Jong-un
310	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Peters, Jeremy W. & Alvarez, Lizette	National desk; politics takes over	A death toll fails to narrow a chasm on gay rights
311	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rubin, Alissa J. & Schreuer, Milan	Foreign desk	France expands its rules allowing police to carry guns while off duty
312	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Parker, Ashley & Herszenhorn, David	National desk	As gun control debate flares, Trump veers from the party line
313	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Taub, Amanda	National desk	Mass attacks, domestic abuse and a pattern of total control
314	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Robles, Frances & Pérez-Peña, Richard	National desk	Gunman threatened to strap explosives to hostages, mayor says
315	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Landler, Mark	National desk	Obama and Clinton differ on terror approach
316	6/16	<i>The New York Times</i>	Unknown	National desk	How terror suspects buy guns – and how they still could, even with a ban

Table A2. (Continued)

317	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Samuels, Robert	A-section	Sensing urgency, Muslims plan to fight Trump with vote
318	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	DeYoung, Karen & DelReal, Jose A.	A-section	Trump says his insinuation about Obama and terror was right
319	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Weiner, Rachel & Nakashima, Ellen	A-section	Hacker pleads guilty in ISIS leak
320	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Gibbons-Neff, Thomas	A-section	NATO expected to keep some Afghan bases open
321	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Sullivan, Kevin, Nakashima, Ellen, Zapotosky, Matt, & Berman, Mark	A-section	Gunman vowed Islamic State loyalty in Facebook postings
322	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Sullivan, Sean, DelReal, Jose A., & Philip, Abby	A-section	Trump tells top Republicans to 'get tougher'
323	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Mufson, Steven & Davenport, Christian	A-section	Boeing's Iran deal faces turbulence
324	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Kane, Paul	A-section	How Robert Casey became a believer in gun control

Table A2. (Continued)

325	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	O’Keefe, Ed & Demirjian, Karoun	A-section	Trump hints at changes in gun laws
326	6/16	<i>The Washington Post</i>	DeBonis, Mike	A-section	Rubio rethinks leaving senate
327	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Zipkin, Amy	Your money	Renting rooms to travelers can be a source of income later in life; Retiring
328	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Ali, Manik Julfikar & Barry, Ellen	World Asia	194 held in Bangladesh mass arrests may have militant ties, police say
329	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Erlanger, Steven	World Europe	Britain asks if tone of ‘Brexit’ campaign made violence inevitable
330	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Mazzetti, Mark & Shane, Scott	World middle east	A Saudi imam, 2 hijackers and lingering 9/11 mystery
331	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Arango, Tim	World middle east	Iraqi forces enter Falluja, encountering little fight from ISIS
332	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Goldstein, Joseph	Metropolitan desk	Decades later, big brother comes out of hiding
333	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Haberman, Maggie, Martin, Jonathan, & Steinhauer, Jennifer	National desk	Bush emerges in unlikely aid to a split party
334	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Steinhauer, Jennifer & Davis, Julie H.	National desk	Why the shooting is unlikely to inspire major new gun laws
335	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Hulse, Carl	Foreign policy	Advocates for release of 9/11 documents worry about potential delay

Table A2. (Continued)

336	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Herszenhorn, David M.	National desk	Senator's 15-hour filibuster gains 'path forward' on gun control measures
337	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Breeden, Aurélien & Morenne, Benoît	Foreign desk	France arrests 323 in Euro tournament's first week
338	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Wilson, Michael	Metropolitan desk	Funeral at last for fire chief lost to twin towers
339	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Cave, Damien, Robles, Frances, Alvarez, Lizette, & Mashal, Mujib	National desk	Orlando united: American city of many flags
340	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Fisher, Max	National desk	When a phrase takes on new meaning: 'Radical Islam,' explained
341	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Belluck, Pam	National desk	Physicists try for tool to predict attacks
342	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Glanz, James & Noveck, Myra	Foreign desk	Palestinian presented no danger, officer says
343	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Searcey, Dionne	Foreign desk	Fleeing desperation in Africa on the most dangerous journey
344	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Erlanger, Steven	Foreign desk	Shifting attention to Mediterranean, NATO fights internal dissent

Table A2. (Continued)

345	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Blinder, Alan, Robles, Frances, Pérez-Peña, Richard, Lichtblau, Eric, Mazzetti, Mark, McDonald, Brent, & Bennett, Kitty	National desk	Gunman in Orlando posted to facebook during nightclub attack, lawmaker says
346	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Alcindor, Yamiche, Rappeport, Alan, & Schweber, Nate	National desk	Sanders, still running, pledges to 'make certain' Trump is defeated
347	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Landler, Mark	Foreign desk	51 U.S. diplomats, in dissent, urge strikes on Assad
348	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Fernandez, Manny	National desk	Judge tosses bid by Texas to block refugees
349	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Burns, Alexander & Kaplan, Thomas	National desk	Trump's speeches on Muslims fire up his base, but may prove costly in election
350	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Stack, Liam & Hauser, Christine	Express	Orlando shooting: What we know and don't know
351	6/17	<i>The New York Times</i>	Cumming-Bruce, Nick	Foreign desk	ISIS committed genocide against Yazidis in Syris and Iraq, U.N. panel says

Table A2. (Continued)

352	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Demirjian, Karoun & O’Keefe, Ed	A-section	After Florida tragedy, a familiar script
353	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	ZeZima, Katie	A-section	Across state, little optimism that support for LGBT community will last
354	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Warrick, Joby	A-section	Islamic state remains a potent threat despite U.S. progress, CIA chief says
355	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Demirjian, Karoun	A-section	House targets Guantanamo releases
356	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	DeBonis, Mike	A-section	GOP unveils plan to rein in president
357	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Jaffe, Greg & Eilperin, Juliet	A-section	In his Orlando speech, president assails ‘weapons of war’ – assault rifles
358	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Miller, Greg	A-section	CIA drone strikes plummet in shift to Pentagon
359	6/17	<i>The Washington Post</i>	ZeZima, Katie & Nakamura, David	A-section	Obama, Biden console survivors, families of victims
360	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Robbins, Liz	NYRegion	Orlando killings rob young New York Muslims of a cherished holiday
361	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Corasaniti, Nick	Politics	A touchy-feely approach from Hillary Clinton; Ad of the week
362	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Ali, Manik Julfikar & Barry, Ellen	Foreign desk	Mass arrests in Bangladesh yield scores of militants, the police say
363	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Erlanger, Steven & Yardley, Jim	Foreign desk	Growing dead over ugly tone of ‘Brexit’ vote
364	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Herszenhorn, David M.	National desk	Gun control compromise offered by G.O.P. senator

Table A2. (Continued)

365	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Park, Haeyoun & Mykhyalyshyn, Iaryna	National desk	Hate crimes now directed at L.G.B.T. people the most
366	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Pérez-Peña, Richard	National desk	Orlando attack brings up history of U.S. massacres
367	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Arango, Tim, Al-Jawoshi, Omar, & Hassan, Falih	Foreign desk	Iraqi commanders proclaim victory over Islamic State in Central Falluja
368	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Robles, Frances & Williams, Timothy	National desk	City's collections to go directly for the victims
369	6/18	<i>The New York Times</i>	Oppel Jr., Richard A. & Blinder, Alan	National desk	Security firm gunman worked for has received black eyes worldwide
370	6/18	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Sullivan, Kevin & Wan, William	A-section	The volatile life of Omar Mateen
371	6/18	<i>The Washington Post</i>	DeYoung, Karen	A-section	No matter who wins in November, Saudi minister says bond will endure
372	6/18	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Markon, Jerry	A-section	Amid gun scrutiny, government's growing watch lists are in sharper focus
373	6/18	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Associated Press	A-section	Damage to black boxes likely to slow probe into EgyptAir crash
374	6/18	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Gibbons-Neff, Thomas & Ryan, Missy	A-section	U.S. forces to stay longer in Yemen to fight al-Qaeda
375	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Lichtblau, Eric	Politics	Specter of 1994 assault weapons ban lingers over new gun control push

Table A2. (Continued)

376	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Unknown	Society Desk	Katherine Campo, Warren Ryan
377	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Haberman, Maggie, Goel, Vindu, Corasaniti, Nick, & Martin, Jonathan	National desk	Apple, uneasy over Trump, will not support Republican convention
378	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Rubin, Alissa J.	Foreign desk	Belgium says it blocked attack on soccer viewers
379	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Barry, Dan, Kovalski, Serge F., Blinder, Alan, & Mashal, Mujib	National desk, the gunman	From troubled child to aggrieved killer
380	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Erlanger, Steven	Foreign desk	Turning to Mediterranean, NATO faces dissent
381	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Arango, Tim, Hassan, Falih, & Al-Jawoshy, Omar	Foreign desk	Iraqi brother but ISIS enemy: War fractures families and sect
382	6/19	<i>The New York Times</i>	Preston, Julia	National desk	Many what-ifs in Trump plan for migrants
383	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Kessler, Glenn	A-section	Guns, terrorism, hate, immigration: Trump's and Clinton speeches after massacre
384	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Birnbaum, Michael	A-section	In Belgium, charges of attempted terrorism

Table A2. (Continued)

385	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Jordan, Mary & Hauslohner, Abigail	A-section	After Orlando, anxiety fills Muslim congregations
386	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Markon, Jerry	A-section	Amid gun scrutiny, government's growing watch lists are in sharper focus
387	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Nakamura, David	A-section	For the president, there is rarely a convenient time to take a family vacation
388	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Unknown	Unknown	Untitled
389	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Unknown	Unknown	Untitled
390	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Greenwald, Glenn	Outlook	The FBI was correct not to arrest Omar Mateen
391	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Sullivan, Kevin & Wan, William	A-section	The volatile life of Omar Mateen
392	6/19	<i>The Washington Post</i>	Lozada, Carlos	Outlook	Why Islam is, in fact, different

Appendix B. Codebook Used to Analyze Articles Published in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*

Code label: PERPET

Short definition: Background information of the perpetrators

Full definition: Detailed information about the perpetrators from the perspective of different sources.

When to use: Apply this code to all references to the perpetrators offered by news reporters.

This also apply to quotes by people close to the perpetrators.

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to people who were also held responsible for other acts marked as terrorism (OTHERS).

Example: *“Et le pire des scénarios, tant redouté, met en scène des profils « dormants » et sans relief, de petits voyous et d’illuminés en apparence parfaitement insérés. Jamais le spectre glaçant d’un terrorisme dilué dans tous les pores de la société n’a autant pris corps. Ainsi, Samy Amimour, 28 ans, un des trois kamikazes qui a ensanglanté le Bataclan, était-il conducteur de bus à la RATP, dont il a claqué la porte pour partir en Syrie. Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, 29 ans, identifié par l’empreinte d’un doigt retrouvé sectionné dans la salle de spectacle, paraissait quant à lui dans des vidéos amateurs de musique rap”* (Extract # 8).

Translation: “And the worst-case scenario, so dreaded, features “dormant” and featureless profiles, little thugs and illuminated people apparently perfectly inserted. Never has the freezing specter of terrorism diluted in all the pores of society taken so much material. Thus, Samy Amimour, 28, one of the three suicide bombers who bloodied the Bataclan, was a bus driver with

the RATP, whose door he slammed to go to Syria. Ismaël Omar Mostefai, 29, identified by the print of a finger found severed in the auditorium, paraded in amateurs videos of rap music.”

Code label: EMERGENCY

Short definition: Reference to the state of emergency

Full definition: The decision by president to enact and extend the state of emergency

When to use: Use this code when the author refers to past and current uses of this legislation

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to any other legal actions (LAWS or COUNTERTERRORISM).

Example: *“Au-delà du projet de loi prolongeant pour trois mois l'état d'urgence, qui sera soumis mercredi au parlement et " adapt - era - son contenu à l'évolution des technologies et des menaces ", notamment concernant les perquisitions et assignations à résidence, M. Hollande entend " faire évoluer notre Constitution " pour instituer un régime d'" état de crise ", distinct de ceux prévus par l'article 16 et par l'article 36 sur l'état de siège”* (Extract # 132).

Translation: “Beyond the bill extending for three months the state of emergency, which will be submitted to parliament on Wednesday and "will adapt - its content to the evolution of technologies and threats", in particular concerning searches and summons to residence, Mr. Hollande intends to "change our Constitution" to institute a regime of "state of crisis", distinct from those provided for by article 16 and article 36 on the state of siege.”

Code label: OTHERS

Short definition: Comparisons to other acts marked as terrorism

Full definition: Reference to perpetrators of other attacks, even failed attacks, that brings into perspective the significance of the 13 November 2015 attacks

When to use: Use when the articles mention other perpetrators

When not to use: do not use when reference to perpetrators of the Bataclan (PERPET) or to other attacks (COMPARISON)

Example: *“Mais depuis quelques semaines, la stratégie djihadiste a changé. Fin septembre, un Japonais a été tué par des hommes armés au Bangladesh. Quelques jours après, c’était au tour d’un travailleur humanitaire italien de tomber sous les balles de djihadistes au Bangladesh encore. Puis le 30 octobre, un avion civil russe était visé dans le Sinai égyptien causant la mort de ses 224 occupants. Avant l’attentat jeudi dernier dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth (44 morts). Et enfin ceux de Paris, le lendemain soir”* (Extract # 48).

Translation: “But in recent weeks, the jihadist strategy has changed. At the end of September, a Japanese [man] was killed by gunmen in Bangladesh. A few days after, it was the turn of a humanitarian aid worker to fall under the bullets of jihadists in Bangladesh again. Then on 30 October, a Russian civil plane was targeted in the Egyptian Sinai causing the death of its 224 occupants. Before the attack last Thursday in the south *banlieue* of Beirut (44 deaths). And finally those of Paris, the following night.” (emphasis my own).

Code label: BATACLAN

Short definition: Details about the events

Full definition: Sections of articles that discuss details about the massacre at Pulse

When to use: Use when the articles explains what happened the night of the events

When not to use: do not use when describing other events (COMPARISON) or when giving an account from survivors of the events (SURVIVOR)

Example: *“C'est une première en France en matière d'attentat. Plusieurs kamikazes se sont fait exploser, dans la soirée du vendredi 13 novembre, au terme d'assauts meurtriers menés aux abords du Stade de France, à Saint-Denis, et dans cinq lieux à Paris, rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi, rue Bichat, boulevard Voltaire, rue de Charonne et dans la salle de spectacle du Bataclan, après la prise en otage du public. Ces attaques, dites " complexes ", au regard de modus operandi en plusieurs étapes, sont inspirées d'une forme de violence ayant cours depuis plusieurs années dans des zones de conflit telles que l'Afghanistan, l'Irak ou la -Syrie, où règne une forme de violence dont la France se croyait jusqu'alors protégée”* (Extract # 20).

Translation: “This is a first in France in terms of attack. Several suicide bombers blew themselves up on the evening of Friday, November 13, after deadly assaults carried out near the Stade de France, in Saint-Denis, and in five places in Paris, rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi, rue Bichat, boulevard Voltaire, rue de Charonne and in the Bataclan concert hall, after the public was taken hostage. These so-called "complex" attacks, in terms of a modus operandi in several stages, are inspired by a form of violence that has been going on for several years in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, where a form of violence reigns from which France believed itself to be protected until then.”

Code label: CANDIDATE

Short definition: Responses by candidates to the presidential primaries

Full definition: Response to the attacks given by politicians who are running for the primary election in the majority parties and also running to the regional elections

When to use: Use when politicians in France are quoted

When not to use: Do not use when president is quoted (PRESIDENT)

Example: *“Vendredi soir, les principaux ténors du parti Les Républicains (LR) ont exprimé leur soutien au gouvernement ainsi qu'au chef de l'Etat dans cette crise sans équivalent sous la Ve République. " Je soutiens la décision prise ce soir de décréter l'état d'urgence et la fermeture des frontières ", a indiqué Nicolas Sarkozy dans un communiqué peu après l'intervention de François Hollande, ajoutant que " dans ces circonstances tragiques, la solidarité de tous les Français s'impose ". Pour l'ancien président de la République, " les terroristes ont déclaré la guerre à la France. Notre réponse doit exprimer une fermeté et une détermination de chaque instant”* (Extract # 24).

Translation: “Friday evening, the main tenors of the Republicans (LR) party expressed their support for the government as well as for the head of state in this unparalleled crisis under the Fifth Republic. "I support the decision taken this evening to declare a state of emergency and the closure of borders," said Nicolas Sarkozy in a statement shortly after François Hollande's intervention, adding that "in these tragic circumstances, the solidarity of all French are needed ". For the former President of the Republic, "the terrorists have declared war on France. Our response must express firmness and determination at all times”

Code label: PRESIDENT

Short definition: Presidential responses to the events

Full definition: Response to the events given by President Hollande and other presidents of various nation-states

When to use: use when Hollande or others are quoted

When not to use: do not use when other candidates to the primaries and regional elections are quoted

Example: *“A l'Elysée, un conseil des ministres a été convoqué d'urgence, et le président François Hollande décide de prendre très vite la parole. "Au moment où je vous parle, dit-il, la voix un peu altérée par l'émotion, des attaques sont en cours... C'est une horreur. " Puis le chef de l'Etat annonce qu'il vient de décréter " l'état d'urgence " et " la fermeture des frontières ". Avant d'affirmer : " Ce que les terroristes veulent c'est nous faire peur, nous saisir d'effroi. Il y a de quoi avoir peur, sentir de l'effroi. Mais il y a aussi y a une nation qui saura vaincre les terroristes".”* (Extract # 23).

Translation: “At the Elysee Palace, a council of ministers was urgently summoned, and President François Hollande decided to speak very quickly. "As I speak to you," he said, his voice a little altered by emotion, attacks are in progress ... It's a horror." Then the head of state announces that he has just decreed "a state of emergency" and "the closure of borders". Before affirming: "What the terrorists want is to scare us, to seize us with fear. There is something to be afraid of, to feel fear. But there is also a nation that will know how to conquer the terrorists".”

Code label: BORDER

Short definition: Re-establishing border control and references to immigration

Full definition: The different decisions and debates about the necessity to reinforce or re-establish border control within the Schengen Zone

When to use: Use when people in positions of authority like politicians working at the national and international level refer to control at the borders and immigration

When not to use: Do not use when state of emergency is mentioned (EMERGENCY)

Example: *"Paris change tout. " Markus Söder, le ministre des finances de Bavière, a sonné la charge contre la politique accueillante de la chancelière, Angela Merkel. " Une nouvelle ère commence. Le continent doit mieux se protéger de ses ennemis qui ne reculent devant rien. Le temps des migrations non contrôlées et de l'immigration illégale ne peut pas continuer. (...) Il serait bon qu'Angela Merkel reconnaisse que l'ouverture non limitée dans le temps des frontières était une erreur ", explique ce -dirigeant de l'Union chrétienne-sociale en Bavière (CSU) dans l'édition dominicale du quotidien Die Welt" (Extract # 109).*

Translation: *"Paris changes everything." Markus Söder, Bavarian Finance Minister, has sounded the charge against the welcoming policies of Chancellor Angela Merkel." A new era begins. The continent must better protect itself from its enemies who will stop at nothing. The time of uncontrolled migration and illegal immigration cannot continue. (...) It would be good for Angela Merkel to recognize that the unlimited opening of the borders was a mistake ", explains this leader of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) in the Sunday edition from the daily Die Welt."*

Code label: TERRORISM

Short definition: Use of the term terrorism

Full definition: Use of the term terrorism in newspaper articles to explain preventive and assessments of acts marked as terrorism and to report on the perception of terrorism

When to use: Use this code when the term terrorism is used in news

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to the attacks (BATACLAN), other events (COMPARISON), and to deployment of military (ARMY)

Example: *“À ce volet technique de la judiciarisation du renseignement s'ajoute le problème de la correctionnalisation des actes de **terrorisme**. Si elle est plus rapide et moins exigeante qu'une procédure criminelle, elle est de plus en plus dénoncée par les magistrats qui la réprouvent car les peines de prison correspondantes sont limitées à dix ans”* (Extract # 29).

Translation: “In addition to this technique of judicialisation of intelligence, there is the problem of correcting acts of terrorism. If it/she is faster and less exigent than a criminal procedure, it/she is more and more denounced par magistrates who condemn it because corresponding prison sentences are limited to ten years.”

Code label: RELIGION

Short definition: Reference to religion

Full definition: Use when newspaper articles mention religion as a way to mark the identity of the perpetrators

When to use: Use this code when people are quoted to talk about Islam, Christianity, or other religions.

When not to use: N/A

Example: “Après ces attentats, qu'attendez-vous de la communauté musulmane de France?”

[question asked by the reporter]

Je les appelle à une prise de parole forte. Pour expliquer que ces actes odieux n'ont rien à voir avec leur religion, pour condamner les terroristes, combattre la radicalisation et défendre les valeurs républicaines dans lesquelles ils se reconnaissent. Il faut que les autorités religieuses se prononcent, fortement. Elles sont les plus crédibles à le faire. Ce n'est pas les stigmatiser que de le dire” (Extract # 122).

Translation: “After these attacks, what do you expect from the Muslim community in France?”

[question asked by the reporter]

I call on them to speak out loudly. To explain that these heinous acts have nothing to do with their religion, to condemn terrorists, fight radicalization and defend the republican values with which they identify. The religious authorities must speak out, strongly. They are the most credible to do so. Saying so is not stigmatizing them.”

Code label: NATIONALITY

Short definition: Reference to the nation and citizenship

Full definition: References made to the national identity and citizenship in the newspapers

When to use: Use when newspapers refer to the nation or the country or when people quoted make reference to the nation

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to European Union debates about immigration (BORDER)

Example: “*Depuis des années, la République recule face au salafisme et à la radicalisation. Elle doit désormais faire face avec fermeté. Il ne doit pas y avoir de paix en France pour ceux qui méprisent et combattent la France. Nous vaincrons*” (Extract # 27).

Translation: “For years, the Republic advances backwards against Salafism and radicalization. It/She must nowadays face with firmness. There shouldn’t be peace in France for those who despise and fight France. We will vanquish.”

Code label: FIRST

Short definition: Reference to primary definers

Full definition: Account given by experts to the attacks

When to use: Use this code when police officers, hospital staff, among others present during the responses to the attacks explain what happened during the attacks

When not to use: Do not use when description about the shooting (BATACLAN) or other events, or when accounts are given by survivors (SURVIVOR).

Example: “*L’Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris a déclenché, vendredi soir, le " plan blanc ", un dispositif prévu pour les situations sanitaires d’urgence et de crise. Dans la loi depuis 2004, il permet de mettre en place des moyens humains et matériels pour absorber l’afflux de patients ou de victimes. Il avait déjà été lancé pour faire face à des épidémies de grippe et de gastro-entérite*” (Extract # 19).

Translation: “The *Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris* triggered the "white plan" on Friday evening, a device intended for emergency and health crisis situations. In the law since 2004, it

makes it possible to deploy human and material resources to absorb the influx of patients or victims. It had already been launched to deal with epidemics of influenza and gastroenteritis.”

Code label: MEDIA

Short definition: Reference to media

Full definition: Mentions of social media use surrounding the attacks, and mentions or citation of other news media outlets

When to use: Use this code when police officers, hospital staff, among others present during the responses to the attacks explain what happened during the attacks

When not to use: Do not use when description about the shooting (BATACLAN) or other events are made by survivors.

Example: *“Le dispositif est désormais tristement rodé. Dès la propagation sur les réseaux sociaux des informations sur les attentats multiples qui ont secoué Paris, vendredi soir, les rédactions audiovisuelles se sont mises en mode « édition spéciale ». « Nous avons basculé dès 21 h 55. Tous les journalistes de la rédaction se sont mobilisés et la couverture a commencé », commente Hervé Bérout, directeur de l'information de BFMTV” (Extract # 37).*

Translation: “The device is now sadly polished. As soon as the information on the multiple attacks that shook Paris was disseminated on social media Friday evening, the audiovisual editorial staff went into “special edition” mode. “We switched from 9:55 pm. All the journalists in the editorial staff got involved and the coverage started,” comments Hervé Bérout, news director of BFMTV.”

Code label: MILITARY

Short definition: Military deployment

Full definition: Reports from military interventions and deployment

When to use: Use this code when military officers or other government officials explain the actions taken by the military

When not to use: Do not use when newspaper describe and explain the state of emergency (EMERGENCY)

Example: *“Les services français et américains ont notamment annoncé une collaboration renforcée dans la lutte contre Daech. La France déploie cette semaine son porte-avions nucléaire, le Charles-de-Gaulle, en Méditerranée, ce qui doit tripler ses capacités de frappe et de renseignement aérien sur la zone”* (Extract # 83).

Translation: “The French and American services have notably announced a reinforced collaboration in the fight against Daesh. France is deploying its nuclear aircraft carrier, the Charles-de-Gaulle, in the Mediterranean this week, which should triple its strike and air intelligence capabilities in the area.”

Appendix C. Codebook Used to Analyze Articles Published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*

Code label: PERPET

Short definition: Background information of the perpetrator

Full definition: Detailed information about the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, from the perspective of different sources.

When to use: Apply this code to all references to Mateen offered by news reporters. This also apply to quotes by people close to the perpetrator and relatives.

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to people who were also held responsible for other acts marked as terrorism (OTHERS).

Example: “Mr. Mateen, who lived in Fort Pierce, Fla., was able to continue working as a security guard with the security firm G4S, where he had worked since 2007, and he was able to buy guns. The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives said Mr. Mateen had legally bought a long gun and a pistol in the past week or two, though it was not clear whether those were the weapons used in the assault, which officials described as a handgun and an AR-15 type of assault rifle” (Extract # 13).

Code label: OTHERS

Short definition: Comparisons to other acts marked as terrorism

Full definition: Reference to perpetrators of other attacks, even failed attacks, that brings into perspective the significance of the 12 June 2016 shooting

When to use: Use when the articles mention other perpetrators

When not to use: Do not use when reference to perpetrator of the Pulse shooting (PERPET)

Example: “In December when a couple in San Bernardino, Calif., left their home armed with assault rifles, they made sure to post their oath of allegiance on Facebook, where law enforcement agents later found it. And just minutes before he opened fire on a cartoon exhibit featuring images of the Prophet Muhammad in Texas in May 2015, Elton Simpson sent out a series of Twitter messages making clear where his allegiances lay” (Extract # 15).

Code label: PULSE

Short definition: Details about the events

Full definition: Sections of articles that discuss details about the massacre at Pulse

When to use: Use when the article describes what happened the night of the events

When not to use: Do not use when describing other events (OTHERS) or when giving an account from survivors of the events (SURVIVOR)

Example: “For three sickening hours on Sunday morning, a life-or-death game of deception played out in a bathroom where the assailant holed up with hostages after killing dozens of people inside the Pulse nightclub” (Extract # 39)

Code label: SURVIVOR

Short definition: Account from people present at Pulse

Full definition: First-hand experience from people who survived the massacre

When to use: Use when people were quoted for escaping the shooting

When not to use: Do not use when first responders are quoted (FIRST)

Example: ““He's shooting everyone that's already dead on the floor, making sure they're dead," Mr. Colon said. "I look over, and he shoots the girl next to me. And I'm just there laying down and I'm thinking 'I'm next, I'm dead.' So I don't know how, but by the glory of God, he shoots toward my head but it hits my hand, and then he shoots me again and it hits the side of my hip. I had no reaction. I was just prepared to just stay there laying down so he won't know that I'm alive".” (Extract # 72).

Code label: CANDIDATE

Short definition: Responses by elected officials

Full definition: Responses to the shooting by Hillary Trump, Donald Trump, and other elected officials

When to use: Use when elected officials are quoted

When not to use: Do not use when the president of the U.S.A. and those of other nations respond to the acts (PRESIDENT)

Example: “Trump, who advocates putting a temporary ban on Muslims entering this country, saw his poll numbers rise significantly in the wake of the San Bernardino attack, as well as after a series of terrorist assaults in Paris last November.

That may be why presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton struck a purposeful tone in her response to the Orlando mass shooting, although she, like Obama, did not make reference to a specific religion” (Extract # 24).

Code label: PRESIDENT

Short definition: Presidential responses to the events

Full definition: Response given by president Obama and other presidents of nation-states to the shooting

When to use: Use when Obama or others are quoted

When not to use: Do not use when other elected officials to the presidency are quoted

(CANDIDATE)

Example: “Mr. Obama pleaded with Americans during his remarks not to "give in to fear or turn against each other," a somewhat muted reference to Mr. Trump's previous call for a ban on Muslims entering the United States.

"In the face of hate and violence, we will love one another," Mr. Obama said. Rather than giving in to fear, the president said, "we will stand united, as Americans, to protect our people, and defend our nation, and to take action against those who threaten us".” (Extract # 12).

Code label: LAWS

Short definition: Reference to legal actions

Full definition: Suggestions offered by people in positions of authority to change and actually enact laws in response to the shooting, including the use of government watchlists such as no-fly lists, and travel ban

When to use: Use this code when references to legal actions were made visible at the local, national, and international level

When not to use: N/A

Example: “Six months after Republicans in Congress defeated a measure that would have closed the so-called terror gap after the San Bernardino, Calif., attack, Senate Democrats moved swiftly on Monday to renew the debate over tightening federal gun laws.

As a first step, the Democrats demanded that Republicans take up legislation aimed at banning the sale of guns or explosives to people who have appeared on watch lists, or who have been suspected by the Justice Department of ties to terrorist organizations” (Extract # 30).

Code label: TERRORISM

Short definition: Use of the term terrorism

Full definition: Use of the term terrorism in newspaper articles to explain preventive and assessments of acts marked as terrorism and to report on the perception of terrorism

When to use: Use this code when the term terrorism is used in news

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to the attack (PULSE), other events (OTHERS)

Example: “Iowans, they learned in January, were preoccupied with terrorism and the economy; Wisconsinites with education and health-care costs. In April, the nation dissected which candidate had the right “New York values”.” (Extract # 6).

“The deadly attack at an Orlando nightclub early Sunday is raising serious concerns among global security experts and criminologists about a convergence between terrorism and the American phenomenon of mass shootings.” (Extract # 18).

Code label: RELIGION

Short definition: Reference to religion

Full definition: Use when newspaper articles mention religion as a way to mark the identity of the perpetrators

When to use: Use this code when people are quoted to talk about Islam, Christianity, or other religions.

When not to use: N/A

Example: “American Muslim groups condemned the shooting. “The Muslim community joins our fellow Americans in repudiating anyone or any group that would claim to justify or excuse such an appalling act of violence,” said Rasha Mubarak, the Orlando regional coordinator of the Council on American-Islamic Relations” (Extract # 13).

Headline: “Is God punishing us with the 2016 election? Some people are seriously starting to wonder” (Extract # 22).

Code label: NATIONALITY

Short definition: Reference to the nation and citizenship

Full definition: References made to the national identity and citizenship in the newspapers

When to use: Use when newspapers refer to the nation or the country or when people quoted make reference to the nation

When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to call for the enactment of security measures (LAWS)

Example: “He repeatedly stretched the facts, for example, in describing the United States as overrun by dangerous migrants. He claimed the country has an "immigration system which does not permit us to know who we let into our country," brushing aside the entire customs and immigration enforcement infrastructure” (Extract # 42).

Code label: FIRST

Short definition: Reference to first responders

Full definition: Account given by first and second responders to the shooting

When to use: Use this code when police officers, hospital staff, among others present during the responses to the attacks explain what happened during the shooting

When not to use: Do not use when description about the shooting (PULSE) or other events are made by survivors (SURVIVOR)

Example: “Authorities declined to offer details. But a senior U.S. law enforcement official said officers delayed their assault on the gunman because the active-shooter scene turned into a

hostage negotiation once the gunman called 911. For three hours, the gunman was on the phone with police and no shots were fired.

"That is when you do wait," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not an authorized spokesman. "It was appropriate"." (Extract # 20)

-----The End-----